1 00:00:03,369 --> 00:00:05,630 Good morning . The committee meets 2 00:00:05,639 --> 00:00:08,279 today to receive testimony from General 3 00:00:08,750 --> 00:00:11,630 Gregory Geo and Commander of us 4 00:00:11,640 --> 00:00:13,850 Northern Command and North American 5 00:00:13,859 --> 00:00:16,250 Aerospace Defense Command and General 6 00:00:16,260 --> 00:00:18,729 Laura Richardson , commander of us 7 00:00:18,739 --> 00:00:21,030 Southern Command . This is General 8 00:00:21,040 --> 00:00:23,420 Geo's first posture hearing as North 9 00:00:23,430 --> 00:00:26,569 com commander and we welcome you , sir . 10 00:00:27,290 --> 00:00:29,457 I would also note that this is General 11 00:00:29,457 --> 00:00:31,679 Richardson's last appearance before the 12 00:00:31,679 --> 00:00:34,029 committee in her current role . General , 13 00:00:34,040 --> 00:00:36,262 I would like to express my appreciation 14 00:00:36,262 --> 00:00:38,930 for your decades of admirable service 15 00:00:38,939 --> 00:00:40,661 to the nation , including your 16 00:00:40,661 --> 00:00:42,883 outstanding leadership of our South Com 17 00:00:42,883 --> 00:00:45,050 forces . Thank you very much , ma'am . 18 00:00:45,790 --> 00:00:47,623 I would like to take a moment to 19 00:00:47,623 --> 00:00:49,957 acknowledge the ongoing crisis in Haiti . 20 00:00:49,957 --> 00:00:52,123 The situation is very concerning and I 21 00:00:52,123 --> 00:00:54,290 understand the US military forces have 22 00:00:54,290 --> 00:00:57,000 been deployed to augment security at 23 00:00:57,009 --> 00:00:58,979 our embassy in Port Au Prince and 24 00:00:58,990 --> 00:01:01,630 evacuate non-essential personnel . This 25 00:01:01,639 --> 00:01:03,770 crisis involves both of your commands 26 00:01:03,779 --> 00:01:06,050 to varying degrees and I would like to 27 00:01:06,059 --> 00:01:08,389 know what resources or support you need 28 00:01:08,400 --> 00:01:11,550 to respond . Us . Northern Command is 29 00:01:11,559 --> 00:01:13,779 key to our national security as the 30 00:01:13,790 --> 00:01:15,846 principal command for protecting the 31 00:01:15,846 --> 00:01:18,012 American homeland . Indeed , the first 32 00:01:18,012 --> 00:01:20,179 of the four priorities outlined in the 33 00:01:20,179 --> 00:01:22,234 national defense strategy is quote , 34 00:01:22,309 --> 00:01:24,779 defending the homeland paced to the 35 00:01:24,790 --> 00:01:27,669 growing multiple domain threat posed by 36 00:01:27,680 --> 00:01:30,160 the People's Republic of China as we 37 00:01:30,169 --> 00:01:32,169 consider the threats from China and 38 00:01:32,169 --> 00:01:34,391 other competitors . Our very concept of 39 00:01:34,391 --> 00:01:36,690 homeland defense must evolve . General 40 00:01:36,900 --> 00:01:38,678 Guillo , I understand north com 41 00:01:38,678 --> 00:01:40,733 published the first homeland defense 42 00:01:40,733 --> 00:01:43,489 policy guidance to meet this challenge . 43 00:01:43,540 --> 00:01:45,540 And when asked for an update on the 44 00:01:45,540 --> 00:01:47,762 status of its implementation and how it 45 00:01:47,762 --> 00:01:49,762 will transform the homeland defense 46 00:01:49,762 --> 00:01:52,480 plans of the department . The urgency 47 00:01:52,489 --> 00:01:54,489 of this mission has been made clear 48 00:01:54,489 --> 00:01:56,656 over the past year with the incursions 49 00:01:56,656 --> 00:01:58,839 of a Chinese surveillance balloon and 50 00:01:58,849 --> 00:02:01,769 other unidentified aerial phenomenon in 51 00:02:01,779 --> 00:02:04,449 our airspace . These events raise 52 00:02:04,459 --> 00:02:07,089 concerns that north com and no ad may 53 00:02:07,099 --> 00:02:09,266 have an awareness gap that needs to be 54 00:02:09,266 --> 00:02:11,929 resolved . America's skies and seas 55 00:02:11,940 --> 00:02:14,610 must be secure to protect our citizens 56 00:02:14,850 --> 00:02:16,572 and the department must pursue 57 00:02:16,572 --> 00:02:18,461 technologies that provide forward 58 00:02:18,461 --> 00:02:20,294 detection . General , I would be 59 00:02:20,294 --> 00:02:22,461 interested in your assessment of these 60 00:02:22,461 --> 00:02:24,350 potential awareness gaps and what 61 00:02:24,350 --> 00:02:26,239 additional tools or resources are 62 00:02:26,239 --> 00:02:28,910 needed to overcome them regionally . 63 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:31,100 North Com also provides support to the 64 00:02:31,110 --> 00:02:33,369 US law enforcement mission by helping 65 00:02:33,380 --> 00:02:35,509 to counter cartels engaged in drug 66 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:37,899 smuggling , human trafficking and money 67 00:02:37,910 --> 00:02:40,188 laundering across the southwest border . 68 00:02:40,389 --> 00:02:42,389 The committee would appreciate your 69 00:02:42,389 --> 00:02:44,222 views on the success of security 70 00:02:44,222 --> 00:02:46,589 cooperations with the Mexican Army and 71 00:02:46,600 --> 00:02:49,720 Navy and what role North com plays in 72 00:02:49,729 --> 00:02:51,840 supporting the Department of Homeland 73 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:54,570 Security and border security operations . 74 00:02:54,750 --> 00:02:57,330 Turning to Southern Command General 75 00:02:57,339 --> 00:02:59,479 Richard in your command faces growing 76 00:02:59,490 --> 00:03:01,750 challenges from China and Russia in 77 00:03:01,759 --> 00:03:04,059 Latin America . The political and 78 00:03:04,070 --> 00:03:06,070 economic instability in the region 79 00:03:06,149 --> 00:03:07,889 presents a situation that our 80 00:03:07,899 --> 00:03:10,460 adversaries are seeking to exploit to 81 00:03:10,470 --> 00:03:12,929 increase their own influence . China in 82 00:03:12,940 --> 00:03:15,440 particular is expanding its presence in 83 00:03:15,449 --> 00:03:17,060 the region including through 84 00:03:17,060 --> 00:03:19,289 investments in strategic infrastructure 85 00:03:19,460 --> 00:03:21,929 such as the Port of Balboa and Panama 86 00:03:22,339 --> 00:03:24,960 five G telecommunications and an 87 00:03:24,970 --> 00:03:27,179 expanding network of space tracking 88 00:03:27,190 --> 00:03:29,279 installations . General , I'm 89 00:03:29,289 --> 00:03:31,345 interested in your assessment of the 90 00:03:31,345 --> 00:03:33,567 challenge from near peer competitors in 91 00:03:33,567 --> 00:03:35,567 Latin America and how we might work 92 00:03:35,567 --> 00:03:37,733 strategically with our partners in the 93 00:03:37,733 --> 00:03:39,678 region to build resilience against 94 00:03:39,678 --> 00:03:43,039 these activities . South com like North 95 00:03:43,100 --> 00:03:45,267 Com continues to work closely with the 96 00:03:45,267 --> 00:03:47,869 US interagency to support counter 97 00:03:47,880 --> 00:03:50,240 narcotic and counter transnational 98 00:03:50,250 --> 00:03:52,910 criminal organizations or TCO . 99 00:03:54,139 --> 00:03:55,972 I am concerned about the growing 100 00:03:55,972 --> 00:03:58,279 threats from TC OS and synthetic opioid 101 00:03:58,289 --> 00:04:00,759 trafficking including fentaNYL which 102 00:04:00,770 --> 00:04:02,770 are contributing to more than 1000 103 00:04:02,779 --> 00:04:05,001 overdose deaths each year in the United 104 00:04:05,001 --> 00:04:07,112 States . General Richardson , I would 105 00:04:07,112 --> 00:04:09,223 ask for an update on South Com's work 106 00:04:09,223 --> 00:04:11,229 with partner nations and other US 107 00:04:11,240 --> 00:04:13,830 government agencies in counter narcotic 108 00:04:13,839 --> 00:04:16,440 and counter TCO efforts . Given South 109 00:04:16,470 --> 00:04:18,320 Com's limited force posture and 110 00:04:18,329 --> 00:04:21,350 resources . Finally , we know that 111 00:04:21,359 --> 00:04:23,359 insecurity throughout the South com 112 00:04:23,359 --> 00:04:25,549 area is contributing to the flow of 113 00:04:25,559 --> 00:04:27,410 migrants North to the US border 114 00:04:27,709 --> 00:04:30,100 economic instability , violence and 115 00:04:30,109 --> 00:04:32,230 corruption continue to be a major 116 00:04:32,239 --> 00:04:34,239 source of insecurity in much of the 117 00:04:34,239 --> 00:04:36,239 region , especially in the Northern 118 00:04:36,239 --> 00:04:38,329 triangle . Countries of Honduras , 119 00:04:38,339 --> 00:04:40,910 Guatemala and El Salvador , General 120 00:04:40,920 --> 00:04:42,864 Ritson . I would like to know your 121 00:04:42,864 --> 00:04:45,031 views on what more can be done to help 122 00:04:45,031 --> 00:04:47,087 improve the situation and strengthen 123 00:04:47,087 --> 00:04:49,309 border security throughout the region . 124 00:04:49,350 --> 00:04:51,517 I thank you again to all witnesses . I 125 00:04:51,517 --> 00:04:53,739 look forward to your testimony and as a 126 00:04:53,739 --> 00:04:55,906 reminder to my colleagues , there will 127 00:04:55,906 --> 00:04:57,683 be a closed session immediately 128 00:04:57,683 --> 00:05:01,059 following this hearing in room SVC 217 . 129 00:05:01,260 --> 00:05:03,149 Let me now turn to my colleague , 130 00:05:03,149 --> 00:05:05,316 Senator work . Thank you Mr Chairman . 131 00:05:05,316 --> 00:05:07,427 And I want to thank our witnesses for 132 00:05:07,427 --> 00:05:09,609 being with us here . Our adversaries 133 00:05:09,619 --> 00:05:12,290 particularly China and Russia are 134 00:05:12,299 --> 00:05:14,429 actively working to exploit America's 135 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:16,720 vulnerabilities . They're doing so here 136 00:05:16,730 --> 00:05:19,040 at home and seeking to expand their 137 00:05:19,049 --> 00:05:22,290 influence in this western hemisphere . 138 00:05:22,760 --> 00:05:26,440 The 2022 national defense strategy 139 00:05:26,529 --> 00:05:29,410 establishes homeland defense as its top 140 00:05:29,420 --> 00:05:32,609 priority . That was a year and a half 141 00:05:32,619 --> 00:05:34,786 ago , but the Biden administration has 142 00:05:34,786 --> 00:05:37,079 not matched that goal with action year 143 00:05:37,089 --> 00:05:39,200 after year . The Biden administration 144 00:05:39,200 --> 00:05:41,420 has declined to fund North Com's 145 00:05:41,429 --> 00:05:45,130 request for the radars and sensors it 146 00:05:45,140 --> 00:05:48,109 needs for proper air defense . Numerous 147 00:05:48,119 --> 00:05:50,559 bases on American soil remain unable to 148 00:05:50,570 --> 00:05:54,079 protect themselves against small drones . 149 00:05:54,529 --> 00:05:57,850 This presents a clear and significant 150 00:05:57,859 --> 00:06:01,160 vulnerability on top of it , all our 151 00:06:01,170 --> 00:06:04,390 war games continue to ignore crucial 152 00:06:04,399 --> 00:06:07,230 domestic resilience problems that would 153 00:06:07,239 --> 00:06:10,600 arise in a potential conflict . The 154 00:06:10,609 --> 00:06:12,829 Biden administration also refuses to 155 00:06:12,839 --> 00:06:15,010 learn from its homeland defense 156 00:06:15,019 --> 00:06:17,480 mistakes last year , Chinese 157 00:06:17,489 --> 00:06:20,769 surveillance um uh balloon 158 00:06:20,779 --> 00:06:24,149 lapse the the lapse of last year's um 159 00:06:24,690 --> 00:06:27,279 um defenses with regard to the Chinese 160 00:06:27,290 --> 00:06:29,859 surveillance balloon is a case in point . 161 00:06:30,269 --> 00:06:32,570 Senior Biden administration , defense 162 00:06:32,579 --> 00:06:35,320 officials responded evasively to 163 00:06:35,329 --> 00:06:38,339 congressional oversight and they leaked 164 00:06:38,350 --> 00:06:41,630 classified information selectively to 165 00:06:41,640 --> 00:06:44,700 deflect blame . The president's staff 166 00:06:44,910 --> 00:06:47,077 declined to conduct an internal review 167 00:06:47,077 --> 00:06:49,510 of the major air defense failure . They 168 00:06:49,519 --> 00:06:51,709 finally did so when this committee 169 00:06:51,799 --> 00:06:55,269 mandated it in the NDA A . As 170 00:06:55,279 --> 00:06:57,480 presided over by our distinguished 171 00:06:57,489 --> 00:07:00,250 chair , the spy balloon was a 172 00:07:00,260 --> 00:07:02,170 significant failure but the most 173 00:07:02,179 --> 00:07:04,739 pressing homeland defense crisis is the 174 00:07:04,750 --> 00:07:06,570 one at our southwest border . 175 00:07:07,440 --> 00:07:09,750 Approximately 70,000 Americans are 176 00:07:09,760 --> 00:07:12,950 dying annually from fentaNYL overdoses . 177 00:07:12,959 --> 00:07:15,015 Most of the supply is synthesized in 178 00:07:15,015 --> 00:07:18,609 Mexico using Chinese precursor 179 00:07:18,619 --> 00:07:21,179 chemicals . Then it is trafficked to 180 00:07:21,190 --> 00:07:23,799 the United States by Mexico's criminal 181 00:07:23,809 --> 00:07:27,660 cartels . The crisis can only worsen as 182 00:07:27,670 --> 00:07:30,140 more deadly drugs flood the market . 183 00:07:31,220 --> 00:07:33,359 The cartels are also executing an 184 00:07:33,369 --> 00:07:36,119 unprecedented human trafficking 185 00:07:36,130 --> 00:07:40,109 operation across our open border and it 186 00:07:40,119 --> 00:07:43,779 is lucrative . The gangs are charging 187 00:07:43,790 --> 00:07:45,957 thousands of dollars for each person . 188 00:07:45,957 --> 00:07:47,957 They traffic . The human tragedy is 189 00:07:47,957 --> 00:07:51,059 severe and so is the risk of 190 00:07:51,070 --> 00:07:54,959 terrorist infiltration . As CNN 191 00:07:54,970 --> 00:07:57,290 reported this past summer , a human 192 00:07:57,299 --> 00:08:00,140 smuggling network with ties to ISIS 193 00:08:00,529 --> 00:08:02,630 helped more than a dozen individuals 194 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:06,160 enter our country illegally . In 195 00:08:06,170 --> 00:08:09,519 October 2 Iranians who were on a 196 00:08:09,529 --> 00:08:12,899 security threat list were caught as 197 00:08:12,910 --> 00:08:15,130 they tried to cross the border from 198 00:08:15,140 --> 00:08:18,519 Mexico General Guillo . 199 00:08:19,369 --> 00:08:22,149 I recognize that many agencies have 200 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:24,470 responsibility at the Southwest border 201 00:08:24,829 --> 00:08:27,130 but Dod is one of them . I hope you 202 00:08:27,140 --> 00:08:30,010 will explain how dod s border security 203 00:08:30,019 --> 00:08:33,289 contributions could be improved . We 204 00:08:33,299 --> 00:08:35,466 also have challenges further south . I 205 00:08:35,466 --> 00:08:37,410 remain concerned about the growing 206 00:08:37,410 --> 00:08:39,577 Chinese threats in Central America and 207 00:08:39,577 --> 00:08:41,688 South America . The Chinese Communist 208 00:08:41,688 --> 00:08:43,799 Party continues to use its well known 209 00:08:43,799 --> 00:08:46,659 playbook in the South com theater . It 210 00:08:46,669 --> 00:08:49,719 aggressively uses predatory economic 211 00:08:49,729 --> 00:08:52,739 and diplomatic practices to influence 212 00:08:52,750 --> 00:08:56,169 governments simultaneously . It sets 213 00:08:56,179 --> 00:08:58,750 conditions to enhance its military 214 00:08:58,760 --> 00:09:01,479 presence , gather intelligence and 215 00:09:01,489 --> 00:09:04,330 limit us access and influence . Great 216 00:09:04,340 --> 00:09:06,729 power competition is happening right 217 00:09:06,739 --> 00:09:09,159 here in the Americas . We cannot ignore 218 00:09:09,169 --> 00:09:11,840 it . Two quick examples underscore the 219 00:09:11,849 --> 00:09:14,510 urgency , Beijing is making Latin 220 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:17,150 America dependent on Huawei for 221 00:09:17,159 --> 00:09:18,881 communications technology . Uh 222 00:09:18,881 --> 00:09:21,000 something they tried to do in our 223 00:09:21,010 --> 00:09:23,000 country . An example of China's 224 00:09:23,010 --> 00:09:25,320 economic influence campaign , we see 225 00:09:25,330 --> 00:09:28,760 the CCPS military influence in Cuba 226 00:09:29,049 --> 00:09:31,469 where we discovered a large Chinese 227 00:09:31,479 --> 00:09:33,312 Intelligence collection center , 228 00:09:33,770 --> 00:09:36,010 General Richardson . I look forward to 229 00:09:36,020 --> 00:09:39,049 hearing how these practices directly 230 00:09:39,059 --> 00:09:42,229 impact the stability of our region . We 231 00:09:42,239 --> 00:09:44,406 should understand the threat they pose 232 00:09:44,409 --> 00:09:47,580 to our national security . How real is 233 00:09:47,590 --> 00:09:49,849 it ? How important is it ? Of course , 234 00:09:49,890 --> 00:09:51,946 there are other malign influences in 235 00:09:51,946 --> 00:09:53,946 this theater . Venezuelan President 236 00:09:53,946 --> 00:09:55,960 Maduro recently has asserted a 237 00:09:55,969 --> 00:09:59,190 provocative extra territorial claim of 238 00:09:59,200 --> 00:10:02,190 sovereignty over a large oil rich 239 00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:05,229 portion of the neighboring nation of 240 00:10:05,239 --> 00:10:08,460 Guyana . This type of instability so 241 00:10:08,469 --> 00:10:11,510 close to our homeland is troubling even 242 00:10:11,520 --> 00:10:13,464 more . Troubling is the consistent 243 00:10:13,464 --> 00:10:15,687 mismatch between the requirements south 244 00:10:15,687 --> 00:10:19,080 com has and the resources it receives . 