1 00:00:01,240 --> 00:00:03,462 Good afternoon everyone . Thank you for 2 00:00:03,462 --> 00:00:06,040 joining us today for this opportunity 3 00:00:06,040 --> 00:00:08,940 for US Northern Command and US stratcom 4 00:00:08,940 --> 00:00:10,996 to highlight their collaboration and 5 00:00:10,996 --> 00:00:13,273 the strategic importance of the arctic . 6 00:00:13,273 --> 00:00:15,162 Why it's so vital to our nation's 7 00:00:15,162 --> 00:00:17,329 defense and for the continued need for 8 00:00:17,329 --> 00:00:19,662 an integrated deterrence approach today . 9 00:00:19,662 --> 00:00:21,607 We're going to cover the strategic 10 00:00:21,607 --> 00:00:23,829 importance of the arctic , the ally and 11 00:00:23,829 --> 00:00:25,996 partner arctic collaboration to ensure 12 00:00:25,996 --> 00:00:28,107 the safety and security in the region 13 00:00:28,107 --> 00:00:30,051 and are integrated defense posture 14 00:00:30,051 --> 00:00:33,350 briefing today from Alaska are US Air 15 00:00:33,350 --> 00:00:35,780 Force General Glenn D Van Herk . He is 16 00:00:35,780 --> 00:00:37,558 the commander of North american 17 00:00:37,558 --> 00:00:40,270 Aerospace Defense Command or NORAD and 18 00:00:40,270 --> 00:00:42,326 the United States Northern Command . 19 00:00:42,326 --> 00:00:45,170 NORAD conducts aerospace warning , 20 00:00:45,170 --> 00:00:47,730 aerospace control and maritime warning 21 00:00:47,730 --> 00:00:49,841 in the defense of the North America , 22 00:00:49,940 --> 00:00:52,560 US Northern Command conducts homeland 23 00:00:52,560 --> 00:00:54,800 defense , civil support and security 24 00:00:54,800 --> 00:00:56,856 cooperation to defend and secure the 25 00:00:56,856 --> 00:00:58,967 United States and its intercepts . Oh 26 00:00:58,967 --> 00:01:01,022 sorry . And its interests , those of 27 00:01:01,022 --> 00:01:03,189 you who are part of the pentagon press 28 00:01:03,189 --> 00:01:05,411 corps may recognize General Van Herk as 29 00:01:05,411 --> 00:01:07,522 he was previously the Director of the 30 00:01:07,522 --> 00:01:09,689 General of the Joint staff and Admiral 31 00:01:09,689 --> 00:01:11,856 Charles Chaz a richard , the Commander 32 00:01:11,856 --> 00:01:14,400 of US Strategic Command . Us stratcom 33 00:01:14,400 --> 00:01:16,511 is responsible for the global Command 34 00:01:16,511 --> 00:01:18,622 and control of US strategic forces to 35 00:01:18,622 --> 00:01:20,400 meet decisive national security 36 00:01:20,400 --> 00:01:22,670 objectives , providing a broad range of 37 00:01:22,670 --> 00:01:24,837 strategic capabilities and options for 38 00:01:24,837 --> 00:01:26,781 the President and the Secretary of 39 00:01:26,781 --> 00:01:29,003 Defense . I just want to go over just a 40 00:01:29,003 --> 00:01:31,226 few quick ground rules before I turn it 41 00:01:31,226 --> 00:01:33,281 over to our briefers . This is an on 42 00:01:33,281 --> 00:01:35,337 the record session . Um I'd like for 43 00:01:35,337 --> 00:01:37,780 you to please state your name and the 44 00:01:37,780 --> 00:01:40,000 outlet for whom you're reporting . And 45 00:01:40,000 --> 00:01:41,944 then I'm gonna alternate between , 46 00:01:41,944 --> 00:01:44,630 y'all here in the room and folks who 47 00:01:44,630 --> 00:01:46,963 have called in . So with that gentlemen , 48 00:01:46,963 --> 00:01:50,010 I'll hand it over to you . Well , thank 49 00:01:50,010 --> 00:01:52,121 you very much Todd . It's General Van 50 00:01:52,121 --> 00:01:54,343 Herk speaking and good afternoon ladies 51 00:01:54,343 --> 00:01:56,454 and gentlemen , thank you for joining 52 00:01:56,454 --> 00:01:58,788 us here virtually from Anchorage Alaska . 53 00:01:58,788 --> 00:02:00,732 It's great to be here with my good 54 00:02:00,732 --> 00:02:02,566 friend and counterpart combatant 55 00:02:02,566 --> 00:02:04,788 Commander Admiral Charles Richard , the 56 00:02:04,788 --> 00:02:04,590 Commander of the United States 57 00:02:04,590 --> 00:02:06,701 Strategic Command Chaz and I are here 58 00:02:06,701 --> 00:02:08,868 in Alaska participating in a number of 59 00:02:08,868 --> 00:02:11,730 events focused on defense and security 60 00:02:11,730 --> 00:02:13,619 issues with our arctic allies and 61 00:02:13,619 --> 00:02:15,508 partners . And we look forward to 62 00:02:15,508 --> 00:02:17,640 discussing these events and important 63 00:02:17,640 --> 00:02:20,210 issues of the arctic with you as the 64 00:02:20,210 --> 00:02:22,321 Commander of North american Aerospace 65 00:02:22,321 --> 00:02:24,377 Defense Command in the United States 66 00:02:24,377 --> 00:02:26,710 Northern Command Unified Campaign Plan 67 00:02:27,340 --> 00:02:30,120 spells out , I am the designated arctic 68 00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:32,176 advocate for arctic capabilities for 69 00:02:32,176 --> 00:02:34,030 the Department of Defense . I 70 00:02:34,030 --> 00:02:36,252 understand and appreciate the strategic 71 00:02:36,252 --> 00:02:38,260 importance of Alaska and the entire 72 00:02:38,260 --> 00:02:40,610 arctic region as a whole . And being 73 00:02:40,620 --> 00:02:43,880 able to survive and thrive as part of 74 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:46,580 our campaigning in the arctic is 75 00:02:46,580 --> 00:02:48,691 essential to safeguarding our U . S . 76 00:02:48,691 --> 00:02:51,340 Interests and stability in the arctic 77 00:02:51,350 --> 00:02:53,680 and much beyond and defending North 78 00:02:53,680 --> 00:02:55,920 America . It's also part of our 79 00:02:55,960 --> 00:02:58,490 integrated deterrence strategy looking 80 00:02:58,490 --> 00:03:00,712 to the future . It is crucial that like 81 00:03:00,712 --> 00:03:02,934 minded nations work collaboratively and 82 00:03:02,934 --> 00:03:04,712 cooperatively to address shared 83 00:03:04,712 --> 00:03:07,046 challenge and maintain what I would say , 84 00:03:07,046 --> 00:03:09,260 our international rules , laws and 85 00:03:09,260 --> 00:03:11,316 norms that have served us well since 86 00:03:11,316 --> 00:03:14,430 the end of World War two . The greatest 87 00:03:14,440 --> 00:03:16,662 advantage that we have that I've said a 88 00:03:16,662 --> 00:03:18,773 couple of times up here in the forums 89 00:03:18,773 --> 00:03:20,829 that I've talked and I think it's an 90 00:03:20,829 --> 00:03:22,996 asymmetric advantage that we have that 91 00:03:22,996 --> 00:03:24,829 Russia and china don't have is a 92 00:03:24,829 --> 00:03:26,496 network of strong alliances , 93 00:03:26,496 --> 00:03:28,551 partnerships and like minded nations 94 00:03:28,551 --> 00:03:30,718 that have been built on the foundation 95 00:03:30,718 --> 00:03:32,940 of shared values , experience and 96 00:03:32,940 --> 00:03:35,540 vision . We've been operating in Alaska 97 00:03:35,540 --> 00:03:37,707 and the broader arctic with allies and 98 00:03:37,707 --> 00:03:39,873 partners for many decades . Throughout 99 00:03:39,873 --> 00:03:41,984 that time , collaborative events such 100 00:03:41,984 --> 00:03:43,651 as the arctic security forces 101 00:03:43,651 --> 00:03:45,762 roundtable and the arctic symposium . 