245 00:10:19,099 --> 00:10:21,266 We need to find cost effective ways to 246 00:10:21,309 --> 00:10:24,280 exert influence in its in this theater . 247 00:10:24,419 --> 00:10:26,289 For example . Um 248 00:10:28,059 --> 00:10:31,150 let's explore the use of the Office of 249 00:10:31,159 --> 00:10:34,729 Strategic Capital in the future . I 250 00:10:34,739 --> 00:10:36,795 look forward to General Richardson's 251 00:10:36,795 --> 00:10:39,719 candid assessment of South Com's most 252 00:10:39,729 --> 00:10:42,520 pressing resource and capability 253 00:10:42,530 --> 00:10:45,250 shortfalls . And I'm eager to learn 254 00:10:45,419 --> 00:10:48,190 what Congress can do to help . Um , 255 00:10:48,210 --> 00:10:51,760 General Guillo , I note that your 256 00:10:51,770 --> 00:10:55,590 name rhymes with hero . Is that right ? 257 00:10:57,530 --> 00:10:59,869 Uh Yes , Senator Tusk . Ok , good . 258 00:10:59,880 --> 00:11:02,510 Well , we , we um expect both of you to 259 00:11:02,520 --> 00:11:05,130 live up to these expectations . Thank 260 00:11:05,140 --> 00:11:07,418 you . Thank you , Senator Worker . And , 261 00:11:07,418 --> 00:11:09,584 uh , let me recognize General Guillo , 262 00:11:09,584 --> 00:11:12,789 please . Chairman Reed , ranking member 263 00:11:12,799 --> 00:11:15,021 Wicker and distinguished members of the 264 00:11:15,021 --> 00:11:16,688 committee . Thank you for the 265 00:11:16,688 --> 00:11:18,966 opportunity to appear before you today . 266 00:11:18,966 --> 00:11:21,021 It's a profound honor to command and 267 00:11:21,021 --> 00:11:23,077 represent the men and women of North 268 00:11:23,077 --> 00:11:25,243 American Aerospace Defense Command and 269 00:11:25,243 --> 00:11:27,299 United States Northern Command as we 270 00:11:27,299 --> 00:11:29,188 speak this morning , American and 271 00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:30,910 Canadian military and civilian 272 00:11:30,910 --> 00:11:32,743 personnel from both commands are 273 00:11:32,743 --> 00:11:32,650 actively defending our homelands 274 00:11:32,659 --> 00:11:34,900 against significant persistent threats 275 00:11:34,909 --> 00:11:37,330 from multiple vectors in all domains . 276 00:11:37,840 --> 00:11:39,896 Although I've only been in command a 277 00:11:39,896 --> 00:11:42,007 few weeks , it is readily clear to me 278 00:11:42,007 --> 00:11:44,229 that the United States , Canada and our 279 00:11:44,229 --> 00:11:46,118 expansive network of partners are 280 00:11:46,118 --> 00:11:48,173 facing in an extraordinarily complex 281 00:11:48,173 --> 00:11:50,173 strategic environment . Competitors 282 00:11:50,173 --> 00:11:52,229 seeking to diminish our military and 283 00:11:52,229 --> 00:11:54,007 economic advantage have fielded 284 00:11:54,007 --> 00:11:56,062 advanced kinetic systems designed to 285 00:11:56,062 --> 00:11:57,673 strike civilian and military 286 00:11:57,673 --> 00:11:59,900 infrastructure in North America , both 287 00:11:59,909 --> 00:12:02,131 above and below the nuclear threshold . 288 00:12:02,580 --> 00:12:04,719 Meanwhile , competitors have rapidly 289 00:12:04,729 --> 00:12:07,059 advanced and routinely used non kinetic 290 00:12:07,070 --> 00:12:09,181 capabilities , targeting our critical 291 00:12:09,181 --> 00:12:11,014 infrastructure and our essential 292 00:12:11,014 --> 00:12:13,181 networks , threats to the homeland are 293 00:12:13,181 --> 00:12:15,330 present in all domains and along all 294 00:12:15,340 --> 00:12:17,284 avenues of approach to include the 295 00:12:17,284 --> 00:12:19,440 Arctic region . As stated in the 296 00:12:19,450 --> 00:12:21,228 national defense strategy , the 297 00:12:21,228 --> 00:12:23,394 People's Republic of China remains our 298 00:12:23,394 --> 00:12:25,228 pacing challenge as the People's 299 00:12:25,228 --> 00:12:27,450 Liberation Army modernizes and grows at 300 00:12:27,450 --> 00:12:29,669 a rapid pace . The Pr CS expanding 301 00:12:29,679 --> 00:12:31,969 nuclear capability and capacity 302 00:12:32,150 --> 00:12:34,150 alongside its development of modern 303 00:12:34,150 --> 00:12:36,094 submarines , missiles , hypersonic 304 00:12:36,094 --> 00:12:38,150 weapons all present significant 305 00:12:38,159 --> 00:12:41,369 challenges for homeland defense while 306 00:12:41,380 --> 00:12:43,324 the Pr CS capabilities are growing 307 00:12:43,324 --> 00:12:45,380 quickly . Russia remains a threat to 308 00:12:45,380 --> 00:12:47,547 the homeland today and is an immediate 309 00:12:47,547 --> 00:12:49,824 non , excuse me , nation state concern . 310 00:12:50,200 --> 00:12:52,144 Russia retains the world's largest 311 00:12:52,144 --> 00:12:54,367 stockpile of strategic and nonstrategic 312 00:12:54,367 --> 00:12:56,533 nuclear weapons along with significant 313 00:12:56,533 --> 00:12:58,760 ca capacity to strike inside North 314 00:12:58,770 --> 00:13:00,940 America with air and sea launch 315 00:13:00,950 --> 00:13:02,940 precision conventional weapons . 316 00:13:03,380 --> 00:13:05,436 Despite heavy lawsuits to its ground 317 00:13:05,436 --> 00:13:07,760 forces in Ukraine , Russia has invested 318 00:13:07,770 --> 00:13:09,826 heavily in systems that can threaten 319 00:13:09,826 --> 00:13:11,770 the United States such as advanced 320 00:13:11,770 --> 00:13:13,937 guided missile submarines , hypersonic 321 00:13:13,937 --> 00:13:16,479 live vehicles . ICBM S as well as 322 00:13:16,489 --> 00:13:18,211 significant cyber and undersea 323 00:13:18,211 --> 00:13:20,322 capabilities as well as developmental 324 00:13:20,322 --> 00:13:22,789 systems such as nuclear torpedo and a 325 00:13:22,799 --> 00:13:24,632 nuclear powered cruise missile . 326 00:13:25,460 --> 00:13:28,359 Meanwhile , North North Korea continues 327 00:13:28,369 --> 00:13:30,340 its bellicose rhetoric while test 328 00:13:30,349 --> 00:13:32,405 launching increasingly advanced long 329 00:13:32,405 --> 00:13:34,640 range missiles and expanding its ties 330 00:13:34,650 --> 00:13:37,309 with China and Russia . While Iran 331 00:13:37,320 --> 00:13:39,209 currently lacks the capability to 332 00:13:39,209 --> 00:13:41,264 strike North America with long range 333 00:13:41,264 --> 00:13:43,209 missiles , it is investing in that 334 00:13:43,209 --> 00:13:45,431 capability . Iran also supports violent 335 00:13:45,431 --> 00:13:47,598 militant groups in the Middle East and 336 00:13:47,598 --> 00:13:49,431 maintains a worldwide network of 337 00:13:49,431 --> 00:13:51,549 operational surrogates . And the most 338 00:13:51,559 --> 00:13:53,670 prevalent and growing threats include 339 00:13:53,670 --> 00:13:55,929 cyber and small unmanned aerial systems 340 00:13:55,940 --> 00:13:58,051 that are being employed inside the US 341 00:13:58,051 --> 00:13:59,829 and Canada against civilian and 342 00:13:59,829 --> 00:14:01,884 military infrastructure in ways that 343 00:14:01,884 --> 00:14:04,107 were not possible even just a few years 344 00:14:04,107 --> 00:14:07,239 ago . With those risks firmly in mind , 345 00:14:07,250 --> 00:14:09,719 NORAD and North Com strive to begin 346 00:14:09,729 --> 00:14:11,785 homeland defense . Well beyond North 347 00:14:11,785 --> 00:14:14,159 America to do so , both commands are 348 00:14:14,169 --> 00:14:16,280 working with the services in Congress 349 00:14:16,280 --> 00:14:18,502 to improve domain awareness in order to 350 00:14:18,502 --> 00:14:21,500 detect track and defeat threats ranging 351 00:14:21,530 --> 00:14:23,641 from long range ballistic missiles to 352 00:14:23,641 --> 00:14:26,659 small unmanned aerial systems . The 353 00:14:26,669 --> 00:14:28,780 defense of North America is an active 354 00:14:28,780 --> 00:14:30,947 endeavor that requires NORAD and North 355 00:14:30,947 --> 00:14:33,113 Com to campaign against threats in all 356 00:14:33,113 --> 00:14:35,380 domains along all approaches . That 357 00:14:35,390 --> 00:14:37,446 effort requires seamless exchange of 358 00:14:37,446 --> 00:14:39,557 information with combatant commands , 359 00:14:39,557 --> 00:14:41,557 conventional and special operations 360 00:14:41,557 --> 00:14:43,779 forces , the intelligence community and 361 00:14:43,779 --> 00:14:45,557 the spectrum of interagency and 362 00:14:45,557 --> 00:14:48,250 international partners . The importance 363 00:14:48,260 --> 00:14:50,038 of collecting and disseminating 364 00:14:50,038 --> 00:14:51,704 information quickly cannot be 365 00:14:51,704 --> 00:14:53,704 overstated . I strongly support the 366 00:14:53,704 --> 00:14:55,538 department's work to advance the 367 00:14:55,538 --> 00:14:57,649 combined joint all domain command and 368 00:14:57,649 --> 00:14:59,704 control concept as we seek to detect 369 00:14:59,704 --> 00:15:01,816 and track potential threats and share 370 00:15:01,816 --> 00:15:04,038 information as quickly as possible with 371 00:15:04,038 --> 00:15:05,927 analysts , operators and decision 372 00:15:05,927 --> 00:15:08,049 makers around the world . Finally , 373 00:15:08,059 --> 00:15:10,226 upon taking command , I began a 90 day 374 00:15:10,226 --> 00:15:12,337 assessment to inform the department , 375 00:15:12,337 --> 00:15:14,690 the joint force and Congress on NORAD 376 00:15:14,700 --> 00:15:16,644 and North Com's ability to execute 377 00:15:16,644 --> 00:15:18,867 assigned tasks and make recommendations 378 00:15:18,867 --> 00:15:20,978 on where the commands could or should 379 00:15:20,978 --> 00:15:23,080 do more . Once complete . I look 380 00:15:23,090 --> 00:15:25,034 forward to sharing my findings and 381 00:15:25,034 --> 00:15:27,146 updated vision on how NORAD and North 382 00:15:27,146 --> 00:15:29,368 Com will best execute the noble mission 383 00:15:29,368 --> 00:15:31,599 of homeland defense . The challenges 384 00:15:31,609 --> 00:15:33,831 facing our homelands are real but there 385 00:15:33,840 --> 00:15:35,784 should be no doubt about nored and 386 00:15:35,784 --> 00:15:37,451 North comm's resolve to deter 387 00:15:37,451 --> 00:15:39,396 aggression and if necessary defeat 388 00:15:39,396 --> 00:15:41,673 threats to our nation and our citizens . 389 00:15:41,890 --> 00:15:44,112 Again , I thank you for the opportunity 390 00:15:44,112 --> 00:15:46,334 to appear this morning . I look forward 391 00:15:46,334 --> 00:15:48,446 to working with the committee and I'm 392 00:15:48,446 --> 00:15:50,612 happy to answer your questions . Thank 393 00:15:50,612 --> 00:15:50,489 you , General Joe . Uh , General 394 00:15:50,500 --> 00:15:53,090 Richardson , please . Chairman Reed , 395 00:15:53,099 --> 00:15:55,321 ranking member wicker and distinguished 396 00:15:55,321 --> 00:15:57,377 members of the committee . Thank you 397 00:15:57,377 --> 00:15:59,432 for the opportunity to appear before 398 00:15:59,432 --> 00:16:01,432 you today with General Guillo . I'm 399 00:16:01,432 --> 00:16:03,599 honored to represent the dedicated men 400 00:16:03,599 --> 00:16:05,821 and women of the United States Southern 401 00:16:05,821 --> 00:16:07,877 Command to discuss the challenges we 402 00:16:07,877 --> 00:16:09,766 share with our neighbors in Latin 403 00:16:09,766 --> 00:16:11,679 America and the Caribbean . Our 404 00:16:11,690 --> 00:16:13,820 national security strategy recognizes 405 00:16:13,830 --> 00:16:15,941 the direct link between this region's 406 00:16:15,941 --> 00:16:19,150 security and our own security . We are 407 00:16:19,159 --> 00:16:21,159 harnessing the power of partnership 408 00:16:21,159 --> 00:16:23,950 from team USA in support of team 409 00:16:23,960 --> 00:16:26,830 democracy by leveraging all instruments 410 00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:29,369 of national power , diplomacy , 411 00:16:29,380 --> 00:16:32,950 information , military and economics 412 00:16:33,179 --> 00:16:36,099 to expeditiously assist partner nations 413 00:16:36,109 --> 00:16:37,998 in addressing the challenges that 414 00:16:37,998 --> 00:16:41,609 impact our collective security . This 415 00:16:41,619 --> 00:16:43,841 region which is our shared neighborhood 416 00:16:43,841 --> 00:16:45,909 remains under assault from a host of 417 00:16:45,919 --> 00:16:48,429 cross cutting trans boundary challenges 418 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,109 that directly threaten our homeland . I 419 00:16:51,119 --> 00:16:53,175 have seen these challenges intensify 420 00:16:53,175 --> 00:16:55,397 since I met with you last year and this 421 00:16:55,397 --> 00:16:58,880 remains a call to action in almost 2.5 422 00:16:58,890 --> 00:17:01,057 years in the command . I've made it my 423 00:17:01,057 --> 00:17:03,112 priority to meet partners where they 424 00:17:03,112 --> 00:17:05,168 are and to listen and understand the 425 00:17:05,168 --> 00:17:07,640 challenges that affect us . All the 426 00:17:07,650 --> 00:17:09,761 world is at an inflection point . Our 427 00:17:09,761 --> 00:17:12,589 partners in the western hemisphere with 428 00:17:12,599 --> 00:17:14,699 whom we are bonded by trade , shared 429 00:17:14,709 --> 00:17:16,880 values , democratic traditions and 430 00:17:16,890 --> 00:17:19,599 family ties are increasingly impacted 431 00:17:19,609 --> 00:17:22,910 by the interference and coercion . I've 432 00:17:22,920 --> 00:17:24,976 learned that our presence absolutely 433 00:17:24,976 --> 00:17:27,698 matters . The People's Republic of 434 00:17:27,708 --> 00:17:29,541 China has exploited the trust of 435 00:17:29,541 --> 00:17:31,759 democracies in this hemisphere using 436 00:17:31,769 --> 00:17:33,999 that trust to steal national secrets , 437 00:17:34,029 --> 00:17:36,698 intellectual property and research 438 00:17:36,708 --> 00:17:39,178 related to academia , agriculture and 439 00:17:39,188 --> 00:17:41,770 health care . The scope and scale of 440 00:17:41,780 --> 00:17:45,069 this espionage is unprecedented through 441 00:17:45,079 --> 00:17:47,301 the Belt and Road initiative . The PR C 442 00:17:47,301 --> 00:17:49,729 aims to amass power and influence at 443 00:17:49,739 --> 00:17:52,319 the expense of the world's democracies . 444 00:17:52,810 --> 00:17:54,977 Here in the western hemisphere , Latin 445 00:17:54,977 --> 00:17:56,921 America and the Caribbean have the 446 00:17:56,921 --> 00:17:59,088 potential to feed and fuel the world . 