102 00:03:45,762 --> 00:03:47,929 Both events going on this week here in 103 00:03:47,929 --> 00:03:50,160 Alaska have allowed us the opportunity 104 00:03:50,540 --> 00:03:52,707 as arctic nations to realize the value 105 00:03:52,707 --> 00:03:54,860 of the arctic as a cooperative region 106 00:03:55,240 --> 00:03:57,760 where countries work together to 107 00:03:57,760 --> 00:04:00,093 address shared challenges in the region . 108 00:04:01,040 --> 00:04:03,096 The continued and ongoing work we do 109 00:04:03,096 --> 00:04:05,680 here will be vital to moving forward to 110 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:07,847 develop cooperative solutions not only 111 00:04:07,847 --> 00:04:09,847 in the military domain , but also a 112 00:04:09,847 --> 00:04:12,450 more broader national security as well . 113 00:04:12,790 --> 00:04:14,623 In a time of what I would say is 114 00:04:14,623 --> 00:04:16,730 renewed strategic competition that 115 00:04:16,730 --> 00:04:19,070 begins as having impact here in the 116 00:04:19,070 --> 00:04:21,126 arctic and around the world . One of 117 00:04:21,126 --> 00:04:23,348 the reasons I'm so I'm so pleased to be 118 00:04:23,348 --> 00:04:25,348 here with Admiral Richard is that I 119 00:04:25,348 --> 00:04:27,292 believe the foundation of homeland 120 00:04:27,292 --> 00:04:29,514 defense is the nuclear deterrent . It's 121 00:04:29,514 --> 00:04:31,792 going to remain that way in the future . 122 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:34,390 That said deterrence by punishment Is 123 00:04:34,390 --> 00:04:36,723 one approach and it's vitally important . 124 00:04:37,240 --> 00:04:39,407 But we also have to balance deterrence 125 00:04:39,407 --> 00:04:41,629 by punishment with deterrence by denial 126 00:04:41,629 --> 00:04:44,570 options and integrated deterrence to 127 00:04:44,570 --> 00:04:46,681 create options for a national command 128 00:04:46,681 --> 00:04:48,681 authority and the secretary and the 129 00:04:48,681 --> 00:04:50,903 president below the nuclear threshold . 130 00:04:50,903 --> 00:04:52,959 Responsive options that undermine an 131 00:04:52,959 --> 00:04:55,570 adversary's confidence and that an 132 00:04:55,570 --> 00:04:57,792 attack on our homeland or in the arctic 133 00:04:57,792 --> 00:04:59,514 or through the arctic could be 134 00:04:59,514 --> 00:05:02,240 successful against the United States or 135 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:04,410 our allies and partners . Today's 136 00:05:04,410 --> 00:05:06,243 strategic environment demands an 137 00:05:06,243 --> 00:05:08,390 integrated deterrence approach that 138 00:05:08,390 --> 00:05:10,430 employs all elements of national 139 00:05:10,430 --> 00:05:13,220 influence , leverages alliances and 140 00:05:13,220 --> 00:05:15,387 partnerships and provides leaders with 141 00:05:15,387 --> 00:05:17,276 a wide range of timely deterrence 142 00:05:17,276 --> 00:05:19,230 options . Together through our 143 00:05:19,230 --> 00:05:22,100 coordinated actions . We strengthen our 144 00:05:22,100 --> 00:05:24,740 collective deterrence capabilities . To 145 00:05:24,740 --> 00:05:27,180 use a sports analogy . I like to do 146 00:05:27,180 --> 00:05:29,640 that for operating in the arctic . We 147 00:05:29,640 --> 00:05:32,900 have to be on the field . Uh we still 148 00:05:32,900 --> 00:05:34,900 have some work to do there . We all 149 00:05:34,900 --> 00:05:37,067 have skin in the game when it comes to 150 00:05:37,067 --> 00:05:38,956 countering competitor competitive 151 00:05:38,956 --> 00:05:41,280 competitor efforts uh that challenged 152 00:05:41,280 --> 00:05:43,502 longtime established international laws 153 00:05:43,502 --> 00:05:45,720 norms and rules in the High North . So 154 00:05:45,720 --> 00:05:47,887 all of the nations represented here in 155 00:05:47,887 --> 00:05:49,998 Alaska this week have been doing much 156 00:05:49,998 --> 00:05:52,690 to bolster the goal of an arctic region 157 00:05:52,770 --> 00:05:55,110 that is safe , prosperous , secure and 158 00:05:55,110 --> 00:05:57,690 stable NORAD and US North com will 159 00:05:57,690 --> 00:05:59,746 continue to work with our allies and 160 00:05:59,746 --> 00:06:01,857 partners to bolster arctic security , 161 00:06:02,340 --> 00:06:04,007 the stability and maintain an 162 00:06:04,007 --> 00:06:05,896 international rules based order . 163 00:06:05,896 --> 00:06:08,062 Admiral Richard and his team , the U . 164 00:06:08,062 --> 00:06:10,173 S . Strategic command team . Our core 165 00:06:10,173 --> 00:06:12,396 components of the department's strategy 166 00:06:12,396 --> 00:06:14,507 are integrated deterrence strategy as 167 00:06:14,507 --> 00:06:16,673 well , not only here in the arctic but 168 00:06:16,673 --> 00:06:18,784 abroad and around the globe . And I'm 169 00:06:18,784 --> 00:06:21,007 happy to have him here with me for this 170 00:06:21,007 --> 00:06:20,910 very important discussion . And I look 171 00:06:20,910 --> 00:06:23,021 forward to your questions and now I'm 172 00:06:23,021 --> 00:06:25,243 gonna turn it over to Admiral Richard . 173 00:06:25,243 --> 00:06:27,243 So thank you Glenn , good afternoon 174 00:06:27,243 --> 00:06:29,521 everyone and I thank you for your time . 175 00:06:29,540 --> 00:06:31,651 So General Van Herk and I Glenn and I 176 00:06:31,651 --> 00:06:34,240 are speaking to you today because we 177 00:06:34,240 --> 00:06:36,940 both see the arctic as a key strategic 178 00:06:36,940 --> 00:06:39,310 region and we know how valuable it is 179 00:06:39,310 --> 00:06:43,140 to us and to our arctic allies . North 180 00:06:43,140 --> 00:06:45,930 com NORAD . North com is the diodes 181 00:06:45,940 --> 00:06:48,630 arctic advocate . But I what I would 182 00:06:48,630 --> 00:06:50,908 want you to know is they are not alone . 183 00:06:51,140 --> 00:06:54,390 Us forces including my strategic forces 184 00:06:54,630 --> 00:06:57,900 routinely operate in this region as do 185 00:06:57,900 --> 00:07:00,850 our arctic allies . This is important . 186 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:03,462 It's important as Lynn was referring to 187 00:07:03,462 --> 00:07:05,630 for us to be on the field because 188 00:07:05,630 --> 00:07:07,574 strategic threats emanate from the 189 00:07:07,574 --> 00:07:09,960 arctic and the evolving threats require 190 00:07:09,960 --> 00:07:12,510 continuing attention . You need to look 191 00:07:12,510 --> 00:07:14,566 no further than Russia strengthening 192 00:07:14,566 --> 00:07:16,880 its forces in the arctic . The PRC's 193 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:19,080 polar silk road for example which 194 00:07:19,080 --> 00:07:21,191 declared article as a china as a near 195 00:07:21,191 --> 00:07:23,191 arctic state . As an example of the 196 00:07:23,191 --> 00:07:25,024 things that we need to address . 197 00:07:25,540 --> 00:07:26,984 Strategic deterrence . My 198 00:07:26,984 --> 00:07:29,760 responsibility is the foundation of our 199 00:07:29,760 --> 00:07:31,927 national defense policy and integrated 200 00:07:31,927 --> 00:07:34,280 deterrence . It enables every U . S . 