447 00:17:59,290 --> 00:18:02,270 Understanding this the PR C has already 448 00:18:02,280 --> 00:18:04,760 and is already busy extracting and 449 00:18:04,770 --> 00:18:07,569 exploiting predatory investment 450 00:18:07,579 --> 00:18:10,479 practices , construction of mega ports 451 00:18:10,489 --> 00:18:12,560 and dual use space facilities and 452 00:18:12,569 --> 00:18:14,625 criminal cyber activities are just a 453 00:18:14,625 --> 00:18:16,625 few of the Pr C's Malign activities 454 00:18:16,625 --> 00:18:18,625 that jeopardize the sovereignty and 455 00:18:18,625 --> 00:18:21,640 safety of the region . Russia remains 456 00:18:21,650 --> 00:18:23,761 an acute threat and seeks to increase 457 00:18:23,761 --> 00:18:26,630 the foot its foothold by bolstering 458 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:28,469 authoritarian regimes in Cuba , 459 00:18:28,479 --> 00:18:31,890 Nicaragua and Venezuela in the last 460 00:18:31,900 --> 00:18:33,900 year , China , Russia and Iran have 461 00:18:33,900 --> 00:18:36,122 increased their presence diplomatically 462 00:18:36,122 --> 00:18:38,344 economically and even militarily in the 463 00:18:38,344 --> 00:18:40,344 region . These activities undermine 464 00:18:40,344 --> 00:18:42,122 democracies and challenge their 465 00:18:42,122 --> 00:18:44,619 credibility . Both China and Russia 466 00:18:44,630 --> 00:18:46,741 exploit the presence of transnational 467 00:18:46,741 --> 00:18:49,449 criminal organizations and amplify 468 00:18:49,459 --> 00:18:51,219 their destabilizing impacts on 469 00:18:51,229 --> 00:18:53,340 democratic government . Governments , 470 00:18:53,650 --> 00:18:55,859 TC OS , traffic weapons , drugs , 471 00:18:55,869 --> 00:18:58,189 people , gold , lithium , rare earth 472 00:18:58,199 --> 00:19:00,366 minerals , commodities and counterfeit 473 00:19:00,366 --> 00:19:02,599 goods while contributing to the surge 474 00:19:02,609 --> 00:19:04,665 of fentaNYL related deaths . Here at 475 00:19:04,665 --> 00:19:07,910 home . The good news is working with 476 00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:10,199 our very willing partners leads to the 477 00:19:10,209 --> 00:19:12,699 best defense . We must use all 478 00:19:12,709 --> 00:19:14,653 available lovers to strengthen our 479 00:19:14,653 --> 00:19:16,979 partnerships with the 28 like minded 480 00:19:16,989 --> 00:19:19,160 democracies in this hemisphere . Who 481 00:19:19,170 --> 00:19:20,949 understand the power of working 482 00:19:20,959 --> 00:19:23,119 together to counter these shared 483 00:19:23,130 --> 00:19:25,719 threats . The United States remains the 484 00:19:25,729 --> 00:19:28,420 preferred and most trusted security 485 00:19:28,430 --> 00:19:32,030 partner in the region . We build trust 486 00:19:32,040 --> 00:19:33,818 through investment and security 487 00:19:33,818 --> 00:19:35,873 co-operation programs that train and 488 00:19:35,873 --> 00:19:37,707 equip our partners , our partner 489 00:19:37,707 --> 00:19:40,209 military and security forces a robust 490 00:19:40,219 --> 00:19:42,270 joint exercise program to build 491 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:44,630 interoperability and the development 492 00:19:44,640 --> 00:19:47,250 and employment of emerging technologies . 493 00:19:47,734 --> 00:19:49,834 Moreover , we maximize the resources 494 00:19:49,844 --> 00:19:52,011 allocated by the Department of State's 495 00:19:52,011 --> 00:19:54,066 International Military Education and 496 00:19:54,066 --> 00:19:56,775 Training program for military financing , 497 00:19:56,785 --> 00:19:59,135 foreign military sales to build that 498 00:19:59,145 --> 00:20:01,755 interoperability and counterbalance pr 499 00:20:01,765 --> 00:20:04,155 C military engagements and investments . 500 00:20:04,849 --> 00:20:07,182 As the national defense strategy states , 501 00:20:07,182 --> 00:20:09,400 the US derives immense benefit from a 502 00:20:09,410 --> 00:20:12,260 stable peaceful and democratic Western 503 00:20:12,270 --> 00:20:15,900 hemisphere that also reduces security 504 00:20:15,910 --> 00:20:18,890 threats to the homeland US South com 505 00:20:18,900 --> 00:20:20,880 continues to innovate and adapt , 506 00:20:20,890 --> 00:20:22,834 putting integrated deterrents into 507 00:20:22,834 --> 00:20:25,619 action every day , we remain committed 508 00:20:25,630 --> 00:20:27,574 to working across all domains with 509 00:20:27,574 --> 00:20:29,352 allies and partners . Combatant 510 00:20:29,352 --> 00:20:31,859 commands the joint force , the US 511 00:20:31,869 --> 00:20:34,290 interagency , nonfederal entities and 512 00:20:34,300 --> 00:20:37,060 the US Congress to guarantee safety , 513 00:20:37,069 --> 00:20:39,770 security and prosperity throughout the 514 00:20:39,780 --> 00:20:42,479 western hemisphere . This is the work 515 00:20:42,489 --> 00:20:45,510 and promise of Us South com as part of 516 00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:48,979 team USA in support of team democracy . 517 00:20:49,540 --> 00:20:51,318 Thank you for assistance . Your 518 00:20:51,318 --> 00:20:54,430 assistance in resourcing this team . I 519 00:20:54,439 --> 00:20:56,606 would also like to recognize behind me 520 00:20:56,606 --> 00:20:58,661 in the audience , the Inter American 521 00:20:58,661 --> 00:21:00,606 Defense College class that is here 522 00:21:00,606 --> 00:21:04,050 today to see how uh the power of uh our 523 00:21:04,060 --> 00:21:06,910 United States Congress and how uh the 524 00:21:06,920 --> 00:21:08,750 Department of Defense and us as 525 00:21:08,760 --> 00:21:10,871 combatant commanders , talk about our 526 00:21:10,871 --> 00:21:12,959 regions . I look forward to your 527 00:21:12,969 --> 00:21:15,025 questions . Thank you . Well , thank 528 00:21:15,025 --> 00:21:17,136 you very much at the suggestion of my 529 00:21:17,136 --> 00:21:19,247 colleague . Uh would all the students 530 00:21:19,247 --> 00:21:21,025 please stand to be recognized ? 531 00:21:33,469 --> 00:21:35,691 And on behalf of my colleagues , let me 532 00:21:35,691 --> 00:21:37,810 say beyond the needles , gracias , 533 00:21:39,199 --> 00:21:43,060 please decision . General uh 534 00:21:43,339 --> 00:21:46,599 geo uh we've had widely supported 535 00:21:46,609 --> 00:21:49,170 penetrations of our airspace by 536 00:21:49,890 --> 00:21:53,500 unmanned vehicles . Um has dod 537 00:21:53,510 --> 00:21:55,677 developed a defined standard operating 538 00:21:55,677 --> 00:21:57,680 procedures for individual base 539 00:21:57,689 --> 00:21:59,522 commanders in dealing with these 540 00:21:59,522 --> 00:22:02,510 vehicles because they could show up and 541 00:22:02,910 --> 00:22:05,030 be detected minutes before they would 542 00:22:05,040 --> 00:22:07,359 be penetrating a space . Do we have a 543 00:22:07,369 --> 00:22:10,130 system or SOPS to deal with them ? 544 00:22:12,619 --> 00:22:15,359 Chairman ? Uh shortly after uh taking 545 00:22:15,369 --> 00:22:17,147 command and beginning my 90 day 546 00:22:17,147 --> 00:22:19,869 assessment , I realized that the uh 547 00:22:20,030 --> 00:22:22,569 challenge of the large increase in the 548 00:22:22,579 --> 00:22:26,359 number of incursions by UASS was a uh 549 00:22:26,369 --> 00:22:29,979 um uh something that was gonna drive 550 00:22:29,989 --> 00:22:32,156 and change probably the direction of , 551 00:22:32,156 --> 00:22:34,322 of my first year in in command because 552 00:22:34,322 --> 00:22:36,810 of that acute number . Uh the services 553 00:22:36,819 --> 00:22:40,260 do have uh authorities but uh work 554 00:22:40,270 --> 00:22:42,199 remains to be done to ensure that 555 00:22:42,209 --> 00:22:44,300 there's uh that they're resource , 556 00:22:44,310 --> 00:22:46,199 they're equipped and then we have 557 00:22:46,199 --> 00:22:48,254 standardized operating procedures to 558 00:22:48,254 --> 00:22:50,421 address those threats and also work uh 559 00:22:50,421 --> 00:22:52,829 remains to be done . Chairman to , to 560 00:22:52,839 --> 00:22:54,895 uh be able to use especially the non 561 00:22:54,895 --> 00:22:56,895 kinetic capabilities that can bring 562 00:22:56,895 --> 00:22:59,150 down those systems safely uh without 563 00:22:59,160 --> 00:23:01,493 interfering with our airspace structure . 564 00:23:01,493 --> 00:23:03,493 Uh At this present time , NORAD and 565 00:23:03,493 --> 00:23:05,660 North Com do not have a , a designated 566 00:23:05,660 --> 00:23:07,049 role in that . But in my 567 00:23:07,049 --> 00:23:09,104 recommendations at the end of the 90 568 00:23:09,104 --> 00:23:11,216 days assessment , uh I will point out 569 00:23:11,216 --> 00:23:13,327 ways that I think that Nora and North 570 00:23:13,327 --> 00:23:15,493 Com could and should uh play a role in 571 00:23:15,493 --> 00:23:17,660 bringing that standardization that you 572 00:23:17,660 --> 00:23:19,771 mentioned . And this uh process would 573 00:23:19,771 --> 00:23:21,716 involve other agencies such as the 574 00:23:21,716 --> 00:23:23,493 Department of Justice , the FBI 575 00:23:23,493 --> 00:23:25,640 Homeland Security . Are we working at 576 00:23:25,650 --> 00:23:28,780 that joint agency level ? Ye yes , 577 00:23:28,790 --> 00:23:30,901 chairman , they have some authorities 578 00:23:30,901 --> 00:23:33,420 now and then as you uh alluded to , uh 579 00:23:33,430 --> 00:23:35,208 we would need to bring them all 580 00:23:35,208 --> 00:23:37,097 together . So we're bringing each 581 00:23:37,097 --> 00:23:39,319 capability together against the same uh 582 00:23:39,319 --> 00:23:41,486 incursion threat . Thank you , General 583 00:23:41,486 --> 00:23:43,708 Richard . And uh the situation in Haiti 584 00:23:43,708 --> 00:23:46,609 is deteriorate , deteriorating rapidly . 585 00:23:46,920 --> 00:23:50,869 Uh On March 10th , uh we sent in 586 00:23:50,880 --> 00:23:53,229 augmentation forces to the embassy . 587 00:23:53,310 --> 00:23:55,421 There's already been some extractions 588 00:23:55,421 --> 00:23:57,421 of uh personnel from the Embassy in 589 00:23:57,421 --> 00:23:59,477 Haiti . And then on March 11th , the 590 00:23:59,477 --> 00:24:01,532 Secretary of Defense increased dod s 591 00:24:01,532 --> 00:24:04,760 contribution of up to $200 million to 592 00:24:04,770 --> 00:24:08,510 provide logistics support uh for a um 593 00:24:08,520 --> 00:24:12,069 security force to come into uh Haiti . 594 00:24:12,560 --> 00:24:15,250 Um Could you just give us the uh your 595 00:24:15,260 --> 00:24:17,093 sense of the implications of the 596 00:24:17,093 --> 00:24:19,219 situation in Haiti ? For the United 597 00:24:19,229 --> 00:24:21,229 States and the region . Thank you , 598 00:24:21,229 --> 00:24:23,849 Senator and uh , and chairman , the uh , 599 00:24:23,859 --> 00:24:25,970 uh , thank you for the question . And 600 00:24:25,970 --> 00:24:28,030 so certainly the US South com has a 601 00:24:28,040 --> 00:24:30,096 wide range of contingency plans . So 602 00:24:30,096 --> 00:24:32,489 we're ready for , uh , whatever would 603 00:24:32,500 --> 00:24:34,640 be required uh for a Department of 604 00:24:34,650 --> 00:24:37,500 Defense Response . And so , um , and 605 00:24:37,510 --> 00:24:39,920 we've , uh , uh over the , uh , 606 00:24:39,930 --> 00:24:42,569 conducted two missions um that have 607 00:24:42,579 --> 00:24:45,400 been uh widely publicized of increasing 608 00:24:45,410 --> 00:24:47,466 security and it would , it's routine 609 00:24:47,466 --> 00:24:49,577 actions that would take place for any 610 00:24:49,577 --> 00:24:51,632 of our embassies across the , across 611 00:24:51,632 --> 00:24:55,010 the globe . And so , uh and the um the 612 00:24:55,020 --> 00:24:57,050 situation in Haiti is , has been 613 00:24:57,060 --> 00:24:59,171 deteriorating over the past couple of 614 00:24:59,171 --> 00:25:01,130 weeks . And so the uh with the 615 00:25:01,140 --> 00:25:03,479 announcement uh that has come and the 616 00:25:03,489 --> 00:25:05,600 political negotiations that have been 617 00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:07,767 happening and occurring , the violence 618 00:25:07,767 --> 00:25:09,933 has been tamped down somewhat over the 619 00:25:09,933 --> 00:25:12,100 past couple of days . And so certainly 620 00:25:12,100 --> 00:25:14,290 the political solution uh seems to be 621 00:25:14,300 --> 00:25:16,660 working and uh hopefully that that 622 00:25:16,670 --> 00:25:19,619 continues on a positive path . But if 623 00:25:19,630 --> 00:25:22,579 not , we have uh uh as I said , the uh 624 00:25:22,589 --> 00:25:24,811 contingency plans ready to respond from 625 00:25:24,811 --> 00:25:27,619 us . South . Com . Thank you . Uh uh 626 00:25:28,369 --> 00:25:31,699 You pointed out the penetration of your 627 00:25:31,709 --> 00:25:35,079 uh A O by China and Russia . Uh It 628 00:25:35,089 --> 00:25:37,680 seems that one of the leading edges of 629 00:25:37,689 --> 00:25:41,359 China's activities is economic um 630 00:25:41,369 --> 00:25:44,800 buying ports , uh getting the Belt and 631 00:25:44,810 --> 00:25:47,040 Road projects underway . And there's 632 00:25:47,050 --> 00:25:50,640 one other area too that is uh their 633 00:25:50,650 --> 00:25:54,000 willingness or their eagerness to uh 634 00:25:54,229 --> 00:25:56,670 acquire more interest in the Inter 635 00:25:56,819 --> 00:25:59,079 American Development Bank . And I 636 00:25:59,089 --> 00:26:01,630 understand that Congress must pass 637 00:26:01,640 --> 00:26:04,469 legislation to authorize the United 638 00:26:04,479 --> 00:26:07,660 States to buy the shares before the 639 00:26:07,670 --> 00:26:09,837 Chinese do . Is that accurate ? And if 640 00:26:09,837 --> 00:26:12,059 the Chinese beat us out , would that be 641 00:26:12,059 --> 00:26:14,170 a problem ? That would be a problem . 642 00:26:14,170 --> 00:26:16,392 Chairman and I , I think through the um 643 00:26:16,392 --> 00:26:18,770 our uh the US government's initiative 644 00:26:18,780 --> 00:26:21,300 uh with the American Prosperity , uh 645 00:26:21,310 --> 00:26:23,489 American partnership for economic 646 00:26:23,500 --> 00:26:26,150 prosperity A PP where the 647 00:26:26,160 --> 00:26:28,839 administration hosted 11 Latin American 648 00:26:28,849 --> 00:26:30,930 heads of state in Washington DC in 649 00:26:30,939 --> 00:26:33,400 November of 23 . And this would be part 650 00:26:33,410 --> 00:26:36,800 of that the , the uh our ability to 651 00:26:36,810 --> 00:26:39,199 invest in critical infrastructure 652 00:26:39,209 --> 00:26:41,376 through the Inter American Development 653 00:26:41,376 --> 00:26:43,376 Bank and the Development of Finance 654 00:26:43,376 --> 00:26:45,579 Corporation DFC . And so the shares 655 00:26:45,589 --> 00:26:47,869 that are coming up uh 75 million in 656 00:26:47,880 --> 00:26:51,410 shares for the US uh to uh purchase 657 00:26:51,420 --> 00:26:53,364 those shares in the Inter American 658 00:26:53,364 --> 00:26:55,420 Development Bank . And this bank has 659 00:26:55,420 --> 00:26:58,410 been established in 1959 to do exactly 660 00:26:58,420 --> 00:27:01,540 these things to uh invest in critical 661 00:27:01,550 --> 00:27:03,880 infrastructure within the region . And 662 00:27:03,890 --> 00:27:06,057 if we don't do it , the Chinese will . 663 00:27:06,057 --> 00:27:08,739 Exactly right . Chairman . Thank you uh 664 00:27:09,479 --> 00:27:11,479 worker , please . Thank you . Let's 665 00:27:11,479 --> 00:27:14,469 just stay in South . Um Venezuelan 666 00:27:14,479 --> 00:27:16,969 President Nicolas Maduro took 667 00:27:16,979 --> 00:27:18,812 unprecedented steps to establish 668 00:27:18,880 --> 00:27:21,500 control over the contested essequibo 669 00:27:21,510 --> 00:27:25,329 region of neighboring Guyana . This 670 00:27:25,339 --> 00:27:27,283 violated an international court of 671 00:27:27,283 --> 00:27:31,270 justice ruling and um the , 672 00:27:31,280 --> 00:27:33,819 the uh region accounts for two thirds 673 00:27:33,829 --> 00:27:36,150 of Guyana's territory and extensive 674 00:27:36,449 --> 00:27:39,290 offshore oil riches . Um 675 00:27:40,069 --> 00:27:43,959 How has this impacted the 676 00:27:44,060 --> 00:27:47,770 security of the region and particularly 677 00:27:48,219 --> 00:27:51,849 the fact that , that , that Venezuela 678 00:27:51,900 --> 00:27:53,844 has deployed light tanks , armored 679 00:27:53,844 --> 00:27:56,067 carriers and missile equip patrol boats 680 00:27:56,150 --> 00:27:59,689 along the affected border . So uh uh 681 00:27:59,699 --> 00:28:02,770 senator , it absolutely has and it is 682 00:28:02,780 --> 00:28:05,150 uh uh in terms of our relationship with 683 00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:08,890 Guyana as a very uh willing partner and 684 00:28:08,900 --> 00:28:10,956 uh uh democracy in the region , very 685 00:28:10,956 --> 00:28:13,122 important partner . And we see that uh 686 00:28:13,122 --> 00:28:15,178 what the Maduro regime and Venezuela 687 00:28:15,178 --> 00:28:17,233 are doing uh and the activities that 688 00:28:17,233 --> 00:28:20,079 are taking uh against this democracy uh 689 00:28:20,089 --> 00:28:23,199 with an unjustified claim . And so 690 00:28:23,359 --> 00:28:26,890 um our support for Guyana , we have 691 00:28:26,900 --> 00:28:29,199 shown that from the , the US government 692 00:28:29,410 --> 00:28:31,521 and uh through all the instruments of 693 00:28:31,521 --> 00:28:33,577 national power , the diplomacy , the 694 00:28:33,577 --> 00:28:36,859 military and uh you have directions 695 00:28:36,869 --> 00:28:40,540 from the White House uh from uh your 696 00:28:40,550 --> 00:28:43,079 superiors in the department as to what 697 00:28:43,280 --> 00:28:46,599 we should do . So as we work our uh 698 00:28:46,609 --> 00:28:49,000 my engagements and what we do with 699 00:28:49,010 --> 00:28:51,121 security cooper operation , we have a 700 00:28:51,121 --> 00:28:53,288 very robust plan with Guyana and we've 701 00:28:53,288 --> 00:28:55,454 continued on that plan and that's been 702 00:28:55,454 --> 00:28:57,530 coordinate with , with our uh us 703 00:28:57,540 --> 00:28:59,707 government briefly describe the plan . 704 00:28:59,707 --> 00:29:03,229 And so it , it consists of uh uh visits 705 00:29:03,239 --> 00:29:06,310 by um by folks in within my command 706 00:29:06,719 --> 00:29:08,939 and uh and the engagements that we do 707 00:29:08,949 --> 00:29:11,000 the exercises , the subject matter 708 00:29:11,010 --> 00:29:13,339 exchanges . We've , we've continued 709 00:29:13,349 --> 00:29:16,619 with all of those um not trying to 710 00:29:16,630 --> 00:29:19,150 exacerbate the situation but continued 711 00:29:19,160 --> 00:29:21,479 on path with our regular engagements 712 00:29:21,489 --> 00:29:23,656 that have been scheduled . And we have 713 00:29:23,656 --> 00:29:25,322 not halted any of that is the 714 00:29:25,322 --> 00:29:27,739 international community assisting us in 715 00:29:27,750 --> 00:29:29,560 that regard , the international 716 00:29:29,569 --> 00:29:31,900 community is very , very much assisting 717 00:29:31,910 --> 00:29:34,021 and I would say our uh allies as part 718 00:29:34,021 --> 00:29:36,021 of our Western hemisphere framework 719 00:29:36,021 --> 00:29:38,510 that we signed in us south com uh with 720 00:29:38,520 --> 00:29:40,742 our allies that work in the region , uh 721 00:29:40,750 --> 00:29:44,069 the UK Canada , uh the Netherlands and 722 00:29:44,079 --> 00:29:46,400 also France . And so as we work 723 00:29:46,410 --> 00:29:48,219 together to coordinate uh our 724 00:29:48,229 --> 00:29:50,396 activities , they also have activities 725 00:29:50,396 --> 00:29:52,507 and , and engagements that they do in 726 00:29:52,507 --> 00:29:54,673 the region and are doing in Guyana and 727 00:29:54,673 --> 00:29:56,729 those are also coordinate . Uh Thank 728 00:29:56,729 --> 00:29:59,800 you very much . Uh Let me switch to um 729 00:29:59,810 --> 00:30:02,000 General Guillo um 730 00:30:02,939 --> 00:30:06,479 deployment of National Guard 731 00:30:06,790 --> 00:30:10,780 troops on the border . Uh I think maybe 732 00:30:10,790 --> 00:30:13,119 a lot of Americans don't understand how 733 00:30:13,130 --> 00:30:16,709 often we do this , but um it's 734 00:30:16,719 --> 00:30:19,560 worsened considerably . The department 735 00:30:19,569 --> 00:30:21,760 is not the lead agency , but it has 736 00:30:21,770 --> 00:30:25,020 deployed troops there in 18 of the 737 00:30:25,030 --> 00:30:27,739 previous uh 21 years . 738 00:30:28,699 --> 00:30:32,319 Um They're called temporary deployments , 739 00:30:32,719 --> 00:30:34,497 but it's beginning to look like 740 00:30:34,497 --> 00:30:37,400 permanent . Um There is a difference in 741 00:30:37,410 --> 00:30:41,280 the way we de we deploy and 742 00:30:41,290 --> 00:30:45,040 notify these units is they're not um in 743 00:30:45,050 --> 00:30:49,020 the sense that um that um 744 00:30:49,130 --> 00:30:52,459 if it's a temporary deployment , they 745 00:30:52,469 --> 00:30:54,880 get 100 and 80 days notice in advance . 746 00:30:54,890 --> 00:30:58,000 If it's um regular deployment , it's a 747 00:30:58,010 --> 00:30:59,843 year and a half . So , could you 748 00:30:59,843 --> 00:31:01,680 discuss that with us ? And is my 749 00:31:01,689 --> 00:31:03,800 understanding correct there , General 750 00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:06,973 Senator , your uh your understanding is , 751 00:31:06,973 --> 00:31:09,180 is correct . Uh The , the primary 752 00:31:09,189 --> 00:31:11,300 difference that uh we see in Northern 753 00:31:11,300 --> 00:31:13,680 Command is uh we're in support as you 754 00:31:13,689 --> 00:31:15,939 mentioned . So therefore , we wait for 755 00:31:15,949 --> 00:31:19,680 the uh request the uh from the lead 756 00:31:19,689 --> 00:31:21,689 agency , in this case , Customs and 757 00:31:21,689 --> 00:31:23,800 Border Protection uh in a request for 758 00:31:23,800 --> 00:31:26,119 assistance that is uh reviewed and then 759 00:31:26,130 --> 00:31:28,297 uh has ultimately been approved by the 760 00:31:28,297 --> 00:31:30,297 Department of Defense . And then at 761 00:31:30,297 --> 00:31:32,463 that point , we can start trying to uh 762 00:31:32,463 --> 00:31:34,574 match through the joint staff and the 763 00:31:34,574 --> 00:31:36,741 National Guard view or the , the , the 764 00:31:36,741 --> 00:31:38,852 correct unit to support that based on 765 00:31:38,852 --> 00:31:40,686 the needs uh that are in that uh 766 00:31:40,689 --> 00:31:43,119 request for assistance as , as you 767 00:31:43,130 --> 00:31:46,310 alluded to , that would be helpful if 768 00:31:46,319 --> 00:31:49,959 we treated it as a 769 00:31:49,969 --> 00:31:53,910 permanent deployment . Senator , I 770 00:31:53,920 --> 00:31:56,449 think uh more than treating it as a e 771 00:31:56,459 --> 00:31:58,292 uh permanent deployment would be 772 00:31:58,292 --> 00:31:59,959 earlier , notification of the 773 00:31:59,959 --> 00:32:02,609 requirements since those change uh that 774 00:32:02,619 --> 00:32:04,786 allows us to tailor the National Guard 775 00:32:04,786 --> 00:32:07,008 Force to meet the changing requirements 776 00:32:07,008 --> 00:32:09,119 of the custom and border protection . 777 00:32:09,119 --> 00:32:11,230 Whereas if we had a permanent force , 778 00:32:11,230 --> 00:32:13,230 we might have permanently the wrong 779 00:32:13,230 --> 00:32:15,508 type of unit to sup to support however , 780 00:32:15,508 --> 00:32:17,286 to , to your point , what we've 781 00:32:17,286 --> 00:32:19,286 established and we must maintain is 782 00:32:19,286 --> 00:32:21,452 having a permanent command and control 783 00:32:21,452 --> 00:32:23,341 structure over there . So we have 784 00:32:23,341 --> 00:32:25,563 continuity and predictability in how we 785 00:32:25,563 --> 00:32:27,619 present the forces and work with the 786 00:32:27,619 --> 00:32:29,730 customs and border protection . Do we 787 00:32:29,730 --> 00:32:31,952 need to give you different authority in 788 00:32:31,952 --> 00:32:34,175 that regard ? Or is it just a matter of 789 00:32:34,175 --> 00:32:36,341 the Department ? I think we have the , 790 00:32:36,341 --> 00:32:38,640 I'm sorry , uh Senator , we have the 791 00:32:38,650 --> 00:32:40,761 authorities that we need . Uh , the , 792 00:32:40,761 --> 00:32:42,839 the thing that we would most benefit 793 00:32:42,849 --> 00:32:45,119 from , uh , as you alluded to is time , 794 00:32:45,130 --> 00:32:47,839 time to pick and train and prepare the 795 00:32:47,849 --> 00:32:50,016 National Guard units that are going to 796 00:32:50,016 --> 00:32:52,016 go down there and support the CBP . 797 00:32:52,016 --> 00:32:54,182 Well , uh , to both of you , uh , tell 798 00:32:54,182 --> 00:32:56,349 us what you need , we'll try to get it 799 00:32:56,349 --> 00:32:58,460 for you . Thank you , sir . Thank you 800 00:32:58,460 --> 00:33:00,516 very much , Senator Worker , Senator 801 00:33:00,516 --> 00:33:03,359 King , please . Thank you , Mr Chairman 802 00:33:03,369 --> 00:33:05,702 in my notes . Since you've been talking , 803 00:33:05,702 --> 00:33:07,980 I've written word gap about five times . 804 00:33:07,980 --> 00:33:09,869 So I'm going to talk about gaps . 805 00:33:09,910 --> 00:33:13,910 General Gill . Um Do we have a sensor 806 00:33:13,920 --> 00:33:16,219 gap at NORAD ? The , we , we learn more 807 00:33:16,229 --> 00:33:18,562 from failures than we do from successes . 808 00:33:18,562 --> 00:33:20,507 What did we learn from the balloon 809 00:33:20,507 --> 00:33:22,507 incursion about the adequacy of our 810 00:33:22,507 --> 00:33:24,673 sensors which is essentially the , the 811 00:33:24,673 --> 00:33:28,140 basis of NORAD , Senator . We learned a 812 00:33:28,150 --> 00:33:31,359 great deal uh to the gaps . Uh what we 813 00:33:31,369 --> 00:33:35,310 have is um we had some uh gaps in the 814 00:33:35,319 --> 00:33:37,375 layered approach where we want to be 815 00:33:37,375 --> 00:33:39,430 able to detect with domain awareness 816 00:33:39,430 --> 00:33:42,349 from satellites down to uh traditional 817 00:33:42,359 --> 00:33:44,709 air . Uh One of the problems is low 818 00:33:44,719 --> 00:33:46,941 altitude is that , that's right , sir , 819 00:33:46,941 --> 00:33:49,052 all the way down to the surface . And 820 00:33:49,052 --> 00:33:51,219 then even in the undersea , uh we were 821 00:33:51,219 --> 00:33:53,219 able to address many of those uh on 822 00:33:53,219 --> 00:33:55,219 initiatives that were started by my 823 00:33:55,219 --> 00:33:57,108 predecessor , General Van Herk by 824 00:33:57,108 --> 00:33:59,275 changing the sensitivity of the radars 825 00:33:59,275 --> 00:34:01,386 that , that we do have and , and that 826 00:34:01,386 --> 00:34:03,441 has allowed us to have better domain 827 00:34:03,441 --> 00:34:05,663 awareness in that uh regime that , that 828 00:34:05,663 --> 00:34:07,663 you mentioned . However , there are 829 00:34:07,663 --> 00:34:09,775 some gaps that will be uh manifesting 830 00:34:09,775 --> 00:34:11,663 uh in the near future . Those are 831 00:34:11,663 --> 00:34:13,570 currently uh uh scheduled to be 832 00:34:13,580 --> 00:34:15,802 addressed by the over the horizon radar 833 00:34:15,802 --> 00:34:18,110 by the H BT SS which is the hypersonic 834 00:34:18,120 --> 00:34:20,219 and ballistic uh tracking uh space 835 00:34:20,229 --> 00:34:23,280 system . Those capabilities are 836 00:34:23,290 --> 00:34:25,489 essential to , to fill gaps that are 837 00:34:25,500 --> 00:34:27,333 growing because of the increased 838 00:34:27,333 --> 00:34:29,444 capability of the adversary . I would 839 00:34:29,444 --> 00:34:31,389 suggest that that's an urgent need 840 00:34:31,389 --> 00:34:33,611 given , given the experience that we've 841 00:34:33,611 --> 00:34:33,560 had , but also given the , the 842 00:34:33,570 --> 00:34:36,270 incredible militarization of the Arctic 843 00:34:36,280 --> 00:34:38,750 coast by , by Russia and the 844 00:34:38,760 --> 00:34:40,871 development of drone technology , all 845 00:34:40,871 --> 00:34:43,038 those things added together , create a 846 00:34:43,038 --> 00:34:45,204 significant risk . I hope you can come 847 00:34:45,204 --> 00:34:47,629 to us with uh with what you need . Uh 848 00:34:47,659 --> 00:34:49,881 because this is something we need to do 849 00:34:49,881 --> 00:34:52,689 in a hurry . Uh We , we can't wait five 850 00:34:52,699 --> 00:34:55,530 years to , to develop this capacity . 851 00:34:56,649 --> 00:35:00,030 We also have an icebreaker gap in terms 852 00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:02,780 of the uh our ability to operate in the 853 00:35:02,790 --> 00:35:04,901 Arctic as the Arctic Ocean opens up . 854 00:35:04,901 --> 00:35:06,679 It's becoming , becoming , as I 855 00:35:06,679 --> 00:35:08,679 mentioned , more militarized by the 856 00:35:08,679 --> 00:35:11,370 Russians in a much more important uh 857 00:35:11,379 --> 00:35:13,169 body of water . It's like we've 858 00:35:13,179 --> 00:35:15,290 suddenly discovered the Mediterranean 859 00:35:15,290 --> 00:35:18,169 Sea . Uh talk to me about uh 860 00:35:18,179 --> 00:35:20,600 icebreaker icebreakers . That's we only 861 00:35:20,610 --> 00:35:22,360 have 1.5 icebreakers , heavy 862 00:35:22,370 --> 00:35:24,426 icebreakers in the , in the Arctic . 863 00:35:25,010 --> 00:35:27,121 That's , that's correct . Senator and 864 00:35:27,121 --> 00:35:29,232 that is a , uh we're , we're severely 865 00:35:29,232 --> 00:35:31,177 outnumbered . Uh We appreciate the 866 00:35:31,177 --> 00:35:33,459 Coast Guard . I'd say 40 to 1 is 867 00:35:33,489 --> 00:35:35,711 outnumbered . That's approximate number 868 00:35:35,711 --> 00:35:38,550 that the Russians have . Yes , Senator 869 00:35:38,560 --> 00:35:40,560 and the , and the Chinese declaring 870 00:35:40,560 --> 00:35:42,727 themselves a near Arctic nation . Uh I 871 00:35:42,727 --> 00:35:44,727 notice when they , when the Chinese 872 00:35:44,727 --> 00:35:46,616 declared themselves a near Arctic 873 00:35:46,616 --> 00:35:48,838 nation , my position is that Maine is a 874 00:35:48,838 --> 00:35:52,429 near Caribbean State . Uh I , 875 00:35:52,590 --> 00:35:55,729 I share your , your view , sir . Uh 876 00:35:56,330 --> 00:35:58,386 We , we do appreciate that the Coast 877 00:35:58,386 --> 00:35:59,997 Guard is , is procuring more 878 00:35:59,997 --> 00:36:02,219 icebreakers . But , but even with those 879 00:36:02,219 --> 00:36:04,386 will be severely outnumbered and , and 880 00:36:04,386 --> 00:36:06,608 that does limit our freedom of maneuver 881 00:36:06,608 --> 00:36:08,663 in that region . It's basically like 882 00:36:08,663 --> 00:36:10,886 not having a road to get where you need 883 00:36:10,886 --> 00:36:13,360 to get . Uh General Richardson . Uh 884 00:36:14,409 --> 00:36:17,149 Let's talk about uh another gap drugs . 885 00:36:17,479 --> 00:36:19,423 Uh Since we've been sitting here , 886 00:36:19,423 --> 00:36:21,489 about 10 Americans have died of drug 887 00:36:21,500 --> 00:36:23,689 overdoses just , just since we began 888 00:36:23,699 --> 00:36:27,340 this meeting 45 minutes ago . One a day 889 00:36:27,350 --> 00:36:30,050 is one day , one person a day is dying 890 00:36:30,060 --> 00:36:32,889 in my home state of Maine . Uh 891 00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:37,659 Do you have the capacity to interdict 892 00:36:37,989 --> 00:36:41,459 drug shipments coming in by sea that we 893 00:36:41,469 --> 00:36:43,560 know of . I've asked this question 894 00:36:43,570 --> 00:36:45,737 every year for about the past 10 years 895 00:36:45,737 --> 00:36:48,909 and I'm afraid I know the answer and , 896 00:36:48,919 --> 00:36:51,141 and Senator . So the uh in the US South 897 00:36:51,141 --> 00:36:52,808 com we have the detection and 898 00:36:52,808 --> 00:36:55,820 monitoring mission and that is to gain 899 00:36:55,830 --> 00:36:58,510 the intelligence uh for I shouldn't , 900 00:36:58,949 --> 00:37:01,060 do you have the capacity ? Do we does 901 00:37:01,060 --> 00:37:02,949 the country you have the terrific 902 00:37:02,949 --> 00:37:05,360 capacity for , for intelligence and 903 00:37:05,370 --> 00:37:08,739 identification ? My concern is once we 904 00:37:08,750 --> 00:37:11,139 know about a dangerous shipment , then 905 00:37:11,149 --> 00:37:13,482 do we have the capacity to interdict it ? 906 00:37:13,482 --> 00:37:15,705 And so the uh we pass that intelligence 907 00:37:15,705 --> 00:37:17,871 over to law enforcement or our partner 908 00:37:17,871 --> 00:37:19,816 nations and it depends on uh who's 909 00:37:19,816 --> 00:37:22,090 close enough to do that . And so in 910 00:37:22,100 --> 00:37:24,211 terms of the capacity , we anticipate 911 00:37:24,211 --> 00:37:26,433 that we're able to , of what we know is 912 00:37:26,433 --> 00:37:30,290 out there uh interdict about 10% of the 913 00:37:30,300 --> 00:37:33,520 known problem . And uh with the um with 914 00:37:33,530 --> 00:37:36,000 the resourcing and capabilities that we 915 00:37:36,010 --> 00:37:38,232 currently are given , I would emphasize 916 00:37:38,232 --> 00:37:40,399 that figure to our colleagues , we can 917 00:37:40,399 --> 00:37:42,343 interdict 10% of what we know of . 