201 00:07:34,280 --> 00:07:36,280 Military operation around the world 202 00:07:36,280 --> 00:07:38,502 including in the arctic . But I want to 203 00:07:38,502 --> 00:07:40,750 echo what General Van Herk just said 204 00:07:40,760 --> 00:07:43,030 and that that alone is not enough . 205 00:07:43,030 --> 00:07:45,960 It's just the Foundation . Uh and uh 206 00:07:45,970 --> 00:07:48,800 Glenn then picks up and takes the rest 207 00:07:48,800 --> 00:07:51,430 of the responsibility of defending 208 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:54,460 north America as well as our arctic 209 00:07:54,460 --> 00:07:56,520 interests . And I would echo what he 210 00:07:56,520 --> 00:07:59,360 had to say about deterrence by denial 211 00:07:59,650 --> 00:08:01,650 in addition to having the strategic 212 00:08:01,650 --> 00:08:03,706 deterrent foundation . And I'd offer 213 00:08:03,706 --> 00:08:05,817 the fact that we're just sitting here 214 00:08:05,817 --> 00:08:07,872 together as an example of integrated 215 00:08:07,872 --> 00:08:09,983 deterrents in action . That's why I'm 216 00:08:09,983 --> 00:08:12,039 here . That's why our forces operate 217 00:08:12,039 --> 00:08:14,206 here and why we will remain here . The 218 00:08:14,206 --> 00:08:16,372 US is an arctic nation were not merely 219 00:08:16,372 --> 00:08:18,483 near the arctic , but it's really not 220 00:08:18,483 --> 00:08:20,706 just about the US . I want to emphasize 221 00:08:20,706 --> 00:08:22,761 the stable rules based international 222 00:08:22,761 --> 00:08:24,483 order in the arctic as well as 223 00:08:24,483 --> 00:08:26,706 elsewhere that Glenn was just referring 224 00:08:26,706 --> 00:08:28,594 to because it benefits the United 225 00:08:28,594 --> 00:08:30,372 States , it benefits all arctic 226 00:08:30,372 --> 00:08:32,600 community nations . It is what's best 227 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:35,610 for stability , security and overall 228 00:08:35,610 --> 00:08:38,120 well being . I also echo General Van 229 00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:40,064 hurt sentiment that our allies and 230 00:08:40,064 --> 00:08:42,064 partners are the greatest strategic 231 00:08:42,064 --> 00:08:44,130 advantage . And we are . There's in 232 00:08:44,130 --> 00:08:45,963 that in the arctic and that this 233 00:08:45,963 --> 00:08:48,130 symposium is a great example of that . 234 00:08:48,230 --> 00:08:50,452 I'm grateful for the work being done to 235 00:08:50,452 --> 00:08:52,730 continually strengthen arctic security . 236 00:08:52,730 --> 00:08:54,452 And I too look forward to your 237 00:08:54,452 --> 00:08:57,890 questions over to take some questions 238 00:08:57,890 --> 00:08:59,946 from the press , those of you in the 239 00:08:59,946 --> 00:09:03,560 room . Yes , ma'am . Thanks doc 240 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,351 General Admiral . It's carla bad with 241 00:09:06,351 --> 00:09:08,500 voice of America . Um first I want to 242 00:09:08,510 --> 00:09:10,870 kind of talk to you about uh since you 243 00:09:10,870 --> 00:09:13,092 want to talk about the arctic , how far 244 00:09:13,092 --> 00:09:15,360 behind are we in the arctic ? There's 245 00:09:15,360 --> 00:09:17,890 been reports about how china and how 246 00:09:17,890 --> 00:09:19,779 Russia have been increasing their 247 00:09:19,779 --> 00:09:22,650 presence . The vast majority of the the 248 00:09:22,650 --> 00:09:24,706 icebreakers that they have their far 249 00:09:24,706 --> 00:09:27,250 exceed our numbers . Can you , can you 250 00:09:27,340 --> 00:09:29,396 put it into perspective for us a few 251 00:09:29,396 --> 00:09:31,396 years ago ? Uh missile defense ? We 252 00:09:31,396 --> 00:09:33,580 were told about how far behind we were 253 00:09:33,580 --> 00:09:35,691 in modernization on missile defense . 254 00:09:35,691 --> 00:09:37,858 Can you do the same thing now with the 255 00:09:37,858 --> 00:09:39,969 arctic ? How far behind are we in the 256 00:09:39,969 --> 00:09:41,969 arctic ? And then I have a follow . 257 00:09:42,240 --> 00:09:44,518 Thanks Carlo . I'll take that question . 258 00:09:44,518 --> 00:09:46,407 It's a general Van Herk first , I 259 00:09:46,407 --> 00:09:48,440 appreciate that question . So how I 260 00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:50,662 would approach that is when you look at 261 00:09:50,662 --> 00:09:52,884 edit unilaterally and you say , how far 262 00:09:52,884 --> 00:09:55,060 are we behind ? Well , certainly with 263 00:09:55,060 --> 00:09:57,330 our two current icebreakers in Russia's 264 00:09:57,330 --> 00:10:00,600 55 plus icebreakers , it appears that 265 00:10:00,600 --> 00:10:02,880 we're dramatically behind . But when 266 00:10:02,880 --> 00:10:04,840 you fuse together that network of 267 00:10:04,840 --> 00:10:06,396 allies and partners and the 268 00:10:06,396 --> 00:10:08,980 capabilities that they bring , We're 269 00:10:08,980 --> 00:10:11,400 not that far significantly behind 270 00:10:11,420 --> 00:10:14,310 Russia . We do have work to do work to 271 00:10:14,310 --> 00:10:16,366 do such as additional communications 272 00:10:16,366 --> 00:10:19,110 capability above 65 north to give us 273 00:10:19,110 --> 00:10:21,277 the ability to command and control . I 274 00:10:21,277 --> 00:10:23,499 would point out that those capabilities 275 00:10:23,499 --> 00:10:25,499 not only benefit us in the military 276 00:10:25,499 --> 00:10:27,666 dimension , but they benefit the local 277 00:10:27,666 --> 00:10:29,554 indigenous population communities 278 00:10:29,554 --> 00:10:31,666 around the globe . I made the analogy 279 00:10:31,666 --> 00:10:33,443 of being on the field . We need 280 00:10:33,443 --> 00:10:35,499 persistence to operate in the arctic 281 00:10:35,499 --> 00:10:37,554 and that requires fuel further north 282 00:10:37,554 --> 00:10:39,499 than Dutch harbor Alaska . So that 283 00:10:39,499 --> 00:10:41,554 vessels from the Coast Guard and the 284 00:10:41,554 --> 00:10:43,230 navy can continue to operate 285 00:10:43,240 --> 00:10:44,740 persistently . And we need 286 00:10:44,740 --> 00:10:47,000 infrastructure uh in the in the arctic 287 00:10:47,010 --> 00:10:48,870 Russia has developed significant 288 00:10:48,870 --> 00:10:50,814 infrastructure infrastructure that 289 00:10:50,814 --> 00:10:53,260 candidly was dilapidated after the Cold 290 00:10:53,260 --> 00:10:55,482 War . They have invested back into that 291 00:10:55,482 --> 00:10:57,649 and we need to do the same . I've been 292 00:10:57,649 --> 00:10:59,760 working with Canada in my Nor red hat 293 00:10:59,760 --> 00:11:01,871 in their budgeting process as well to 294 00:11:01,871 --> 00:11:04,149 give us some additional infrastructure . 295 00:11:04,149 --> 00:11:06,316 Why that's important is to campaign uh 296 00:11:06,316 --> 00:11:08,538 and be on that field . You have to have 297 00:11:08,538 --> 00:11:10,427 places to operate from in the air 298 00:11:10,427 --> 00:11:12,260 domain in the C . Domain and the 299 00:11:12,260 --> 00:11:14,038 undersea domain . And those are 300 00:11:14,038 --> 00:11:16,038 critical to make that happen . So I 301 00:11:16,038 --> 00:11:18,371 wouldn't say we're significantly behind . 302 00:11:18,371 --> 00:11:20,427 When you look at it from a an allies 303 00:11:20,427 --> 00:11:22,593 and partners perspective , if you look 304 00:11:22,593 --> 00:11:22,530 at it from an individual unilateral 305 00:11:22,530 --> 00:11:26,100 perspective we have work to do . And 306 00:11:26,100 --> 00:11:28,156 then also I wanted to ask a question 307 00:11:28,156 --> 00:11:30,044 about the ground based mid course 308 00:11:30,044 --> 00:11:31,989 defense system . A PS the american 309 00:11:31,989 --> 00:11:34,240 physical society had released a report 310 00:11:34,240 --> 00:11:36,790 just a few weeks ago saying that the 311 00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:38,967 ground based mid course defense system 312 00:11:38,967 --> 00:11:41,380 is unreliable , vulnerable to counter 313 00:11:41,380 --> 00:11:43,102 measures its effectiveness and 314 00:11:43,102 --> 00:11:45,780 battlefield like situations is likely 315 00:11:45,780 --> 00:11:49,180 low . It concludes that G . M . D . Is 316 00:11:49,180 --> 00:11:51,440 not expected to provide a robust , 317 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:53,496 reliable defense against more than a 318 00:11:53,496 --> 00:11:56,290 very simple attack from an I . C . B . 319 00:11:56,290 --> 00:12:00,120 M . And they basically slammed the 320 00:12:00,130 --> 00:12:03,450 pace of testing the amount of 321 00:12:03,450 --> 00:12:05,800 interceptor hits is a success . They 322 00:12:05,810 --> 00:12:07,977 point out that only 10 hits out of the 323 00:12:07,977 --> 00:12:10,143 19 tests have been successful over the 324 00:12:10,143 --> 00:12:12,520 last 20 years . Um So my question to 325 00:12:12,520 --> 00:12:15,880 you is how effective do you think the 326 00:12:15,890 --> 00:12:18,057 ground based mid course defense system 327 00:12:18,057 --> 00:12:20,057 of the United States is right now ? 328 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:23,607 Thanks Carla . First I have confidence 329 00:12:23,607 --> 00:12:25,662 in my ability to defend our homeland 330 00:12:25,662 --> 00:12:28,100 from a rogue states such as Dprk North 331 00:12:28,100 --> 00:12:30,850 Korea with the current system . 332 00:12:31,540 --> 00:12:34,070 Yesterday or actually on it was 333 00:12:34,070 --> 00:12:37,020 yesterday I had the privilege of going 334 00:12:37,020 --> 00:12:39,020 up to clear Alaska to see our early 335 00:12:39,020 --> 00:12:41,320 warning radar capabilities and the long 336 00:12:41,320 --> 00:12:43,264 range discriminating radar and the 337 00:12:43,264 --> 00:12:46,060 capabilities that it will bring to us 338 00:12:46,440 --> 00:12:48,551 to defend against future capabilities 339 00:12:48,551 --> 00:12:51,090 such as decoys and deception tactics 340 00:12:51,090 --> 00:12:53,490 that could be incorporated . What 341 00:12:53,490 --> 00:12:55,546 you're talking about is really about 342 00:12:55,546 --> 00:12:58,260 capability and also capacity . I would 343 00:12:58,260 --> 00:13:00,790 point out to you that I'm not tasked to 344 00:13:00,790 --> 00:13:03,340 defend against china and Russia for 345 00:13:03,340 --> 00:13:05,507 ballistic missiles in I C . B . M , my 346 00:13:05,507 --> 00:13:07,729 counterpart is sitting right next to me 347 00:13:07,729 --> 00:13:09,173 that is his real role and 348 00:13:09,173 --> 00:13:11,062 responsibility and we rely on the 349 00:13:11,062 --> 00:13:13,173 strategic deterrent to do that . I am 350 00:13:13,173 --> 00:13:15,118 tasked from a ground based missile 351 00:13:15,118 --> 00:13:17,173 defense perspective to go after that 352 00:13:17,173 --> 00:13:19,396 rogue nation in a limited attack On our 353 00:13:19,396 --> 00:13:21,284 Homeland in North America and I'm 354 00:13:21,284 --> 00:13:23,618 comfortable doing that as we go forward . 355 00:13:23,640 --> 00:13:25,307 They will continue to develop 356 00:13:25,307 --> 00:13:27,473 additional capacity and capability and 357 00:13:27,473 --> 00:13:29,529 that's why it's crucial to field the 358 00:13:29,529 --> 00:13:31,696 next generation interceptor on time in 359 00:13:31,696 --> 00:13:33,918 28 or sooner . And to continue with the 360 00:13:33,918 --> 00:13:35,973 service life extension program which 361 00:13:35,973 --> 00:13:38,084 gives me additional reliance uh , and 362 00:13:38,084 --> 00:13:39,973 and resilience in the system with 363 00:13:39,973 --> 00:13:42,280 regards to your cyber comment , I am 364 00:13:42,280 --> 00:13:44,280 comfortable where we are and I have 365 00:13:44,280 --> 00:13:46,169 asked the same questions , I have 366 00:13:46,169 --> 00:13:48,058 crawled down in the holes at Fort 367 00:13:48,058 --> 00:13:50,224 Greely Alaska and asked those kinds of 368 00:13:50,224 --> 00:13:52,224 questions . I flew over Fort Greely 369 00:13:52,224 --> 00:13:54,224 yesterday to take a look at missile 370 00:13:54,224 --> 00:13:56,390 field Four , the questions I ask is 371 00:13:56,390 --> 00:13:58,840 about how confident are we in our 372 00:13:58,840 --> 00:14:01,840 ability to defend and to understand our 373 00:14:01,840 --> 00:14:03,951 cyber vulnerabilities . We go through 374 00:14:03,951 --> 00:14:06,630 routine testing and practices to ensure 375 00:14:06,630 --> 00:14:10,570 that our our systems are currently uh 376 00:14:10,580 --> 00:14:12,660 free of malign activities . So I'm 377 00:14:12,660 --> 00:14:14,716 comfortable with that carla , I hope 378 00:14:14,716 --> 00:14:16,327 that answers your question . 379 00:14:19,140 --> 00:14:22,140 Yeah . Again , it points out only 10 380 00:14:22,140 --> 00:14:23,807 hits of the 19 hits have been 381 00:14:23,807 --> 00:14:27,310 successful . Um What would you say to 382 00:14:27,310 --> 00:14:29,477 counter that has has the military been 383 00:14:29,477 --> 00:14:31,570 getting better as the hits have ? As 384 00:14:31,570 --> 00:14:33,980 you get more practice ? Is it fair to 385 00:14:33,980 --> 00:14:36,520 just sum up the missile defense program 386 00:14:36,520 --> 00:14:39,160 with 10 successful hits out of 19 hits . 387 00:14:39,160 --> 00:14:41,327 Can you talk about that a little bit I 388 00:14:41,327 --> 00:14:43,216 will talk about that a little bit 389 00:14:43,216 --> 00:14:45,327 Carlos . So I would actually say that 390 00:14:45,327 --> 00:14:48,400 that shooting down a BB in space coming 391 00:14:48,400 --> 00:14:51,630 at you with another BB going into space 392 00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:54,000 is a significant challenge . And so 393 00:14:54,000 --> 00:14:56,660 that if you do that 50% of the time . 