918 00:37:43,270 --> 00:37:46,199 That's , that's inexcusable . And I'm 919 00:37:46,209 --> 00:37:47,820 not that , I don't mean it's 920 00:37:47,820 --> 00:37:49,876 inexcusable for you . But one of the 921 00:37:49,876 --> 00:37:52,098 problems that strikes me is when , when 922 00:37:52,098 --> 00:37:54,098 everybody's in charge , nobody's in 923 00:37:54,098 --> 00:37:56,939 charge and you've got yourself DEA DH S 924 00:37:56,949 --> 00:37:59,005 the intelligence community . And the 925 00:37:59,005 --> 00:38:02,500 problem is Americans are dying uh in 926 00:38:02,510 --> 00:38:04,732 about every 10 days , we have September 927 00:38:04,732 --> 00:38:07,850 11th , 3000 people die in this country 928 00:38:07,860 --> 00:38:10,570 every 10 days . And you use the word in 929 00:38:10,580 --> 00:38:12,929 your testimony , assault . And that's 930 00:38:12,939 --> 00:38:15,060 what it is . It's an assault , but 931 00:38:15,070 --> 00:38:17,292 we're treating it as a kind of domestic 932 00:38:17,292 --> 00:38:19,459 law enforcement problem when it , it's 933 00:38:19,459 --> 00:38:21,459 an assault and most of it is coming 934 00:38:21,459 --> 00:38:23,681 from outside of our country . So I hope 935 00:38:23,681 --> 00:38:26,014 that you will work with your colleagues , 936 00:38:26,014 --> 00:38:29,229 perhaps form a , a task group to , to , 937 00:38:29,239 --> 00:38:31,020 to get after this problem of 938 00:38:31,030 --> 00:38:33,030 interdiction . And if we don't have 939 00:38:33,030 --> 00:38:34,974 capacity , if we don't have enough 940 00:38:34,974 --> 00:38:37,110 coast guard cutters or DH S doesn't 941 00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:40,679 have the capacity . Tell us , tell us 942 00:38:40,689 --> 00:38:43,639 because we can't solve a problem if we 943 00:38:43,649 --> 00:38:45,816 don't know what , what it is , we know 944 00:38:45,816 --> 00:38:47,982 the general shape of the problem , but 945 00:38:47,982 --> 00:38:50,149 you're in a position to tell us what's 946 00:38:50,149 --> 00:38:52,760 missing and what you can do in order to 947 00:38:52,770 --> 00:38:55,310 help protect this country . And Senator , 948 00:38:55,320 --> 00:38:57,939 I would offer that um that we can't 949 00:38:58,020 --> 00:39:00,242 interdict our way out of this problem . 950 00:39:00,242 --> 00:39:02,298 And we've got to be able to go after 951 00:39:02,298 --> 00:39:04,459 the networks . We've got to be a able 952 00:39:04,469 --> 00:39:06,580 to go after the drug labs . We've got 953 00:39:06,590 --> 00:39:08,757 to be able to follow the money and the 954 00:39:08,757 --> 00:39:10,757 money laundering , which is fueling 955 00:39:10,757 --> 00:39:14,239 this very um rich uh environment that 956 00:39:14,250 --> 00:39:16,583 the transnational criminal organization . 957 00:39:16,583 --> 00:39:18,694 We have to talk about the demand side 958 00:39:18,694 --> 00:39:20,917 here and treatment and prevention . I I 959 00:39:20,917 --> 00:39:23,139 totally agree with that , but this is a 960 00:39:23,139 --> 00:39:25,306 discreet problem that I think uh we do 961 00:39:25,306 --> 00:39:27,361 have some capacity to deal with . Uh 962 00:39:27,361 --> 00:39:29,583 final question . This was isn't about a 963 00:39:29,583 --> 00:39:31,306 gap . But what is your overall 964 00:39:31,306 --> 00:39:33,028 assessment of , of the Chinese 965 00:39:33,028 --> 00:39:34,750 incursion into Latin America ? 966 00:39:34,750 --> 00:39:36,917 Specifically , they've been doing this 967 00:39:36,919 --> 00:39:38,863 for some time doing infrastructure 968 00:39:38,870 --> 00:39:41,037 projects in other parts of the world . 969 00:39:41,037 --> 00:39:43,037 There's some development of buyer's 970 00:39:43,037 --> 00:39:44,870 remorse that the Chinese haven't 971 00:39:44,870 --> 00:39:46,926 performed as they were expected that 972 00:39:46,926 --> 00:39:49,340 the the the debt colonialism is , is , 973 00:39:49,350 --> 00:39:51,649 is becoming a problem is that occurring 974 00:39:51,659 --> 00:39:53,437 in Latin America in your view . 975 00:39:53,437 --> 00:39:56,500 Absolutely . Senator and my concern as 976 00:39:56,510 --> 00:39:58,566 a combatant commander for the region 977 00:39:58,566 --> 00:40:01,060 and 22 of 31 countries in the region 978 00:40:01,070 --> 00:40:03,070 have signed on to the Belt and Road 979 00:40:03,070 --> 00:40:05,510 initiative . But the uh it's all uh 980 00:40:05,520 --> 00:40:07,576 investment , a lot of investment and 981 00:40:07,576 --> 00:40:09,687 critical infrastructure where the big 982 00:40:09,687 --> 00:40:11,798 money projects are . That's Deepwater 983 00:40:11,798 --> 00:40:14,870 port five G space , safe city , smart 984 00:40:14,879 --> 00:40:17,169 city technology to be able to spy on 985 00:40:17,179 --> 00:40:20,239 the , on the um on the populations . 986 00:40:20,389 --> 00:40:22,500 And so it's , it's the with the state 987 00:40:22,500 --> 00:40:25,469 owned enterprises from the PR C . And 988 00:40:25,479 --> 00:40:27,590 my concern is being able to use those 989 00:40:27,590 --> 00:40:29,646 for military application if required 990 00:40:29,646 --> 00:40:31,423 and it's in all of the critical 991 00:40:31,423 --> 00:40:33,701 infrastructure . Thank you . Thank you , 992 00:40:33,701 --> 00:40:35,979 Senator King , Senator Fisher , please . 993 00:40:35,979 --> 00:40:38,090 Thank you , Mr Chairman and thank you 994 00:40:38,090 --> 00:40:40,312 both for being here today . General GEO 995 00:40:40,312 --> 00:40:42,535 I've appreciated our discussions on the 996 00:40:42,535 --> 00:40:43,979 challenges of detecting , 997 00:40:43,979 --> 00:40:46,449 characterizing and tracking potential 998 00:40:46,459 --> 00:40:49,030 threats to our homeland . And most 999 00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:51,159 Americans are fully aware of the 1000 00:40:51,169 --> 00:40:53,489 incident with the Chinese balloon , but 1001 00:40:54,179 --> 00:40:57,149 north com has other responsibilities as 1002 00:40:57,159 --> 00:40:59,270 well , especially with protecting the 1003 00:40:59,270 --> 00:41:01,830 homeland from the more advanced threats 1004 00:41:02,000 --> 00:41:03,833 that are out there , which would 1005 00:41:03,833 --> 00:41:06,090 include ballistic and cruise missiles . 1006 00:41:06,429 --> 00:41:09,729 Uh Why is having that improved domain 1007 00:41:09,739 --> 00:41:12,629 awareness , the which is the ability to 1008 00:41:12,639 --> 00:41:15,689 detect and , and track the threats and 1009 00:41:15,699 --> 00:41:19,330 also to provide a clear threat picture 1010 00:41:19,340 --> 00:41:22,179 of what's out there and to be able to 1011 00:41:22,189 --> 00:41:25,020 discriminate what you're seeing . 1012 00:41:25,840 --> 00:41:28,030 Why is that so important to defending 1013 00:41:28,040 --> 00:41:31,370 our Homeland Senator . It's important 1014 00:41:31,379 --> 00:41:34,149 because it gives us time , time to uh 1015 00:41:34,239 --> 00:41:38,060 inform leaders make decisions and enact 1016 00:41:38,070 --> 00:41:40,126 uh defeat mechanisms to defeat these 1017 00:41:40,126 --> 00:41:42,239 threats that are coming in . Uh You 1018 00:41:42,250 --> 00:41:44,649 mentioned the discrimination capability 1019 00:41:44,659 --> 00:41:46,881 as the threat becomes more advanced and 1020 00:41:46,881 --> 00:41:49,350 they can put out decoys . Uh we could 1021 00:41:49,360 --> 00:41:53,000 needlessly shoot uh interceptors at uh , 1022 00:41:53,010 --> 00:41:55,066 at objects that are not a threat but 1023 00:41:55,066 --> 00:41:57,121 having the discrimination radar make 1024 00:41:57,121 --> 00:41:59,121 sure that we can actually shoot and 1025 00:41:59,121 --> 00:42:01,343 kill the uh the warhead that would be a 1026 00:42:01,343 --> 00:42:03,399 threat . And the other thing I would 1027 00:42:03,399 --> 00:42:05,177 quickly say , uh Senator is the 1028 00:42:05,177 --> 00:42:07,399 capabilities are growing so much by the 1029 00:42:07,399 --> 00:42:09,510 adversary . That domain awareness you 1030 00:42:09,510 --> 00:42:11,621 mentioned , needs to push out further 1031 00:42:11,621 --> 00:42:13,843 away from our shores , detect earlier , 1032 00:42:13,843 --> 00:42:15,788 characterize them earlier , as you 1033 00:42:15,788 --> 00:42:17,788 mentioned . So we have more time to 1034 00:42:17,788 --> 00:42:20,010 employ the defense capabilities that we 1035 00:42:20,010 --> 00:42:22,121 have . Are we moving quickly enough ? 1036 00:42:22,121 --> 00:42:24,360 Uh Senator , right on the uh we're 1037 00:42:24,370 --> 00:42:26,370 right on the edge . I think that uh 1038 00:42:26,370 --> 00:42:28,481 we're moving quickly and I appreciate 1039 00:42:28,481 --> 00:42:30,481 all the support from , from uh this 1040 00:42:30,481 --> 00:42:32,703 body and the services . Uh but we can't 1041 00:42:32,703 --> 00:42:34,926 uh pause at all because the adversaries 1042 00:42:34,926 --> 00:42:37,148 and multiple adversaries , not just one 1043 00:42:37,148 --> 00:42:39,259 are , are growing very , very quickly 1044 00:42:39,259 --> 00:42:41,037 and it , and it really is at an 1045 00:42:41,037 --> 00:42:43,037 alarming rate . I'm , I'm concerned 1046 00:42:43,037 --> 00:42:44,926 about what um we're seeing in the 1047 00:42:44,926 --> 00:42:48,790 president's budget request for um 1048 00:42:48,929 --> 00:42:52,239 fy 2025 . The administration 1049 00:42:52,250 --> 00:42:55,780 decreases spending for the glide phase 1050 00:42:55,790 --> 00:42:59,139 interceptor program and it's , it's 1051 00:42:59,149 --> 00:43:01,260 stating it's going to be delivered in 1052 00:43:01,260 --> 00:43:05,000 2035 yet in the NDA A of 1053 00:43:05,010 --> 00:43:08,639 FY 24 in section 1666 1054 00:43:08,929 --> 00:43:11,149 that requires the missile defense 1055 00:43:11,159 --> 00:43:14,520 agency to achieve an initial 1056 00:43:14,530 --> 00:43:17,689 operational capability of that 1057 00:43:17,699 --> 00:43:21,120 program by um December 1058 00:43:21,129 --> 00:43:24,979 31st 2029 . How 1059 00:43:24,989 --> 00:43:27,020 do you respond to ? My concerns , 1060 00:43:28,969 --> 00:43:31,479 Senator ? My response is that uh I view 1061 00:43:31,489 --> 00:43:33,267 hypersonics as perhaps the most 1062 00:43:33,267 --> 00:43:35,459 destabilizing uh threat that we have 1063 00:43:35,469 --> 00:43:37,989 out there because of the fast speed and 1064 00:43:38,000 --> 00:43:40,167 more than that the maneuverability and 1065 00:43:40,167 --> 00:43:42,439 the unpredictability on where it will 1066 00:43:42,449 --> 00:43:44,282 impact as opposed to a ballistic 1067 00:43:44,290 --> 00:43:46,401 missile which is fairly predictable . 1068 00:43:46,489 --> 00:43:49,280 Uh I've worked very closely in my short 1069 00:43:49,290 --> 00:43:51,346 period of time with MD A . I'm , I'm 1070 00:43:51,346 --> 00:43:53,457 pleased with some of the efforts that 1071 00:43:53,457 --> 00:43:55,679 they're doing to uh intercept uh in the 1072 00:43:55,679 --> 00:43:57,457 glide phase and then also using 1073 00:43:57,457 --> 00:43:59,659 existing systems such as the SM six to 1074 00:43:59,669 --> 00:44:01,725 adapt against that threat . And then 1075 00:44:01,725 --> 00:44:03,947 I'm also very pleased with that MB A is 1076 00:44:03,947 --> 00:44:06,389 doing with the H BT SS , the uh uh 1077 00:44:06,399 --> 00:44:08,810 satellite capability to detect and 1078 00:44:08,820 --> 00:44:10,931 track hypersonics , you know , just , 1079 00:44:10,931 --> 00:44:13,419 just , just yesterday , we heard from a 1080 00:44:13,429 --> 00:44:16,120 senior analyst with the National Air 1081 00:44:16,129 --> 00:44:19,530 and Space Intelligence Center , he told 1082 00:44:19,540 --> 00:44:22,250 Congress that quote , China now has the 1083 00:44:22,260 --> 00:44:25,449 world's leading hypersonic arsenal . So 1084 00:44:25,459 --> 00:44:27,790 given the , the pace that we're seeing 1085 00:44:27,800 --> 00:44:30,489 with , with Russia and with China as 1086 00:44:30,500 --> 00:44:32,850 they advance their hypersonic weapons 1087 00:44:32,860 --> 00:44:35,409 programs , should the department 1088 00:44:35,419 --> 00:44:38,629 accelerate the development of those 1089 00:44:38,639 --> 00:44:41,689 hypersonic defense systems ? Um 1090 00:44:42,489 --> 00:44:45,010 Really when , when it is technically 1091 00:44:45,020 --> 00:44:48,040 feasible to do so , Senator I support 1092 00:44:48,050 --> 00:44:50,340 moving all of our uh capabilities 1093 00:44:50,350 --> 00:44:52,517 against the strategic threats that you 1094 00:44:52,517 --> 00:44:54,739 mentioned as far left as possible based 1095 00:44:54,739 --> 00:44:57,510 on the growing and uh consistently 1096 00:44:57,520 --> 00:44:59,853 growing capabilities of our adversaries . 1097 00:44:59,853 --> 00:45:02,020 Thank you , General Richardson . Thank 1098 00:45:02,020 --> 00:45:04,242 you for all the work that you have done 1099 00:45:04,242 --> 00:45:06,520 and , and your service to this country . 1100 00:45:06,520 --> 00:45:09,350 Um When , when we talk about uh China 1101 00:45:09,360 --> 00:45:12,379 and the Belt and Road initiatives , you , 1102 00:45:12,389 --> 00:45:15,030 you answered uh Senator King on that , 1103 00:45:15,040 --> 00:45:17,151 But when you're looking at the longer 1104 00:45:17,159 --> 00:45:21,000 term uh strategies that China has in 1105 00:45:21,360 --> 00:45:25,310 um the bind that they continue 1106 00:45:25,320 --> 00:45:29,070 to do in uh in your uh area of 1107 00:45:29,080 --> 00:45:32,739 responsibility . Um How serious a 1108 00:45:32,750 --> 00:45:35,209 threat is that I look at it as a 1109 00:45:35,219 --> 00:45:37,649 serious threat uh because of the , the , 1110 00:45:37,659 --> 00:45:39,750 the ability of these state owned , 1111 00:45:39,760 --> 00:45:42,100 controlled by the government companies . 1112 00:45:42,360 --> 00:45:44,527 Uh If I just take the Panama Canal and 1113 00:45:44,527 --> 00:45:46,638 the five state owned enterprises that 1114 00:45:46,638 --> 00:45:48,638 are along either side of the Panama 1115 00:45:48,638 --> 00:45:50,804 Canal , and that's a very uh important 1116 00:45:50,804 --> 00:45:52,889 strategic line of uh communication . 1117 00:45:52,899 --> 00:45:56,850 And so uh i it's it , there are a lot 1118 00:45:56,860 --> 00:45:59,560 of uh large implications there in terms 1119 00:45:59,570 --> 00:46:01,419 of uh in the all the critical 1120 00:46:01,429 --> 00:46:03,651 infrastructure , the deep water ports , 1121 00:46:03,651 --> 00:46:06,040 the five G space , uh safe city , smart 1122 00:46:06,050 --> 00:46:08,399 city technology , so very concerning . 1123 00:46:08,540 --> 00:46:10,429 Thank you . And , and thank you , 1124 00:46:10,429 --> 00:46:12,651 General Gio you , you made comments , I 1125 00:46:12,651 --> 00:46:14,873 think it was yesterday before the , the 1126 00:46:14,873 --> 00:46:16,929 House Committee or , or two days ago 1127 00:46:16,929 --> 00:46:18,820 before the House Armed Services 1128 00:46:18,830 --> 00:46:22,560 Committee about um seeing or 1129 00:46:22,570 --> 00:46:24,681 the possibility of seeing in the very 1130 00:46:24,681 --> 00:46:27,810 near future of Chinese aircraft in uh 1131 00:46:27,860 --> 00:46:31,669 in closeness to our homeland . I thank 1132 00:46:31,679 --> 00:46:33,957 you for bringing that to our attention . 1133 00:46:34,709 --> 00:46:36,931 Thank you , Senator Fisher . Uh Senator 1134 00:46:36,931 --> 00:46:39,889 Hirono , please . Thank you , Mr 1135 00:46:39,899 --> 00:46:41,899 Chairman . Thank you both for being 1136 00:46:41,899 --> 00:46:45,679 here , General Guo . I remain concerned 1137 00:46:45,689 --> 00:46:49,449 about the dod S uh uh missile defense 1138 00:46:51,209 --> 00:46:53,320 posture , I guess you can call it and 1139 00:46:53,320 --> 00:46:55,959 that the dod does not have a plan to 1140 00:46:55,969 --> 00:46:58,136 address the current and future missile 1141 00:46:58,136 --> 00:47:00,247 defense needs of Hawaii . And it's an 1142 00:47:00,247 --> 00:47:02,469 issue that I have brought up , but with 1143 00:47:02,469 --> 00:47:04,358 just about everybody who comes to 1144 00:47:04,358 --> 00:47:06,580 testify from the dod and the 2024 NDA A 1145 00:47:06,580 --> 00:47:08,870 directs a plan for the missile defense 1146 00:47:08,879 --> 00:47:11,189 of Hawaii , which Indo Paycom is 1147 00:47:11,199 --> 00:47:14,469 leading general . Your predecessor told 1148 00:47:14,479 --> 00:47:16,489 me last year that North Com is 1149 00:47:16,500 --> 00:47:18,389 responsible for protecting Hawaii 1150 00:47:18,389 --> 00:47:20,556 against ballistic missile threats from 1151 00:47:20,556 --> 00:47:22,667 North Korea . But of course , we also 1152 00:47:22,667 --> 00:47:24,611 need to concern ourselves with the 1153 00:47:24,611 --> 00:47:26,722 missile threats , cruise missiles and 1154 00:47:26,722 --> 00:47:28,278 hypersonics . Have you been 1155 00:47:28,278 --> 00:47:30,500 coordinating with Indo Paycom regarding 1156 00:47:30,500 --> 00:47:32,667 the development of the missile defense 1157 00:47:32,667 --> 00:47:36,209 plan ? Senator , I , I have uh we work 1158 00:47:36,219 --> 00:47:39,250 very closely with uh Indo Paycom on uh 1159 00:47:39,260 --> 00:47:42,169 all defense of our entire homeland and , 1160 00:47:42,179 --> 00:47:44,179 and , and I , I also agree with the 1161 00:47:44,179 --> 00:47:46,346 characterization that that General Van 1162 00:47:46,346 --> 00:47:48,568 Herk did on our specific role in that . 