394 00:14:57,140 --> 00:15:00,210 That's pretty good when you combine 395 00:15:00,210 --> 00:15:02,310 your shot doctrine which may involve 396 00:15:02,310 --> 00:15:05,360 more than a single missile going after 397 00:15:05,360 --> 00:15:07,550 a single threat . We are dramatically 398 00:15:07,550 --> 00:15:10,530 able to increase our confidence and 399 00:15:10,530 --> 00:15:12,697 bringing down threats to North America 400 00:15:12,697 --> 00:15:14,863 and our homeland . I'm not going to go 401 00:15:14,863 --> 00:15:16,974 into details about shot doctrine . It 402 00:15:16,974 --> 00:15:19,220 factors in reliance capability of the 403 00:15:19,220 --> 00:15:21,387 missiles . But let's just say I'm very 404 00:15:21,387 --> 00:15:23,600 comfortable with our ability to shoot 405 00:15:23,600 --> 00:15:26,050 down a limited attack on our homeland 406 00:15:26,050 --> 00:15:28,570 from the North korean or any other 407 00:15:28,570 --> 00:15:32,560 rogue state at this time . Let's 408 00:15:32,560 --> 00:15:34,782 go to the phones real quickly . Um lita 409 00:15:36,440 --> 00:15:39,620 Hi Lolita , Baldor with . Ap thanks to 410 00:15:39,620 --> 00:15:41,731 both of you for doing this . I wanted 411 00:15:41,731 --> 00:15:44,680 to follow up on us capabilities in the 412 00:15:44,690 --> 00:15:47,200 arctic . Um you talked about some of 413 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:49,280 the areas including the ice breakers 414 00:15:49,290 --> 00:15:52,060 which have long been a major complaint 415 00:15:52,060 --> 00:15:54,430 of the military that that that that the 416 00:15:54,430 --> 00:15:57,290 U . S . Doesn't have as many um 417 00:15:57,300 --> 00:16:00,520 icebreakers as it needs . Can you talk 418 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:02,742 a little bit about looking ahead to the 419 00:16:02,742 --> 00:16:04,853 future ? What are your priorities and 420 00:16:04,853 --> 00:16:07,140 how soon do you think you will be able 421 00:16:07,140 --> 00:16:11,040 to address some of what many consider 422 00:16:11,050 --> 00:16:12,820 serious shortfalls such as the 423 00:16:12,820 --> 00:16:16,750 icebreakers , the fuel and the other um 424 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:18,649 facilities that are needed in the 425 00:16:18,649 --> 00:16:20,816 arctic . How many years out are you do 426 00:16:20,816 --> 00:16:23,038 you believe from starting to solve some 427 00:16:23,038 --> 00:16:25,038 of these problems And then I have a 428 00:16:25,038 --> 00:16:28,730 second I have a follow up thanks leader . 429 00:16:28,730 --> 00:16:30,897 So first I would tell you that I think 430 00:16:30,897 --> 00:16:32,619 we can solve many of these the 431 00:16:32,619 --> 00:16:34,786 challenges that we're faced with today 432 00:16:34,786 --> 00:16:37,119 in the near term in months to two years . 433 00:16:37,119 --> 00:16:39,174 Okay . Some of those are ensuring we 434 00:16:39,174 --> 00:16:41,230 have forces that are dedicated to an 435 00:16:41,230 --> 00:16:43,710 arctic mission that are available to me 436 00:16:43,720 --> 00:16:45,770 on a day to day basis or at least 437 00:16:45,770 --> 00:16:47,850 episodically to operate in the 438 00:16:47,850 --> 00:16:49,961 stressful environment of the arctic . 439 00:16:49,961 --> 00:16:51,961 Those are easy things to do for the 440 00:16:51,961 --> 00:16:54,017 services to dedicate , to organize , 441 00:16:54,017 --> 00:16:56,240 train and equip specific forces . What 442 00:16:56,240 --> 00:16:58,462 you're talking about for infrastructure 443 00:16:58,462 --> 00:17:00,770 and additional capabilities will take a 444 00:17:00,770 --> 00:17:04,130 little bit longer . I would say the 445 00:17:04,130 --> 00:17:06,650 icebreaker piece will be begin to be 446 00:17:06,650 --> 00:17:09,490 solved in 24 as the Coast Guard fields 447 00:17:09,490 --> 00:17:11,601 their first icebreaker and they field 448 00:17:11,601 --> 00:17:13,657 six over the next several years . So 449 00:17:13,657 --> 00:17:16,340 let's just say 2 to 2 to 56 year time 450 00:17:16,340 --> 00:17:18,340 frame is what I would expect to see 451 00:17:18,340 --> 00:17:20,173 there on the ice breakers . With 452 00:17:20,173 --> 00:17:22,229 regards to infrastructure . That's a 453 00:17:22,229 --> 00:17:23,729 great question . Uh , that 454 00:17:23,729 --> 00:17:25,770 infrastructure is not funded . I'm 455 00:17:25,770 --> 00:17:27,760 encouraged with where we're going 456 00:17:27,940 --> 00:17:29,662 infrastructure to operate from 457 00:17:29,662 --> 00:17:31,850 airfields and provide base operating 458 00:17:31,850 --> 00:17:34,500 support as forces leave , for example , 459 00:17:34,500 --> 00:17:36,722 to maybe go to the Yukon or Indo pak ka 460 00:17:36,722 --> 00:17:39,660 mayo are we have to to identify train 461 00:17:39,660 --> 00:17:42,110 and equip dedicated forces that roll in 462 00:17:42,110 --> 00:17:44,480 and allow me to defend the strategic 463 00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:46,700 nature of Alaska and what's here and 464 00:17:46,700 --> 00:17:49,330 across the arctic . And so you know 465 00:17:49,330 --> 00:17:51,497 that that being not funded . It's hard 466 00:17:51,497 --> 00:17:53,663 for me to give you an example if it is 467 00:17:53,663 --> 00:17:55,830 funded , I'm , I'm confident we'll see 468 00:17:55,830 --> 00:17:57,997 Canada step up and fund more this year 469 00:17:57,997 --> 00:18:00,163 And I hope to see more in our budget . 470 00:18:00,163 --> 00:18:02,386 I would expect across the fit up we can 471 00:18:02,386 --> 00:18:04,552 address many of those issues so in the 472 00:18:04,552 --> 00:18:06,719 next 4 to 5 years but I can't give you 473 00:18:06,719 --> 00:18:08,997 a specific date . Lita Great thank you . 474 00:18:08,997 --> 00:18:10,997 And and again as just a brief quick 475 00:18:10,997 --> 00:18:12,997 follow up on a slightly unconnected 476 00:18:12,997 --> 00:18:16,360 issue um can you give us any insight 477 00:18:16,370 --> 00:18:18,830 into any D . O . D . Contribution for 478 00:18:18,830 --> 00:18:22,340 the expected government response when 479 00:18:22,350 --> 00:18:25,170 Title 42 is lifted later this month . 480 00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:29,350 Thank you very much . So I don't have a 481 00:18:29,350 --> 00:18:31,517 specific tasking . There's planning on 482 00:18:31,517 --> 00:18:33,739 going right now . What I expect my task 483 00:18:33,739 --> 00:18:35,906 will be to be is to provide contracted 484 00:18:35,906 --> 00:18:38,270 support in the form of transportation 485 00:18:38,640 --> 00:18:41,920 uh and medical primarily and 486 00:18:41,920 --> 00:18:44,087 facilities . The department is looking 487 00:18:44,087 --> 00:18:46,300 at facilities in support of homeland 488 00:18:46,300 --> 00:18:49,140 security and other agencies across the 489 00:18:49,140 --> 00:18:51,196 government . I do not expect a large 490 00:18:51,196 --> 00:18:53,360 number of D . O . D . Title 10 forces 491 00:18:53,370 --> 00:18:55,320 to increase . We will contract the 492 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:59,260 majority of that force out quickly . 493 00:18:59,270 --> 00:19:01,437 Um What we're here to talk about today 494 00:19:01,437 --> 00:19:03,492 which is the strategic importance of 495 00:19:03,492 --> 00:19:05,437 the arctic um the ally and partner 496 00:19:05,437 --> 00:19:07,381 arctic collaboration to ensure the 497 00:19:07,381 --> 00:19:09,492 safety and security of the region and 498 00:19:09,492 --> 00:19:11,714 integrated deterrence . We're gonna try 499 00:19:11,714 --> 00:19:13,937 to keep our questions focused on arctic 500 00:19:13,937 --> 00:19:15,992 issues . We'll go back to the room . 