1163 00:47:48,820 --> 00:47:51,280 So um I have some concerns that , that 1164 00:47:51,290 --> 00:47:53,346 there are so many different commands 1165 00:47:53,346 --> 00:47:55,290 involved in the missile defense of 1166 00:47:55,290 --> 00:47:57,457 Hawaii uh missile defense in general . 1167 00:47:57,457 --> 00:47:59,623 So we have , uh , you , we have , um , 1168 00:47:59,623 --> 00:48:01,679 well , we have North Com Indo paycom 1169 00:48:01,679 --> 00:48:04,879 space com Stratcom Missile Defense 1170 00:48:04,889 --> 00:48:06,833 Agency . Do you have some concerns 1171 00:48:06,833 --> 00:48:09,056 about how all of you are coordinating ? 1172 00:48:09,056 --> 00:48:11,222 Uh , and , and coming up with the kind 1173 00:48:11,222 --> 00:48:13,056 of plan that we need for missile 1174 00:48:13,056 --> 00:48:15,580 defense ? Senator II , I think that we 1175 00:48:15,590 --> 00:48:17,590 communicate , uh , very well , uh , 1176 00:48:17,590 --> 00:48:19,701 with each other . I think that we all 1177 00:48:19,701 --> 00:48:21,757 understand the priorities . And so I 1178 00:48:21,757 --> 00:48:23,757 haven't seen any place where having 1179 00:48:23,757 --> 00:48:26,070 multiple uh agencies responsible for a 1180 00:48:26,080 --> 00:48:28,500 common area uh presenting a seam or a 1181 00:48:28,510 --> 00:48:30,750 challenge . Uh but I'm very acutely 1182 00:48:30,760 --> 00:48:32,927 aware of the potential and I watch for 1183 00:48:32,927 --> 00:48:36,500 that very closely . The 2024 1184 00:48:36,510 --> 00:48:39,449 NDA A as I mentioned , directs a plan 1185 00:48:39,459 --> 00:48:41,929 from Indo Paycom . So that plan is 1186 00:48:42,100 --> 00:48:44,322 going to be presented to us , I hope by 1187 00:48:44,322 --> 00:48:46,679 next month , which is uh uh the time 1188 00:48:46,689 --> 00:48:49,350 frame for that plan . So um I assume 1189 00:48:49,360 --> 00:48:51,138 that that plan will reflect the 1190 00:48:51,138 --> 00:48:53,249 coordinate uh input from all of you . 1191 00:48:54,929 --> 00:48:57,096 General Richardson , China is building 1192 00:48:57,096 --> 00:48:58,985 a deep water port in Peru that is 1193 00:48:58,985 --> 00:49:01,207 expected to open this November and will 1194 00:49:01,207 --> 00:49:03,479 be the first South American port 1195 00:49:03,489 --> 00:49:05,656 controlled by China . And this is just 1196 00:49:05,656 --> 00:49:07,378 one example of China's growing 1197 00:49:07,378 --> 00:49:09,322 influence in Latin America through 1198 00:49:09,322 --> 00:49:11,850 economic ties , controlling critical 1199 00:49:11,860 --> 00:49:13,879 minerals and establishing port and 1200 00:49:13,889 --> 00:49:16,550 space facilities . This presents unique 1201 00:49:16,560 --> 00:49:18,669 strategic risk to us , national 1202 00:49:18,679 --> 00:49:21,449 security and global order . General . 1203 00:49:21,459 --> 00:49:23,403 What changes are you seeing in the 1204 00:49:23,403 --> 00:49:25,292 region as a result of the growing 1205 00:49:25,292 --> 00:49:27,459 influence of the PR C . And what steps 1206 00:49:27,459 --> 00:49:29,629 are you taking to counter China's 1207 00:49:29,639 --> 00:49:32,360 influence in Latin America ? So , thank 1208 00:49:32,370 --> 00:49:34,481 you , Senator . And the uh we have uh 1209 00:49:34,481 --> 00:49:36,592 doubled down and with the increase of 1210 00:49:36,592 --> 00:49:38,481 funding last year from the United 1211 00:49:38,481 --> 00:49:41,110 States Congress uh US and uh south com 1212 00:49:41,120 --> 00:49:43,342 and Africom received some fence funding 1213 00:49:43,350 --> 00:49:45,250 that went to uh security cooper 1214 00:49:45,260 --> 00:49:48,360 operation uh programs and then also 1215 00:49:48,370 --> 00:49:50,592 with flexible authorities . So that was 1216 00:49:50,592 --> 00:49:53,590 extremely helpful and it allows us to 1217 00:49:53,600 --> 00:49:56,870 be very responsive in terms of uh being 1218 00:49:56,879 --> 00:50:00,429 able to uh help our partner nations um 1219 00:50:00,520 --> 00:50:03,379 to counter the influence of China . And 1220 00:50:03,389 --> 00:50:05,611 so I want to thank you for that and our 1221 00:50:05,611 --> 00:50:07,778 ability to be able to respond to be uh 1222 00:50:07,778 --> 00:50:10,750 responsive . Uh These uh heads of state 1223 00:50:10,760 --> 00:50:12,927 are generally in the seat for one term 1224 00:50:12,927 --> 00:50:15,149 of four years . So they're working on a 1225 00:50:15,149 --> 00:50:17,316 stopwatch , not a calendar and they're 1226 00:50:17,316 --> 00:50:19,538 trying to show progress within months , 1227 00:50:19,538 --> 00:50:21,593 not years . And so really appreciate 1228 00:50:21,593 --> 00:50:25,100 that resourcing . Do you have ? So you 1229 00:50:25,110 --> 00:50:26,888 mentioned that we have provided 1230 00:50:26,888 --> 00:50:28,888 additional resources , do you think 1231 00:50:28,888 --> 00:50:31,250 that we are doing enough to counter 1232 00:50:31,260 --> 00:50:33,419 because China is from my perspective 1233 00:50:33,429 --> 00:50:35,540 everywhere and especially of course , 1234 00:50:35,540 --> 00:50:37,762 in the Indo Pacific area , we know what 1235 00:50:37,762 --> 00:50:39,818 their uh influences are and with the 1236 00:50:39,818 --> 00:50:41,985 Pacific Island nations , for example . 1237 00:50:41,985 --> 00:50:44,096 So now they're in Latin America , are 1238 00:50:44,096 --> 00:50:46,610 we doing enough to really uh address 1239 00:50:46,719 --> 00:50:49,139 all of the , the kind of long term uh 1240 00:50:49,149 --> 00:50:52,969 focus that China has throughout ? Uh 1241 00:50:53,149 --> 00:50:56,270 so Senator , the um uh the through all 1242 00:50:56,280 --> 00:50:58,502 of the instruments of power of team usa 1243 00:50:58,502 --> 00:51:01,300 and bringing those together uh and 1244 00:51:01,310 --> 00:51:03,477 synchronizing and integrating better . 1245 00:51:03,477 --> 00:51:05,810 The chairman brought up the uh the A PP , 1246 00:51:05,810 --> 00:51:07,921 the American Partnership for economic 1247 00:51:07,921 --> 00:51:10,219 prosperity and the uh I DB invest 1248 00:51:10,229 --> 00:51:12,080 program that through that , that 1249 00:51:12,090 --> 00:51:15,090 initial program uh to invest in the 1250 00:51:15,100 --> 00:51:17,100 western hemisphere is huge and it's 1251 00:51:17,100 --> 00:51:19,156 just a start . And I would recommend 1252 00:51:19,379 --> 00:51:22,290 that that is something very similar 1253 00:51:22,300 --> 00:51:24,530 this program to the Economic Recovery 1254 00:51:24,540 --> 00:51:27,639 Act of 1948 WW , which was so 1255 00:51:27,649 --> 00:51:30,010 instrumental uh in terms of the 1256 00:51:30,020 --> 00:51:32,242 economic recovery . And I see that this 1257 00:51:32,242 --> 00:51:35,429 economic recovery uh for the region due 1258 00:51:35,439 --> 00:51:37,969 to the impacts of COVID what it did to 1259 00:51:37,979 --> 00:51:40,201 the economies of the region and now the 1260 00:51:40,201 --> 00:51:41,812 trans transnational criminal 1261 00:51:41,812 --> 00:51:44,169 organizations taking advantage of this . 1262 00:51:44,429 --> 00:51:46,651 And so this is a first start with these 1263 00:51:46,651 --> 00:51:49,290 11 heads of state from Latin America 1264 00:51:49,300 --> 00:51:51,078 that were here in Washington in 1265 00:51:51,078 --> 00:51:53,600 November of 23 for this program that 1266 00:51:53,610 --> 00:51:56,050 was rolling out billions of dollars for 1267 00:51:56,060 --> 00:51:58,189 critical infrastructure investment by 1268 00:51:58,199 --> 00:52:00,899 the US government . So we are on a very 1269 00:52:00,909 --> 00:52:02,909 good path with a third of our Latin 1270 00:52:02,909 --> 00:52:05,330 American leaders with this economic 1271 00:52:05,340 --> 00:52:07,396 investment . And I would say that uh 1272 00:52:07,396 --> 00:52:09,530 national security rests on their 1273 00:52:09,540 --> 00:52:12,459 economic security . And we , we can do 1274 00:52:12,469 --> 00:52:14,580 more and through this program , if we 1275 00:52:14,580 --> 00:52:16,691 can build this out , we would be on a 1276 00:52:16,691 --> 00:52:18,636 good path with our partners in our 1277 00:52:18,636 --> 00:52:20,636 shared neighborhood so close to our 1278 00:52:20,636 --> 00:52:22,800 homeland . Well , that aspect of 1279 00:52:22,810 --> 00:52:25,088 working with our Latin American allies , 1280 00:52:25,088 --> 00:52:27,032 I think is really critical because 1281 00:52:27,032 --> 00:52:29,143 that's what we're doing in the area . 1282 00:52:29,143 --> 00:52:31,254 Uh Could I just ask one more question 1283 00:52:31,254 --> 00:52:33,199 relating to uh some questions from 1284 00:52:33,199 --> 00:52:35,239 Senator King ? Keep it short , I'll 1285 00:52:35,250 --> 00:52:37,399 keep it short . Uh You mentioned that 1286 00:52:37,409 --> 00:52:40,429 regarding that they , uh they in 1287 00:52:40,439 --> 00:52:43,830 addiction of drugs that it requires us 1288 00:52:43,840 --> 00:52:45,951 to really pay attention to some other 1289 00:52:45,951 --> 00:52:48,007 aspects such as uh going after the , 1290 00:52:48,007 --> 00:52:50,939 these criminal uh forces . Uh is there 1291 00:52:50,949 --> 00:52:53,449 uh in a , in a governmental task force 1292 00:52:53,459 --> 00:52:55,459 of some sort that , that you're all 1293 00:52:55,459 --> 00:52:57,681 working together that would include Dod 1294 00:52:57,681 --> 00:53:00,639 Doj Coast Guard to counter the drug 1295 00:53:00,649 --> 00:53:02,760 threat . We are working together . I 1296 00:53:02,770 --> 00:53:05,290 would say that we need to , there needs 1297 00:53:05,300 --> 00:53:08,409 to be more focus , more uh resourcing 1298 00:53:08,419 --> 00:53:11,695 on this particular grouping uh to get 1299 00:53:11,705 --> 00:53:13,761 after the problem sets . And I would 1300 00:53:13,761 --> 00:53:15,816 say from the money laundering to the 1301 00:53:15,816 --> 00:53:18,925 drug labs and following where not just 1302 00:53:18,935 --> 00:53:21,225 the , the small semi Submersible that 1303 00:53:21,235 --> 00:53:23,354 has , it's loaded with uh counter 1304 00:53:23,364 --> 00:53:25,524 narcotics , but actually getting to 1305 00:53:25,534 --> 00:53:27,655 where it's produced and getting in 1306 00:53:27,665 --> 00:53:29,887 there . And so the work that we've done 1307 00:53:29,887 --> 00:53:31,998 in Colombia has been very effective . 1308 00:53:32,014 --> 00:53:35,564 Uh but the uh but the , the the amounts 1309 00:53:35,574 --> 00:53:38,090 are only increasing . And so we've got 1310 00:53:38,100 --> 00:53:40,267 to , we've got to figure out we've got 1311 00:53:40,267 --> 00:53:42,378 to follow this money and we've got to 1312 00:53:42,378 --> 00:53:45,889 get after these TC OS uh as a holistic , 1313 00:53:45,899 --> 00:53:49,729 more uh filled out robust program . 1314 00:53:50,199 --> 00:53:52,310 Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 1315 00:53:57,669 --> 00:54:01,219 Yeah . Thank rounds is yielded to 1316 00:54:01,229 --> 00:54:03,396 Senator Budd . Senator Budd , please . 1317 00:54:03,396 --> 00:54:05,229 Thank you , Chairman . Thank you 1318 00:54:05,229 --> 00:54:07,062 Senator rounds for yielding . Um 1319 00:54:07,062 --> 00:54:09,229 Senator Guillo . Um Thank you both for 1320 00:54:09,229 --> 00:54:11,451 being here , by the way . Uh You know , 1321 00:54:11,451 --> 00:54:11,229 it's my understanding there have been a 1322 00:54:11,239 --> 00:54:13,219 lot of drone incursions along our 1323 00:54:13,229 --> 00:54:16,659 southern border . Um How many drone 1324 00:54:16,669 --> 00:54:18,949 incursions have we had ? And , um , and 1325 00:54:18,959 --> 00:54:20,181 what are they doing ? 1326 00:54:22,310 --> 00:54:25,250 Senator , the uh number of incursions 1327 00:54:25,260 --> 00:54:27,371 uh was something that was alarming to 1328 00:54:27,371 --> 00:54:29,482 me . Uh As I , as I took command last 1329 00:54:29,482 --> 00:54:32,149 month , uh I don't know the actual 1330 00:54:32,159 --> 00:54:34,381 number . I don't think anybody does but 1331 00:54:34,381 --> 00:54:36,492 it's , it's in the thousands . I have 1332 00:54:36,492 --> 00:54:38,270 uh talked to customs and border 1333 00:54:38,270 --> 00:54:40,548 protection who are responsible for the , 1334 00:54:40,548 --> 00:54:43,729 the uh UAs um incursions and uh in , in 1335 00:54:43,739 --> 00:54:46,729 the , in the border uh along with doj 1336 00:54:47,100 --> 00:54:50,189 and uh they put the number at thousands 1337 00:54:50,199 --> 00:54:52,199 uh over what period of time is that 1338 00:54:52,199 --> 00:54:54,389 thousands ? Uh I would say in the , in 1339 00:54:54,399 --> 00:54:56,989 the , probably over a month we could 1340 00:54:57,000 --> 00:54:58,889 probably have over 1000 a month . 1341 00:54:58,889 --> 00:55:00,889 General . Do they ? Um , do they in 1342 00:55:00,889 --> 00:55:03,090 your view represent a homeland defense 1343 00:55:03,100 --> 00:55:06,350 threat ? Senator ? 1344 00:55:06,360 --> 00:55:09,760 They , uh , they alarm me uh from the 1345 00:55:09,770 --> 00:55:11,826 per being the person responsible for 1346 00:55:11,826 --> 00:55:13,937 homeland defense . I haven't seen any 1347 00:55:13,937 --> 00:55:15,937 of them manifest in a threat to the 1348 00:55:15,937 --> 00:55:18,048 level of national defense , but I see 1349 00:55:18,048 --> 00:55:21,340 the potential only growing uh general 1350 00:55:21,350 --> 00:55:23,709 uh continuing on with a different topic . 1351 00:55:23,719 --> 00:55:25,941 Do you consider the F-15 E strike Eagle 1352 00:55:25,941 --> 00:55:28,000 to be a capable aircraft ? And are 1353 00:55:28,010 --> 00:55:30,050 these , are there particular 1354 00:55:30,060 --> 00:55:32,570 characteristics for the F-15 uh that 1355 00:55:32,580 --> 00:55:34,524 make it ideal for Homeland defense 1356 00:55:35,139 --> 00:55:37,250 Senator ? I think the , uh F-15 E 1357 00:55:37,260 --> 00:55:39,840 Strike Eagle is a phenomenal aircraft . 1358 00:55:39,850 --> 00:55:43,679 Uh , what makes it uh applicable uh , 1359 00:55:43,689 --> 00:55:45,800 in our theater is the same thing that 1360 00:55:45,800 --> 00:55:48,022 makes it applicable around the world is 1361 00:55:48,022 --> 00:55:50,189 its , its versatility . It's , uh , in 1362 00:55:50,189 --> 00:55:52,411 many ways , unmatched air to ground and 1363 00:55:52,411 --> 00:55:54,745 in many ways it's un matched air to air . 1364 00:55:54,745 --> 00:55:56,856 It has a phenomenal uh radar that can 1365 00:55:56,856 --> 00:55:59,030 be , it's an a , an A ESA radar uh 1366 00:55:59,040 --> 00:56:01,770 electrically uh scanned which allows it 1367 00:56:01,780 --> 00:56:05,290 to pick out low , slow moving and also 1368 00:56:05,300 --> 00:56:08,530 low radar cross section uh such as 1369 00:56:08,540 --> 00:56:11,540 drones or other uh um threats like 1370 00:56:11,550 --> 00:56:13,717 cruise missiles . So the uh the Strike 1371 00:56:13,717 --> 00:56:16,149 Eagle is a fantastic aircraft . Thank 1372 00:56:16,159 --> 00:56:18,492 you . So , in its fiscal year 25 budget , 1373 00:56:18,492 --> 00:56:21,739 the Air Force plans to divest 26 1374 00:56:21,750 --> 00:56:24,479 F-15 Strike Eagles at the same time 1375 00:56:24,489 --> 00:56:26,489 that it's buying less than expected 1376 00:56:26,689 --> 00:56:30,189 F-35s F-15 exs and other fighters . So 1377 00:56:30,199 --> 00:56:32,629 it's got me very concerned , not just 1378 00:56:32,639 --> 00:56:34,729 for homeland defense and the 1379 00:56:34,739 --> 00:56:36,909 descriptions that uh uh you shared a 1380 00:56:36,919 --> 00:56:39,129 moment ago but including potential 1381 00:56:39,139 --> 00:56:41,750 conflict with China and also for 1382 00:56:41,760 --> 00:56:43,739 responses to crises and other 1383 00:56:43,750 --> 00:56:47,570 geographic combatant commands . Um So 1384 00:56:47,580 --> 00:56:49,919 if we , you would agree to uh to keep 1385 00:56:49,929 --> 00:56:52,040 your eye on that and share with us uh 1386 00:56:52,040 --> 00:56:54,151 concerns as they arise related to the 1387 00:56:54,151 --> 00:56:56,580 F-15 , I will Senator . Thank you . So , 1388 00:56:56,590 --> 00:56:58,780 changing topics uh General Richardson 1389 00:56:58,790 --> 00:57:01,149 and General Guillo both . Uh you 1390 00:57:01,159 --> 00:57:03,326 mentioned TC OS just a minute ago . Uh 1391 00:57:03,370 --> 00:57:05,750 General Richardson's um like the 1392 00:57:05,760 --> 00:57:07,927 Mexican drug cartels , they often move 1393 00:57:07,927 --> 00:57:10,860 not just drugs and the lethal fentaNYL , 1394 00:57:11,070 --> 00:57:13,540 but they move people . So many of these 1395 00:57:13,550 --> 00:57:16,129 activities proceed without interruption 1396 00:57:16,139 --> 00:57:18,472 in both of your areas of responsibility . 1397 00:57:18,719 --> 00:57:22,389 Section 1068 of the fiscal year , 2024 1398 00:57:22,399 --> 00:57:25,139 NDA A requires the Secretary of Defense 1399 00:57:25,360 --> 00:57:27,527 to submit a plan for coordinating with 1400 00:57:27,527 --> 00:57:29,739 defense partners in North and South 1401 00:57:29,750 --> 00:57:31,889 America and supporting interagency 1402 00:57:31,899 --> 00:57:33,899 departments and agencies to counter 1403 00:57:33,899 --> 00:57:35,788 human trafficking including human 1404 00:57:35,788 --> 00:57:38,540 trafficking by these TC OS . So have 1405 00:57:38,550 --> 00:57:40,500 either of you been consulted on 1406 00:57:40,510 --> 00:57:42,232 developing that plan , General 1407 00:57:42,232 --> 00:57:44,343 Richardson will start with you . So , 1408 00:57:44,343 --> 00:57:46,879 Senator , the uh we work migration 1409 00:57:46,889 --> 00:57:50,000 every uh every day in uh United States 1410 00:57:50,010 --> 00:57:52,610 Southern Command and uh for this past 1411 00:57:52,620 --> 00:57:55,340 year uh with the trilateral agreement 1412 00:57:55,350 --> 00:57:57,239 that the United States government 1413 00:57:57,239 --> 00:57:59,294 signed with Panama and Colombia . So 1414 00:57:59,294 --> 00:58:01,017 we're very aware of the uh the 1415 00:58:01,017 --> 00:58:03,149 migration Jennifer May beyond just 1416 00:58:03,159 --> 00:58:05,979 General Awareness . Uh Secretary of 1417 00:58:05,989 --> 00:58:08,045 Defense is required to submit a plan 1418 00:58:08,045 --> 00:58:10,322 for coordinating with defense partners . 1419 00:58:10,322 --> 00:58:12,545 Are you working on that plan ? I am not 1420 00:58:12,545 --> 00:58:14,656 specifically working on that plan for 1421 00:58:14,656 --> 00:58:16,878 the Department of Defense . Uh the Os D 1422 00:58:16,878 --> 00:58:19,045 and the joint staff will be working on 1423 00:58:19,045 --> 00:58:21,267 that . Senator . The same answer we are 1424 00:58:21,267 --> 00:58:23,267 are not working directly . We're in 1425 00:58:23,267 --> 00:58:25,433 support of the department , you know , 1426 00:58:25,433 --> 00:58:27,433 that's um not to you but the to the 1427 00:58:27,433 --> 00:58:30,399 Department of Defense and the Secretary , 1428 00:58:30,659 --> 00:58:32,770 that's disappointing . So I'd like to 1429 00:58:32,770 --> 00:58:34,548 follow up with both you and the 1430 00:58:34,548 --> 00:58:36,603 department on this to make sure that 1431 00:58:36,603 --> 00:58:38,770 that begins to get implemented . So we 1432 00:58:38,770 --> 00:58:40,937 can begin stopping the illegal flow of 1433 00:58:40,937 --> 00:58:43,429 uh deadly fentaNYL and other drugs and 1434 00:58:43,439 --> 00:58:46,120 the tragic uh uh trafficking of humans . 1435 00:58:46,570 --> 00:58:48,681 Um You know , that's big business for 1436 00:58:48,681 --> 00:58:50,737 the cartels and it's contributing to 1437 00:58:50,737 --> 00:58:52,737 instability in countries across our 1438 00:58:52,737 --> 00:58:54,737 hemisphere . So what efforts beyond 1439 00:58:54,737 --> 00:58:56,792 that plan since that's not yet being 1440 00:58:56,792 --> 00:58:58,848 developed ? What efforts are already 1441 00:58:58,848 --> 00:59:00,959 underway with you or your partners to 1442 00:59:00,959 --> 00:59:00,540 address human trafficking ? General 1443 00:59:00,550 --> 00:59:03,840 Richardson , thank you , Senator . And 1444 00:59:03,850 --> 00:59:06,229 uh I'm , I'm not aware that the uh that 1445 00:59:06,239 --> 00:59:08,929 the report is not uh the , the report 1446 00:59:08,939 --> 00:59:11,469 could very well be um be uh well , 1447 00:59:11,479 --> 00:59:13,669 along its way , we're just not um 1448 00:59:13,770 --> 00:59:15,939 actively working on it uh from our 1449 00:59:15,949 --> 00:59:18,060 levels . And a lot of times the joint 1450 00:59:18,060 --> 00:59:20,629 staff in the uh O SS D will work those 1451 00:59:20,639 --> 00:59:22,528 things to allow us to continue to 1452 00:59:22,528 --> 00:59:24,989 execute our , our daily missions . But 1453 00:59:25,000 --> 00:59:27,111 we are working very closely because I 1454 00:59:27,111 --> 00:59:30,030 have the Darien uh in my a or which is 1455 00:59:30,040 --> 00:59:32,550 a , which is a huge human trafficking 1456 00:59:32,560 --> 00:59:35,429 um area . And you're exactly right in 1457 00:59:35,439 --> 00:59:37,439 terms of the transnational criminal 1458 00:59:37,439 --> 00:59:39,439 organizations have only gotten more 1459 00:59:39,439 --> 00:59:42,070 powerful over 300 billion $300 billion 1460 00:59:42,080 --> 00:59:44,800 annual revenue business . They traffic 1461 00:59:44,810 --> 00:59:48,439 humans drugs , uh gold lithium , uh all 1462 00:59:48,449 --> 00:59:51,330 kinds of uh counterfeit goods . And so 1463 00:59:51,570 --> 00:59:53,737 uh only getting more powerful . And so 1464 00:59:53,737 --> 00:59:55,626 the work that we do the Colombian 1465 00:59:55,626 --> 00:59:57,848 military and their operation . He fo to 1466 00:59:57,848 --> 01:00:00,070 go after the criminal networks that are 1467 01:00:00,070 --> 01:00:01,848 doing these , um these criminal 1468 01:00:01,848 --> 01:00:04,159 activities as well as the uh Panama 1469 01:00:04,330 --> 01:00:06,669 Center Front and Sanan border forces 1470 01:00:06,679 --> 01:00:08,568 that are going after the criminal 1471 01:00:08,568 --> 01:00:11,209 networks in Panama in the interest of 1472 01:00:11,219 --> 01:00:13,330 Time chair , I'll yield . But I would 1473 01:00:13,330 --> 01:00:15,386 love to continue discussions perhaps 1474 01:00:15,386 --> 01:00:17,497 offline about your efforts in regards 1475 01:00:17,497 --> 01:00:19,497 to human trafficking in North com . 1476 01:00:19,497 --> 01:00:21,663 Thank you . Thank you , Senator Budd . 1477 01:00:21,663 --> 01:00:23,886 Senator Kelly , please . Thank you , Mr 1478 01:00:23,886 --> 01:00:25,663 Chairman General Guillo General 1479 01:00:25,663 --> 01:00:27,886 Richardson . Great to see both of you . 1480 01:00:27,886 --> 01:00:30,052 Um General Richardson . Uh Yesterday , 1481 01:00:30,052 --> 01:00:32,250 we're talking a little bit about Haiti 1482 01:00:32,790 --> 01:00:35,409 and um the situation on the ground 1483 01:00:35,419 --> 01:00:38,570 being chaotic gangs running rampant in 1484 01:00:38,580 --> 01:00:40,610 their capital . And this week , the 1485 01:00:40,620 --> 01:00:42,676 Prime Minister of Haiti announced he 1486 01:00:42,676 --> 01:00:44,842 would resign and then Kenya paused the 1487 01:00:44,842 --> 01:00:47,009 agreement to send 1000 police officers 1488 01:00:47,009 --> 01:00:49,231 until a new government was would be put 1489 01:00:49,231 --> 01:00:51,389 into place . South . Com has 1490 01:00:51,399 --> 01:00:53,659 successfully airlifted embassy staff 1491 01:00:53,669 --> 01:00:56,239 out of the country but a number of 1492 01:00:56,250 --> 01:00:58,719 Americans still remain in Haiti and 1493 01:00:58,729 --> 01:01:01,360 some may be looking to leave . Some are 1494 01:01:01,370 --> 01:01:04,320 concerned that the US has not initiated 1495 01:01:04,330 --> 01:01:06,810 a non combatant evacuation order . A 1496 01:01:06,820 --> 01:01:09,060 neo to get Americans out of Haiti 1497 01:01:09,520 --> 01:01:11,449 General . Have you been tasked to 1498 01:01:11,459 --> 01:01:15,030 operate an evacuation ? So Senator , as 1499 01:01:15,040 --> 01:01:17,151 part of the wide range of contingency 1500 01:01:17,151 --> 01:01:19,207 plans that US South com has , we are 1501 01:01:19,207 --> 01:01:21,570 ready for a a non uh a a neo uh 1502 01:01:21,580 --> 01:01:25,239 activation if required and uh and have 1503 01:01:25,250 --> 01:01:27,870 other plans ready . Uh ready to go as 1504 01:01:27,879 --> 01:01:30,080 we always do and keep those plans 1505 01:01:30,090 --> 01:01:33,330 refreshed over and over . Uh uh So 1506 01:01:33,340 --> 01:01:36,679 we're ready um at any time for any type 1507 01:01:36,689 --> 01:01:40,389 of crisis . And are you , are you doing ? 1508 01:01:40,399 --> 01:01:42,510 So you say you're ready now ? But are 1509 01:01:42,510 --> 01:01:44,732 there any additional preparations uh in 1510 01:01:44,732 --> 01:01:48,419 the event that this becomes a necessity ? 1511 01:01:48,860 --> 01:01:51,820 I think the uh the two missions of in 1512 01:01:51,830 --> 01:01:54,052 increasing the security at the , at the 1513 01:01:54,052 --> 01:01:57,270 embassy and uh and a little bit of my 1514 01:01:57,280 --> 01:02:00,879 capability as well expanding that uh uh 1515 01:02:00,889 --> 01:02:03,280 is the platform that we would use if we 1516 01:02:03,290 --> 01:02:05,580 need to expand from there . And so we 1517 01:02:05,590 --> 01:02:08,179 put in uh all of the , the necessary 1518 01:02:08,189 --> 01:02:11,280 measures and uh uh that are necessary 1519 01:02:11,290 --> 01:02:13,457 for any of the plans to be activated . 1520 01:02:13,520 --> 01:02:15,742 So it would be true to say that there's 1521 01:02:15,742 --> 01:02:18,139 mission planning currently underway in 1522 01:02:18,149 --> 01:02:20,371 case you have to do this , we always do 1523 01:02:20,379 --> 01:02:22,490 mission planning in the , in the , in 1524 01:02:22,490 --> 01:02:25,080 the military . So , absolutely . Well , 1525 01:02:25,090 --> 01:02:27,312 thank you . Thank you , General General 1526 01:02:27,419 --> 01:02:30,260 Gu . Uh I just on Monday morning , I 1527 01:02:30,270 --> 01:02:32,214 got back from a trip to the Arctic 1528 01:02:32,214 --> 01:02:34,810 where I was able to see firsthand uh 1529 01:02:34,820 --> 01:02:36,764 some of the efforts by the Navy to 1530 01:02:36,764 --> 01:02:39,409 pursue our Arctic strategic objectives . 1531 01:02:39,949 --> 01:02:42,469 And the Arctic is a real an area of 1532 01:02:42,479 --> 01:02:44,535 concern . And a great example of the 1533 01:02:44,535 --> 01:02:46,757 intersection between defense policies , 1534 01:02:46,757 --> 01:02:48,812 climate and strategic partnerships . 1535 01:02:48,812 --> 01:02:50,939 Melting ice is making the Arctic more 1536 01:02:50,959 --> 01:02:53,181 accessible to everyone including Russia 1537 01:02:53,181 --> 01:02:55,750 and China . It's rich with oil minerals . 1538 01:02:55,760 --> 01:02:58,469 Fishing other natural resources and we 1539 01:02:58,479 --> 01:03:00,729 have to ensure that a free and peaceful 1540 01:03:00,739 --> 01:03:03,550 Arctic um benefits . Uh The United 1541 01:03:03,560 --> 01:03:05,616 States and our partners and allies , 1542 01:03:05,699 --> 01:03:07,699 Russia seeks to use the Arctic as a 1543 01:03:07,699 --> 01:03:10,000 staging ground for power projection in 1544 01:03:10,010 --> 01:03:12,659 addition to its being a critical 1545 01:03:12,669 --> 01:03:14,447 defense and deterrent for their 1546 01:03:14,447 --> 01:03:16,447 homeland . Uh But they also seek to 1547 01:03:16,447 --> 01:03:19,300 control the region . Uh We've made real 1548 01:03:19,310 --> 01:03:21,590 progress in combating Russian influence 1549 01:03:21,600 --> 01:03:23,711 in the Arctic over the last year with 1550 01:03:23,711 --> 01:03:27,120 Finland and Sweden joining NATO . Uh 1551 01:03:27,139 --> 01:03:31,040 Now , every country with a border 1552 01:03:31,050 --> 01:03:33,250 on the Arctic is part of NATO , with 1553 01:03:33,260 --> 01:03:35,919 the exception of Russia . And we must 1554 01:03:35,929 --> 01:03:38,080 not miss this opportunity to advance 1555 01:03:38,090 --> 01:03:39,979 our interests in the Arctic while 1556 01:03:39,979 --> 01:03:42,201 Russia is focusing on their illegal and 1557 01:03:42,201 --> 01:03:45,159 brutal invasion of Ukraine . General 1558 01:03:45,439 --> 01:03:47,328 Guillo , I'd like to hear in more 1559 01:03:47,328 --> 01:03:49,770 detail what you think the US and NATO 1560 01:03:49,780 --> 01:03:52,350 strategy should look like in the Arctic . 1561 01:03:54,260 --> 01:03:56,593 Senator first . Thanks for visiting our , 1562 01:03:56,593 --> 01:03:58,704 our forces up there during ice camp . 1563 01:03:58,704 --> 01:04:01,889 Uh as , as you alluded to , it's uh an 1564 01:04:01,899 --> 01:04:04,840 extremely important uh operation uh 1565 01:04:04,860 --> 01:04:07,020 that demonstrates our capability up 1566 01:04:07,030 --> 01:04:09,159 there with the submarines and the LC 1567 01:04:09,169 --> 01:04:11,770 130 all the other aircraft and forces 1568 01:04:12,510 --> 01:04:15,229 uh as far as what we could do or should 1569 01:04:15,239 --> 01:04:18,010 do with NATO in the Arctic . Uh you 1570 01:04:18,020 --> 01:04:20,770 described uh exercises that we're doing 1571 01:04:20,780 --> 01:04:23,229 on the , I'll call the Alaska side or 1572 01:04:23,239 --> 01:04:25,530 the , the 10 o'clock approach . Um 1573 01:04:25,540 --> 01:04:27,540 We've also had some success working 1574 01:04:27,540 --> 01:04:29,651 with NATO and European command on the 1575 01:04:29,651 --> 01:04:31,873 two o'clock , the northeast approach uh 1576 01:04:31,873 --> 01:04:33,929 just last week for the first time in 1577 01:04:33,929 --> 01:04:36,129 over two years . Uh The Russians sent 1578 01:04:36,139 --> 01:04:38,709 two bear bombers down along that avenue 1579 01:04:38,719 --> 01:04:41,280 through what we call the GE I UK Gap , 1580 01:04:41,610 --> 01:04:43,721 uh Greenland , Iceland and the United 1581 01:04:43,721 --> 01:04:46,189 Kingdom uh approaching the Canadian and 1582 01:04:46,199 --> 01:04:47,866 the United States air defense 1583 01:04:47,866 --> 01:04:49,977 identification zones . I haven't seen 1584 01:04:49,977 --> 01:04:52,459 this uh activity in over two years . We 1585 01:04:52,469 --> 01:04:54,802 were able to track them the entire time . 1586 01:04:54,802 --> 01:04:57,030 Thanks to the radar network and the 1587 01:04:57,040 --> 01:04:59,030 information sharing uh between 1588 01:04:59,040 --> 01:05:01,340 countries within U com . Uh Norway is 1589 01:05:01,350 --> 01:05:04,050 one that I'll point out and uh and , 1590 01:05:04,060 --> 01:05:06,227 and Northern command . So we were able 1591 01:05:06,227 --> 01:05:08,409 to track this activity or did you uh 1592 01:05:08,419 --> 01:05:11,510 what range were you able to intercept 1593 01:05:11,520 --> 01:05:13,850 them ? Uh uh Senator , we didn't have 1594 01:05:13,860 --> 01:05:15,693 to intercept them because we had 1595 01:05:15,693 --> 01:05:17,804 aircraft flying to the point where we 1596 01:05:17,804 --> 01:05:19,638 would intercept them before they 1597 01:05:19,638 --> 01:05:21,749 crossed the identification zone . And 1598 01:05:21,749 --> 01:05:24,027 the uh Russians turned around prior to , 1599 01:05:24,070 --> 01:05:25,959 to reaching that zone . So we had 1600 01:05:25,959 --> 01:05:27,737 aircraft , both Canadian and US 1601 01:05:27,737 --> 01:05:29,737 fighters postured along the line uh 1602 01:05:29,737 --> 01:05:31,348 which I think is uh probably 1603 01:05:31,348 --> 01:05:33,629 disheartening to the Russians to fly 1604 01:05:33,639 --> 01:05:35,695 all that way to find out that , that 1605 01:05:35,695 --> 01:05:37,861 we're waiting for them . Have you seen 1606 01:05:37,861 --> 01:05:39,917 that's due to a NATO Cooper ? So the 1607 01:05:39,917 --> 01:05:42,028 Russians are pretty good operating in 1608 01:05:42,028 --> 01:05:41,959 the , in the Arctic . Have you seen 1609 01:05:41,969 --> 01:05:45,229 advancements by the Chinese ? Uh What 1610 01:05:45,239 --> 01:05:46,989 I've seen , Senator is , is a 1611 01:05:47,000 --> 01:05:49,222 willingness and a desire by the Chinese 1612 01:05:49,222 --> 01:05:51,659 to act up there . Uh we've seen them in 1613 01:05:51,669 --> 01:05:54,020 the maritime , uh , we've seen them 1614 01:05:54,030 --> 01:05:58,010 under the cloud of a technical um , or 1615 01:05:58,020 --> 01:06:00,300 scientific research , but we think it's 1616 01:06:00,310 --> 01:06:02,532 uh certainly more mission uh to include 1617 01:06:02,532 --> 01:06:05,149 military . And then I expect uh to , to 1618 01:06:05,159 --> 01:06:09,110 see air activity uh in the Alas Alaska 1619 01:06:09,120 --> 01:06:11,342 part of the Arctic , uh as soon as this 1620 01:06:11,342 --> 01:06:13,398 year , potentially , it's a , it's a 1621 01:06:13,398 --> 01:06:15,564 very big concern of mine . Thank you , 1622 01:06:15,564 --> 01:06:17,898 General . Thank you , Senator , Senator . 