501 00:19:15,992 --> 00:19:18,050 Yes sir brief question logo erratic 502 00:19:18,060 --> 00:19:20,520 from Newsmax . Um Is the administration 503 00:19:20,590 --> 00:19:22,701 budgeting enough in the fiscal year ? 504 00:19:22,701 --> 00:19:25,490 2023 From what you've seen for arctic 505 00:19:25,490 --> 00:19:27,712 defense or would there be anything else 506 00:19:27,712 --> 00:19:29,934 that you would need in order to bolster 507 00:19:29,934 --> 00:19:33,330 those capabilities ? Well , it's hard 508 00:19:33,330 --> 00:19:35,441 to say we're not getting enough money 509 00:19:35,441 --> 00:19:37,608 when you look at a $778 billion dollar 510 00:19:37,608 --> 00:19:39,774 budget but but I would tell you I have 511 00:19:39,774 --> 00:19:41,886 capability gaps and shortfalls . It's 512 00:19:41,886 --> 00:19:44,219 the infrastructure that we talked about . 513 00:19:44,219 --> 00:19:46,386 It's the communications were currently 514 00:19:46,386 --> 00:19:48,820 undergoing testing with a couple of 515 00:19:48,820 --> 00:19:51,042 companies , one Web and the Starlink as 516 00:19:51,042 --> 00:19:53,264 well for some additional communications 517 00:19:53,264 --> 00:19:55,598 capabilities in the arctic at this time . 518 00:19:56,040 --> 00:19:58,330 And so I would say those are some of 519 00:19:58,330 --> 00:20:01,110 the gaps that we see what what I'm 520 00:20:01,110 --> 00:20:03,277 talking about I don't think requires a 521 00:20:03,277 --> 00:20:05,166 dramatic increase in funding . It 522 00:20:05,166 --> 00:20:07,332 requires prioritization within some of 523 00:20:07,332 --> 00:20:09,166 the funding that we have and the 524 00:20:09,166 --> 00:20:10,999 potential for additional funding 525 00:20:10,999 --> 00:20:12,940 applied to the arctic and to the 526 00:20:12,940 --> 00:20:16,520 homeland defense equities . Thank you 527 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:19,120 very much . Yes sir . Thank you john 528 00:20:19,120 --> 00:20:22,130 harper with you , can you discuss in a 529 00:20:22,130 --> 00:20:24,440 little bit more detail the testing 530 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:25,996 you're doing with these new 531 00:20:25,996 --> 00:20:28,218 communication capabilities with the two 532 00:20:28,218 --> 00:20:30,550 companies that you mentioned ? Sure . 533 00:20:31,140 --> 00:20:33,251 Right now , as you know , Starlink in 534 00:20:33,251 --> 00:20:36,210 one Web have fielded uh satellite 535 00:20:36,210 --> 00:20:38,710 constellations in low earth orbit to 536 00:20:38,710 --> 00:20:40,821 provide data and voice communications 537 00:20:40,821 --> 00:20:43,100 capabilities . The department has been 538 00:20:43,100 --> 00:20:45,220 gracious enough to give us funding to 539 00:20:45,220 --> 00:20:48,120 provide terminals . We have some 540 00:20:48,120 --> 00:20:50,950 terminals in locations in the arctic 541 00:20:51,540 --> 00:20:54,950 that we're currently evaluating their 542 00:20:54,950 --> 00:20:57,420 their viability and their capability to 543 00:20:57,420 --> 00:20:59,642 provide the command and control that we 544 00:20:59,642 --> 00:21:01,531 need from a tactical level in the 545 00:21:01,531 --> 00:21:03,642 arctic for ongoing operations all the 546 00:21:03,642 --> 00:21:05,809 way to the strategic level . I'm gonna 547 00:21:05,809 --> 00:21:07,864 go visit one of those companies when 548 00:21:07,864 --> 00:21:10,280 we're done here today uh and take a 549 00:21:10,280 --> 00:21:13,210 look at the what they offer for us to 550 00:21:13,210 --> 00:21:15,990 do and the capabilities and how much 551 00:21:15,990 --> 00:21:18,212 they're moving forward . I look forward 552 00:21:18,212 --> 00:21:20,101 to continuing to partner with the 553 00:21:20,101 --> 00:21:22,046 department throughout this test to 554 00:21:22,046 --> 00:21:24,379 increase our communication capabilities . 555 00:21:24,379 --> 00:21:27,140 And um just a quick follow up , what's 556 00:21:27,140 --> 00:21:29,362 kind of the time frame for this testing 557 00:21:29,362 --> 00:21:31,584 and then what would the next step be in 558 00:21:31,584 --> 00:21:33,820 terms of pursuing or acquiring those 559 00:21:33,820 --> 00:21:37,080 capabilities or services ? Yes , so I 560 00:21:37,080 --> 00:21:39,820 think we'll be done in uh you know , 561 00:21:39,830 --> 00:21:41,997 we're certainly with inside the year . 562 00:21:41,997 --> 00:21:44,219 The next step is to provide terminals . 563 00:21:44,219 --> 00:21:46,070 Uh We're through the services to 564 00:21:46,070 --> 00:21:48,360 integrate terminals on capabilities , 565 00:21:48,360 --> 00:21:50,840 platforms and capabilities and also 566 00:21:50,840 --> 00:21:53,540 within uh you know , communication 567 00:21:53,540 --> 00:21:55,318 nodes such as command posts and 568 00:21:55,318 --> 00:21:57,660 operation centers to allow us to share 569 00:21:57,660 --> 00:21:59,850 data and information and also with our 570 00:21:59,850 --> 00:22:03,030 allies and partners . Thank you . And 571 00:22:03,040 --> 00:22:04,929 Admiral , do you have any similar 572 00:22:04,929 --> 00:22:06,818 communication challenges for your 573 00:22:06,818 --> 00:22:08,762 forces operating at those northern 574 00:22:08,762 --> 00:22:10,818 latitudes in the arctic . And do you 575 00:22:10,818 --> 00:22:12,818 have any plans for , you know , any 576 00:22:12,818 --> 00:22:14,929 sort of similar initiatives along the 577 00:22:14,929 --> 00:22:16,873 lines of what General Van Herk was 578 00:22:16,873 --> 00:22:19,370 discussing , What I'll offer is that my 579 00:22:19,370 --> 00:22:21,500 forces do operate in the arctic and 580 00:22:21,500 --> 00:22:23,550 therefore also require command and 581 00:22:23,550 --> 00:22:26,110 control domain awareness . Uh And and 582 00:22:26,110 --> 00:22:30,050 uh so I my forces are a subset of the 583 00:22:30,060 --> 00:22:32,400 uh uh requirements that you just heard 584 00:22:32,410 --> 00:22:36,080 Glenn talking about . And so in general , 585 00:22:36,080 --> 00:22:38,080 it is the same issue in terms of 586 00:22:38,080 --> 00:22:41,560 recapitalizing in some cases , but 587 00:22:41,570 --> 00:22:44,330 Glenn was hitting on a , just the 588 00:22:44,330 --> 00:22:46,386 ability to go accomplish the mission 589 00:22:46,386 --> 00:22:48,620 perhaps in a new and better way is 590 00:22:48,620 --> 00:22:51,060 something that we're very alert to and 591 00:22:51,060 --> 00:22:53,300 the idea that we have these commercial 592 00:22:53,300 --> 00:22:55,880 capabilities that would enable us to 593 00:22:55,880 --> 00:22:57,880 accomplish the mission in a new and 594 00:22:57,880 --> 00:22:59,547 better way compared to simply 595 00:22:59,547 --> 00:23:01,658 recapitalizing what we've done in the 596 00:23:01,658 --> 00:23:03,824 past . I think it's very exciting . Uh 597 00:23:03,824 --> 00:23:05,824 And both Glenn and I are looking at 598 00:23:05,824 --> 00:23:08,080 opportunities to do that . Alright , 599 00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:10,247 let's go back to the phones bill , are 600 00:23:10,247 --> 00:23:12,550 you there ? Oh yeah . Hi , um I have a 601 00:23:12,550 --> 00:23:14,860 Merv question one for each of you , 602 00:23:15,240 --> 00:23:17,184 General Van Herk , one of the more 603 00:23:17,184 --> 00:23:20,280 visible um uh , presence of the 604 00:23:20,280 --> 00:23:22,810 Russians in the arctic have been 605 00:23:22,820 --> 00:23:25,350 strategic bomber flights somewhat 606 00:23:25,350 --> 00:23:27,600 provocative running up against the air 607 00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:30,180 defense zones . What are you seeing in 608 00:23:30,180 --> 00:23:32,700 terms of Russian bomber flights ? We 609 00:23:32,700 --> 00:23:34,811 haven't heard anything recently . And 610 00:23:34,811 --> 00:23:36,978 have has there been any change in that 611 00:23:36,978 --> 00:23:39,710 since uh the invasion ? And for Admiral 612 00:23:39,710 --> 00:23:41,830 Richard , you mentioned the China's 613 00:23:41,830 --> 00:23:44,240 fractional orbital capability . Is that 614 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:47,410 something that China intends to use for 615 00:23:47,420 --> 00:23:51,290 its ambitions in the arctic . Thanks 616 00:23:51,290 --> 00:23:53,234 Bill , I'll talk about the bombers 617 00:23:53,234 --> 00:23:56,280 first . So what we're seeing is his 618 00:23:56,290 --> 00:23:58,450 within historical norms and we're not 619 00:23:58,450 --> 00:24:00,670 seeing any dramatic change based on 620 00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:05,230 ongoing activities in the european 621 00:24:05,370 --> 00:24:08,360 kor we saw A spike back in the 622 00:24:08,360 --> 00:24:11,410 2020 , timeframe . But I would 623 00:24:11,410 --> 00:24:14,540 characterize what we see today is 624 00:24:14,540 --> 00:24:16,950 within the historical norms of activity . 625 00:24:18,240 --> 00:24:20,240 Hey , so Bill , what I would add to 626 00:24:20,240 --> 00:24:22,184 your question about the fractional 627 00:24:22,184 --> 00:24:24,351 orbit bombardment capability , I would 628 00:24:24,351 --> 00:24:26,580 use that as a specific example of I 629 00:24:26,580 --> 00:24:28,747 think we all need to be conscious that 630 00:24:28,747 --> 00:24:31,560 we don't know what the endpoint of 631 00:24:31,560 --> 00:24:33,360 china's trajectory is with the 632 00:24:33,360 --> 00:24:36,260 expansion of its forces . Uh strategic 633 00:24:36,260 --> 00:24:39,440 forces being a subset of that . They've 634 00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:42,610 not said what their intent there is . 635 00:24:42,620 --> 00:24:44,780 And so that is something that I think 636 00:24:44,790 --> 00:24:48,660 as we move forward , we we be alert to 637 00:24:48,660 --> 00:24:51,930 how the threat changes and then what 638 00:24:51,930 --> 00:24:53,930 are we going to have to have from a 639 00:24:53,930 --> 00:24:55,819 capability , capacity and posture 640 00:24:55,819 --> 00:24:57,986 standpoint to execute what I think are 641 00:24:57,986 --> 00:25:00,041 some very good strategies that we've 642 00:25:00,041 --> 00:25:02,263 just come out with . All right . Thanks 643 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:06,607 guards from the Washington times . For 644 00:25:06,607 --> 00:25:09,450 those of you keeping a transcript um Mr 645 00:25:09,450 --> 00:25:12,830 Castillo Bloomberg for General von 646 00:25:12,830 --> 00:25:15,040 Erich , the Starlink one web 647 00:25:15,050 --> 00:25:17,400 experiments are those the product of 648 00:25:17,400 --> 00:25:19,680 General O'Shaughnessy ? These unfunded 649 00:25:19,680 --> 00:25:21,736 priority list from a couple of years 650 00:25:21,736 --> 00:25:23,791 ago from 2020 when he asked for like 651 00:25:23,791 --> 00:25:25,236 $80 million to start that 652 00:25:27,540 --> 00:25:29,762 Tony , I would say no , they're they're 653 00:25:29,762 --> 00:25:32,680 not a direct output of that that ask 654 00:25:32,690 --> 00:25:36,580 candidly . I 655 00:25:36,580 --> 00:25:38,302 mean , wasn't that one of your 656 00:25:38,302 --> 00:25:41,030 priorities too ? It is absolutely one 657 00:25:41,030 --> 00:25:43,197 of my priorities were able to garner . 658 00:25:43,197 --> 00:25:45,141 I think it was $50 million dollars 659 00:25:45,340 --> 00:25:48,450 through one of my unfunded requests in 660 00:25:48,450 --> 00:25:50,740 the first year of command to enable us 661 00:25:50,740 --> 00:25:52,962 to move out with the testing that we're 662 00:25:52,962 --> 00:25:55,073 currently doing the terminals that we 663 00:25:55,073 --> 00:25:57,129 fielded right now . Richard and both 664 00:25:57,129 --> 00:25:59,240 for both of you ? The missile defense 665 00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:01,240 question . I know it's not directly 666 00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:03,296 arctic related but they may actually 667 00:26:03,296 --> 00:26:05,462 come over the arctic . Possibly I want 668 00:26:05,462 --> 00:26:05,190 to ask you about North Korea and its 669 00:26:05,190 --> 00:26:07,980 capabilities every time there's a test 670 00:26:07,990 --> 00:26:09,879 there's been a lot of nervousness 671 00:26:09,879 --> 00:26:11,934 throughout the world . I want to ask 672 00:26:11,934 --> 00:26:14,157 you though at this point , do they have 673 00:26:14,157 --> 00:26:16,840 a capability to make a warhead to the 674 00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:20,020 rice CBM Jake . Sullivan , the National 675 00:26:20,020 --> 00:26:23,450 Security Adviser April 14 said that has 676 00:26:23,450 --> 00:26:25,672 yet to be proven . I wanted to get your 677 00:26:25,672 --> 00:26:27,894 candid assessment of where that program 678 00:26:27,894 --> 00:26:30,172 is at this moment realizing that the G . 679 00:26:30,172 --> 00:26:32,172 B I program is designed to go after 680 00:26:32,172 --> 00:26:33,000 that threat 681 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:41,590 clear . So I mean he's there right now 682 00:26:41,590 --> 00:26:43,701 covering these very issues that we're 683 00:26:43,701 --> 00:26:45,701 talking about . Right , so we'll go 684 00:26:45,701 --> 00:26:47,757 ahead and adhere to the ground rules 685 00:26:47,757 --> 00:26:49,923 and so if you guys want to come see me 686 00:26:49,923 --> 00:26:48,990 afterwards , I'm happy to get on this 687 00:26:48,990 --> 00:26:51,180 question for you . Alright , let's go 688 00:26:51,180 --> 00:26:53,513 back to the phones Alex . Are you there , 689 00:26:54,840 --> 00:26:58,130 yep , I'm here . Um I have a question 690 00:26:58,130 --> 00:27:02,080 for Admiral Richard on the topic 691 00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:05,910 of strategic deterrence and you 692 00:27:05,920 --> 00:27:08,020 feel free to answer this also within 693 00:27:08,020 --> 00:27:10,760 kind of the context of the arctic , but 694 00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:13,900 I I wanted to ask about kind of the 695 00:27:13,900 --> 00:27:17,210 topic of slick . Um , and I'm wondering , 696 00:27:17,210 --> 00:27:19,760 Admiral Richard , if you're concerned , 697 00:27:19,770 --> 00:27:21,840 um , that a public rift and the 698 00:27:21,840 --> 00:27:24,660 administration is developing as a 699 00:27:24,660 --> 00:27:27,320 result of conflicting views around 700 00:27:27,320 --> 00:27:31,220 slick . Um , in no , I I'm not , 701 00:27:31,220 --> 00:27:34,420 I I think , uh , it has all been 702 00:27:34,430 --> 00:27:36,960 adequately addressed and I've made my 703 00:27:36,970 --> 00:27:39,280 recommendations and I'm very confident 704 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:42,200 that the my department has a process in 705 00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:45,050 order to address recommendations and 706 00:27:45,050 --> 00:27:48,400 come to a good overall answer . Thank 707 00:27:48,400 --> 00:27:52,350 you sir . Go ahead . The 708 00:27:52,350 --> 00:27:54,980 news general , you were talking about 709 00:27:54,980 --> 00:27:57,147 the icebreaker differential of I think 710 00:27:57,147 --> 00:28:00,810 22 verses 55 . And he also used the 711 00:28:00,810 --> 00:28:03,032 cliche a couple of times about being on 712 00:28:03,032 --> 00:28:06,790 the field . I'm wondering what field 713 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:08,856 you're talking about , Where it's an 714 00:28:08,856 --> 00:28:12,050 even fight between 55 2 . I say that 715 00:28:12,050 --> 00:28:14,161 only because I know you all have been 716 00:28:14,161 --> 00:28:16,439 pleading for more icebreakers for many , 717 00:28:16,439 --> 00:28:18,606 many years . It's been in the budget . 718 00:28:18,606 --> 00:28:20,439 It never seems to happen . So my 719 00:28:20,439 --> 00:28:22,217 question is , and and since the 720 00:28:22,217 --> 00:28:24,328 icebreakers do flow into the arctic , 721 00:28:24,328 --> 00:28:28,070 it is an art question , why haven't you 722 00:28:28,070 --> 00:28:30,750 guys been successful in convincing 723 00:28:30,750 --> 00:28:32,990 Congress to fund more icebreakers and 724 00:28:33,000 --> 00:28:36,610 and to get them moving ? Well , I'm not 725 00:28:36,610 --> 00:28:39,460 sure it's it's a specific to Congress . 726 00:28:39,840 --> 00:28:41,920 I would say it's the department 727 00:28:42,050 --> 00:28:46,000 Congress advocacy overall . I 728 00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,930 believe that the successful nous has 729 00:28:48,930 --> 00:28:51,030 been based on education about the 730 00:28:51,030 --> 00:28:53,141 importance of the arctic . That's why 731 00:28:53,141 --> 00:28:55,086 we're here in Alaska is to educate 732 00:28:55,086 --> 00:28:57,710 folks on the value , what the arctic 733 00:28:57,710 --> 00:29:00,500 brings , what environmental change is 734 00:29:00,500 --> 00:29:04,210 doing in the arctic giving access to 735 00:29:04,210 --> 00:29:06,432 resources that haven't been available . 736 00:29:06,540 --> 00:29:08,230 And it will create strategic 737 00:29:08,230 --> 00:29:10,700 competition which has the potential for 738 00:29:10,700 --> 00:29:12,644 friction to create instability . I 739 00:29:12,644 --> 00:29:14,867 think when you combine that education , 740 00:29:14,867 --> 00:29:17,100 what we're seeing is people understand 741 00:29:17,100 --> 00:29:19,770 the true value of the region and now 742 00:29:19,770 --> 00:29:21,381 we're looking at funding the 743 00:29:21,381 --> 00:29:23,326 capabilities to ensure that we can 744 00:29:23,326 --> 00:29:25,103 execute an integrated deterrent 745 00:29:25,103 --> 00:29:28,070 strategy in the arctic . I wish we were 746 00:29:28,070 --> 00:29:30,430 ahead of where we are . But the fact is 747 00:29:30,430 --> 00:29:33,070 we're moving out with some vigor right 748 00:29:33,070 --> 00:29:36,670 now to make that happen . Yeah . 749 00:29:41,740 --> 00:29:45,400 Did you hear the question sir ? The 750 00:29:45,400 --> 00:29:47,511 question is that you think you'll get 751 00:29:47,511 --> 00:29:49,456 any new icebreakers in the next 10 752 00:29:49,456 --> 00:29:51,122 years ? I'm not gonna get new 753 00:29:51,122 --> 00:29:52,956 icebreakers in the Department of 754 00:29:52,956 --> 00:29:54,900 Defense and I'm not asking for new 755 00:29:54,900 --> 00:29:56,733 icebreakers in the Department of 756 00:29:56,733 --> 00:29:58,956 Defense . I defer to the comment on the 757 00:29:58,956 --> 00:29:58,740 Coast Guard . He has asked for him , 758 00:29:58,740 --> 00:30:00,907 he's got six of them funded that we're 759 00:30:00,907 --> 00:30:02,962 gonna field in the next the next few 760 00:30:02,962 --> 00:30:05,129 years . I believe it's three heavy and 761 00:30:05,129 --> 00:30:08,160 three medium . Alright . Thanks 762 00:30:08,160 --> 00:30:10,271 everyone , gentlemen , Before we sign 763 00:30:10,271 --> 00:30:12,327 off , have you any final words you'd 764 00:30:12,327 --> 00:30:15,100 like to to state ? Well , Todd , thanks 765 00:30:15,100 --> 00:30:17,211 for the opportunity to talk . I think 766 00:30:17,211 --> 00:30:19,322 it's a crucial time to talk about the 767 00:30:19,322 --> 00:30:22,280 arctic uh activity in the arctic due to 768 00:30:22,280 --> 00:30:24,613 environmental changes going to increase , 769 00:30:24,613 --> 00:30:26,391 that gives us the potential for 770 00:30:26,391 --> 00:30:28,820 friction and strategic competition that 771 00:30:28,820 --> 00:30:31,000 could actually explode into something 772 00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:33,520 global . So I think it's important to 773 00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:35,576 execute our integrated turn strategy 774 00:30:35,576 --> 00:30:37,631 that we talk about these issues . We 775 00:30:37,631 --> 00:30:39,742 develop the capabilities to make sure 776 00:30:39,742 --> 00:30:41,964 that we have the persistence and when I 777 00:30:41,964 --> 00:30:44,131 say on the field that we're able to be 778 00:30:44,131 --> 00:30:46,076 there to ensure that international 779 00:30:46,076 --> 00:30:48,131 rules , laws and norms and behaviors 780 00:30:48,131 --> 00:30:50,076 are adhered to . This is not about 781 00:30:50,076 --> 00:30:52,480 militarizing the arctic , this is about 782 00:30:52,480 --> 00:30:54,560 ensuring that the arctic is free , 783 00:30:54,620 --> 00:30:56,787 prosperous , that economic development 784 00:30:56,787 --> 00:30:59,090 can continue to occur within those 785 00:30:59,090 --> 00:31:01,034 norms and laws and rules that have 786 00:31:01,034 --> 00:31:03,146 served us well since the end of World 787 00:31:03,146 --> 00:31:05,490 War Two . Chess . What I'll just add is 788 00:31:05,490 --> 00:31:07,660 is that I'm happy on behalf of my 789 00:31:07,660 --> 00:31:09,549 command to have an opportunity to 790 00:31:09,549 --> 00:31:11,860 endorse what General Van Herk just said 791 00:31:12,040 --> 00:31:14,040 and to show that he is not the only 792 00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:16,140 commander who has come to these 793 00:31:16,140 --> 00:31:18,307 conclusions and sees the importance of 794 00:31:18,307 --> 00:31:20,307 the arctic . Happy to support NORAD 795 00:31:20,307 --> 00:31:23,090 North com . General Van Herk . Admiral 796 00:31:23,090 --> 00:31:24,868 Richard , thank you very much , 797 00:31:24,868 --> 00:31:27,034 gentlemen for your time . Thank you to 798 00:31:27,034 --> 00:31:26,060 the press corps .