1623 01:06:18,840 --> 01:06:22,020 Thank you , Mr Chairman , uh John 1624 01:06:22,250 --> 01:06:24,306 Guille General Richardson . First of 1625 01:06:24,306 --> 01:06:26,600 all , thank you to you and your teams 1626 01:06:26,610 --> 01:06:29,600 for your service to our country . Uh 1627 01:06:30,010 --> 01:06:32,232 I'd like to follow up just a little bit 1628 01:06:32,232 --> 01:06:34,343 with what Senator Kelly began talking 1629 01:06:34,343 --> 01:06:36,454 about with regard to Haiti . And so , 1630 01:06:36,454 --> 01:06:39,469 um General Richardson , it seems to me 1631 01:06:39,479 --> 01:06:42,709 that uh it , it rather surprises me 1632 01:06:42,719 --> 01:06:44,552 that there may not have been any 1633 01:06:44,552 --> 01:06:47,070 advance notice requesting additional or 1634 01:06:47,080 --> 01:06:48,691 follow up with regard to the 1635 01:06:48,691 --> 01:06:51,439 possibility of a neo operation in Haiti . 1636 01:06:51,800 --> 01:06:55,729 It wouldn't that seem to be uh a kind 1637 01:06:55,739 --> 01:06:57,350 of an advisory that would be 1638 01:06:57,350 --> 01:06:59,520 appropriate if , if you receive 1639 01:06:59,530 --> 01:07:01,197 something , at least from the 1640 01:07:01,197 --> 01:07:03,308 administration indicating that it's a 1641 01:07:03,308 --> 01:07:05,252 possibility and that wouldn't that 1642 01:07:05,252 --> 01:07:07,308 maybe uh give you the opportunity to 1643 01:07:07,308 --> 01:07:09,363 notify those individuals responsible 1644 01:07:09,363 --> 01:07:11,419 for providing you with the resources 1645 01:07:11,419 --> 01:07:13,530 necessary to do your duty to be ready 1646 01:07:13,530 --> 01:07:15,697 to go or , I mean , it doesn't seem to 1647 01:07:15,697 --> 01:07:17,808 me that they can be on high alert all 1648 01:07:17,808 --> 01:07:19,808 the time . Could you just expand on 1649 01:07:19,808 --> 01:07:22,030 that a little bit please . So Senator , 1650 01:07:22,030 --> 01:07:23,808 I didn't mean to give the , the 1651 01:07:23,808 --> 01:07:25,974 perception that we're , uh , not ready 1652 01:07:25,974 --> 01:07:28,141 or that nobody's asked us to , uh , to 1653 01:07:28,141 --> 01:07:30,141 be ready or anything like that . We 1654 01:07:30,141 --> 01:07:31,808 have been , uh , we have been 1655 01:07:31,808 --> 01:07:33,974 discussing that and talking about that 1656 01:07:33,974 --> 01:07:36,308 and I have been talking with , uh , our , 1657 01:07:36,308 --> 01:07:38,530 uh , joint staff , our chairman and our 1658 01:07:38,530 --> 01:07:40,641 Secretary of Defense , uh , uh , over 1659 01:07:40,641 --> 01:07:42,641 the past two weeks about all of the 1660 01:07:42,641 --> 01:07:45,219 range of plans that uh we might be have 1661 01:07:45,229 --> 01:07:47,820 to do an evacuation , a neo , a mass 1662 01:07:47,830 --> 01:07:50,209 migration , all of those things . And , 1663 01:07:50,219 --> 01:07:52,169 and then so those uh missions of 1664 01:07:52,179 --> 01:07:54,401 extracting some non-essential personnel 1665 01:07:54,401 --> 01:07:56,512 from the US Embassy . It's not just a 1666 01:07:56,512 --> 01:07:58,679 matter of being ready to fight tonight 1667 01:07:58,679 --> 01:08:00,846 as much as , yeah , we are aware of it 1668 01:08:00,846 --> 01:08:02,846 and we are doing some prep planning 1669 01:08:02,846 --> 01:08:04,623 just in case the call is made . 1670 01:08:04,623 --> 01:08:06,790 Absolutely , Senator , we are ready to 1671 01:08:06,790 --> 01:08:08,957 go . We have all of our plans ready to 1672 01:08:08,957 --> 01:08:11,012 go . Ok . Thank you . And , and then 1673 01:08:11,012 --> 01:08:13,068 also II I noted with regard to uh uh 1674 01:08:13,068 --> 01:08:15,012 discussions earlier here about the 1675 01:08:15,012 --> 01:08:17,180 transnational criminal organizations , 1676 01:08:17,189 --> 01:08:19,356 the drug cartels and so forth south of 1677 01:08:19,356 --> 01:08:21,300 our border . Both of you have some 1678 01:08:21,300 --> 01:08:23,522 responsibilities with regard to whether 1679 01:08:23,522 --> 01:08:25,689 it's in other parts of the , the , the 1680 01:08:25,689 --> 01:08:28,819 No I command uh or SOCOM . Just a uh a 1681 01:08:28,830 --> 01:08:31,020 reminder once again that under the NDA 1682 01:08:31,029 --> 01:08:33,251 A , we've already authorized the use of 1683 01:08:33,251 --> 01:08:35,418 our cyber teams to be able to find out 1684 01:08:35,418 --> 01:08:37,640 in advance and to know who these people 1685 01:08:37,640 --> 01:08:39,529 are where they bank , uh how they 1686 01:08:39,529 --> 01:08:41,862 communicate and so forth . So hopefully , 1687 01:08:41,862 --> 01:08:44,140 uh we will author , not just authorize , 1688 01:08:44,140 --> 01:08:46,140 but now we will , we will fund that 1689 01:08:46,140 --> 01:08:48,196 part of the operation so that we can 1690 01:08:48,196 --> 01:08:50,419 assist those countries who want our 1691 01:08:50,430 --> 01:08:52,819 expertise in finding out more about 1692 01:08:52,830 --> 01:08:54,774 these organizations that , that is 1693 01:08:54,774 --> 01:08:56,997 available to them and simply that it is 1694 01:08:56,997 --> 01:08:59,163 available to you for your use . Uh Let 1695 01:08:59,163 --> 01:09:01,052 me also just general gel with the 1696 01:09:01,059 --> 01:09:03,128 potential investments of fighter 1697 01:09:03,139 --> 01:09:05,488 aircraft by the Air Force . There are 1698 01:09:05,499 --> 01:09:07,499 concerns about how the Air National 1699 01:09:07,499 --> 01:09:09,588 Guard who shoulder a significant 1700 01:09:09,599 --> 01:09:11,528 portion of the burden of homeland 1701 01:09:11,539 --> 01:09:13,809 defense , how they will be able to 1702 01:09:13,818 --> 01:09:15,596 continue to support you in that 1703 01:09:15,596 --> 01:09:17,769 capacity while also fulfilling their 1704 01:09:17,778 --> 01:09:19,945 obligations under the National defense 1705 01:09:19,945 --> 01:09:22,111 strategy . I bring this up because the 1706 01:09:22,111 --> 01:09:24,167 resourcing of the Air National Guard 1707 01:09:24,167 --> 01:09:26,729 received uh uh that , that the 1708 01:09:26,738 --> 01:09:28,905 resourcing that the Air National Guard 1709 01:09:28,905 --> 01:09:31,648 receives appears to be incongruent with 1710 01:09:31,659 --> 01:09:33,881 their mission assignments which include 1711 01:09:33,979 --> 01:09:36,289 both the aerospace control alert 1712 01:09:36,298 --> 01:09:40,088 defense strategy using the same uh uh 1713 01:09:40,099 --> 01:09:42,266 resources and then also supporting the 1714 01:09:42,266 --> 01:09:44,155 joint force in , in that national 1715 01:09:44,155 --> 01:09:46,266 defense strategy . I'm just curious , 1716 01:09:46,266 --> 01:09:48,266 are you involved in any planning or 1717 01:09:48,266 --> 01:09:50,432 discussions with Secretary Kendall and 1718 01:09:50,432 --> 01:09:52,599 General Lowe as they discuss the , the 1719 01:09:52,599 --> 01:09:55,890 plan for long term Air Force fighter 1720 01:09:55,899 --> 01:09:58,066 force structure ? And if not , I would 1721 01:09:58,066 --> 01:10:00,066 encourage your , your involvement . 1722 01:10:00,066 --> 01:10:02,288 Could you share just a little bit about 1723 01:10:02,288 --> 01:10:04,399 your communications with them ? Yes , 1724 01:10:04,399 --> 01:10:06,621 Senator and first , thanks for pointing 1725 01:10:06,621 --> 01:10:08,677 out the outstanding contributions of 1726 01:10:08,677 --> 01:10:10,843 the National Guard . We cannot conduct 1727 01:10:10,843 --> 01:10:13,177 our air defense mission uh without them , 1728 01:10:13,177 --> 01:10:12,770 they're not only the cornerstone they , 1729 01:10:12,779 --> 01:10:15,640 you know , they uh uh they provide at 1730 01:10:15,649 --> 01:10:17,482 20 different ac a sites that you 1731 01:10:17,482 --> 01:10:20,229 mentioned uh our 24 7 capability to 1732 01:10:20,240 --> 01:10:22,462 respond because of their importance . I 1733 01:10:22,462 --> 01:10:24,629 have talked directly with the Chief of 1734 01:10:24,629 --> 01:10:26,684 staff of the Air Force General Alvin 1735 01:10:26,684 --> 01:10:28,629 about uh the commitment of the Air 1736 01:10:28,629 --> 01:10:30,740 Force to that mission . And then also 1737 01:10:30,740 --> 01:10:32,962 what is gonna happen with the future as 1738 01:10:32,962 --> 01:10:34,907 we draw down some capabilities and 1739 01:10:34,907 --> 01:10:36,962 bring on new capabilities to include 1740 01:10:36,962 --> 01:10:39,129 the uh collaborative combat aircraft , 1741 01:10:39,129 --> 01:10:41,296 the next generation air dominance . Uh 1742 01:10:41,350 --> 01:10:43,406 General Alvin was very clear that he 1743 01:10:43,406 --> 01:10:45,461 fully supports uh our mission and he 1744 01:10:45,461 --> 01:10:47,572 understands the no fail nature of our 1745 01:10:47,572 --> 01:10:49,859 mission . And then he invited me to be 1746 01:10:49,870 --> 01:10:52,169 a part of the future discussions on how 1747 01:10:52,180 --> 01:10:54,291 they incorporate these capabilities . 1748 01:10:54,291 --> 01:10:56,513 Excellent because we have to be able to 1749 01:10:56,513 --> 01:10:58,624 incorporate the air guard and they've 1750 01:10:58,624 --> 01:10:58,339 got to have the resources to do that 1751 01:10:58,350 --> 01:11:00,517 successfully . General Richardson , we 1752 01:11:00,517 --> 01:11:02,683 discussed uh China's growing footprint 1753 01:11:02,700 --> 01:11:04,867 and the influence throughout South com 1754 01:11:04,867 --> 01:11:06,867 and how important it is that the US 1755 01:11:06,867 --> 01:11:08,978 remain engaged in the region . One of 1756 01:11:08,978 --> 01:11:11,033 the main tools that you have at your 1757 01:11:11,033 --> 01:11:13,144 disposal as we discussed in my office 1758 01:11:13,144 --> 01:11:16,649 is uh section 333 of title 10 , which 1759 01:11:16,660 --> 01:11:19,379 lets the dod help build the security 1760 01:11:19,390 --> 01:11:21,112 capacity of friendly nations . 1761 01:11:21,240 --> 01:11:24,029 Unfortunately , section 333 requires 1762 01:11:24,040 --> 01:11:26,390 you to navigate a ponderous bureaucracy 1763 01:11:26,740 --> 01:11:28,851 in both the Department of Defense and 1764 01:11:28,851 --> 01:11:31,018 the Department of State before you can 1765 01:11:31,018 --> 01:11:33,680 make use of this authority . It is not 1766 01:11:33,689 --> 01:11:36,370 agile and it clearly is not very , very 1767 01:11:36,379 --> 01:11:38,410 quick . Ironically , the Chinese 1768 01:11:38,419 --> 01:11:40,530 Communist Party is not bogged down by 1769 01:11:40,530 --> 01:11:42,549 the same bureaucratic inertia . How 1770 01:11:42,560 --> 01:11:45,109 important is section 333 authority to 1771 01:11:45,120 --> 01:11:47,790 your mission and how can it be improved ? 1772 01:11:47,979 --> 01:11:50,589 It's uh it is my main lever uh in 1773 01:11:50,600 --> 01:11:52,711 security cooperations . Senator . And 1774 01:11:52,711 --> 01:11:55,339 so the triple three as we call it uh 1775 01:11:55,350 --> 01:11:58,310 and the ability to be able to I I have 1776 01:11:58,319 --> 01:12:00,720 a triple three package and uh right now 1777 01:12:00,729 --> 01:12:02,785 that's navigating all of the wickets 1778 01:12:02,785 --> 01:12:04,673 that it needs to go through for a 1779 01:12:04,673 --> 01:12:08,319 counter pr C effort uh on port scanners 1780 01:12:08,330 --> 01:12:11,100 for example . And uh and the stealing 1781 01:12:11,109 --> 01:12:13,220 of data that the PR C does and to be 1782 01:12:13,229 --> 01:12:15,950 able to uh put a US company in there to 1783 01:12:15,959 --> 01:12:18,370 be uh to be able to do the scanning for 1784 01:12:18,379 --> 01:12:21,759 in and out . Uh cargo is extremely 1785 01:12:21,770 --> 01:12:23,826 important because again , it's about 1786 01:12:23,826 --> 01:12:25,992 the data . And so the triple three and 1787 01:12:25,992 --> 01:12:27,714 flexible authorities and being 1788 01:12:27,714 --> 01:12:31,000 responsive is uh is extremely important . 1789 01:12:31,009 --> 01:12:33,065 And so I appreciate the help and the 1790 01:12:33,065 --> 01:12:34,810 assistance on those uh those 1791 01:12:34,819 --> 01:12:36,930 authorities . Thank you . Thank you , 1792 01:12:36,930 --> 01:12:38,819 Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator 1793 01:12:38,819 --> 01:12:41,979 Senator Peters , please . Thank you , 1794 01:12:41,990 --> 01:12:44,101 Mr Chairman and uh General GEO and uh 1795 01:12:44,101 --> 01:12:46,212 general uh Richardson . Thank you for 1796 01:12:46,212 --> 01:12:48,379 your service and all the men and women 1797 01:12:48,379 --> 01:12:50,323 who serve along with you . We , we 1798 01:12:50,323 --> 01:12:52,601 appreciate that uh uh general uh uh go , 1799 01:12:52,601 --> 01:12:54,879 you mentioned the importance of uh the , 1800 01:12:54,879 --> 01:12:56,823 the challenges or I should say the 1801 01:12:56,823 --> 01:12:58,934 significant challenges we face in the 1802 01:12:58,934 --> 01:13:01,046 Arctic in a previous question and how 1803 01:13:01,046 --> 01:13:03,157 we need to seek ways to uh to address 1804 01:13:03,157 --> 01:13:05,268 that uh make additional investment uh 1805 01:13:05,268 --> 01:13:08,040 in the Arctic uh resilient platforms as 1806 01:13:08,049 --> 01:13:10,160 well as cold weather training , which 1807 01:13:10,160 --> 01:13:12,770 is essential for our troops . And a key 1808 01:13:12,779 --> 01:13:15,569 portion of Kis cold weather training is 1809 01:13:15,580 --> 01:13:18,390 completed every winter during northern 1810 01:13:18,589 --> 01:13:21,310 uh strike at the National All Domain 1811 01:13:21,319 --> 01:13:23,330 War Fing uh War Fighting Center in 1812 01:13:23,339 --> 01:13:26,100 Michigan . We are blessed with uh cold 1813 01:13:26,109 --> 01:13:27,998 weather during the winters and it 1814 01:13:27,998 --> 01:13:30,600 provides a great training opportunity . 1815 01:13:30,729 --> 01:13:33,459 So my , my question for you uh uh 1816 01:13:33,470 --> 01:13:36,169 general is that while the summer 1817 01:13:36,180 --> 01:13:38,347 training portion of northern strike is 1818 01:13:38,347 --> 01:13:40,750 extensive , we believe that the 1819 01:13:40,759 --> 01:13:43,399 exercises , winter interation of that 1820 01:13:43,410 --> 01:13:46,270 training that we conduct there uh has 1821 01:13:46,279 --> 01:13:48,500 some great expansion opportunities uh 1822 01:13:48,509 --> 01:13:50,729 to provide uh cost effective cold 1823 01:13:50,740 --> 01:13:52,890 weather training uh for uh men and 1824 01:13:52,899 --> 01:13:55,160 women who may be tasked to serve up 1825 01:13:55,169 --> 01:13:57,280 there . So my question for you is how 1826 01:13:57,280 --> 01:13:59,779 can we grow Kis uh Arctic training 1827 01:13:59,790 --> 01:14:02,109 through exercises like Northern strike 1828 01:14:02,209 --> 01:14:04,089 to support the priorities of our 1829 01:14:04,100 --> 01:14:07,020 national security strategy . Senator I 1830 01:14:07,029 --> 01:14:09,540 I would be a strong proponent of doing 1831 01:14:09,549 --> 01:14:12,060 exactly as you stated . Uh One of the 1832 01:14:12,069 --> 01:14:14,759 concerns I have uh as I visited uh 1833 01:14:14,770 --> 01:14:17,419 Alaska uh in the about a week into my 1834 01:14:17,430 --> 01:14:20,899 command uh to assess uh many of the , 1835 01:14:20,910 --> 01:14:23,080 the areas that you just discussed was 1836 01:14:23,089 --> 01:14:25,379 that the forces up there are extremely 1837 01:14:25,390 --> 01:14:28,330 well uh trained and equipped with the 1838 01:14:28,339 --> 01:14:30,228 right equipment to operate in the 1839 01:14:30,228 --> 01:14:32,283 Arctic . But the backfill forces are 1840 01:14:32,283 --> 01:14:34,117 probably very well trained , but 1841 01:14:34,117 --> 01:14:36,228 they're not equipped and they haven't 1842 01:14:36,228 --> 01:14:36,040 trained in that environment . So 1843 01:14:36,049 --> 01:14:38,430 anything that we could do for the 1844 01:14:38,439 --> 01:14:40,495 supplementing forces or the backfill 1845 01:14:40,495 --> 01:14:42,550 forces that would go into the Arctic 1846 01:14:42,550 --> 01:14:44,939 training them in uh in either in the 1847 01:14:44,950 --> 01:14:47,061 Arctic environment or in something as 1848 01:14:47,061 --> 01:14:49,283 you described that would replicate that 1849 01:14:49,283 --> 01:14:51,506 uh will be very important , not only to 1850 01:14:51,506 --> 01:14:53,283 give them those skills , but to 1851 01:14:53,283 --> 01:14:55,506 identify what are the pieces of kit and 1852 01:14:55,506 --> 01:14:57,617 equipment that we need to develop and 1853 01:14:57,617 --> 01:14:59,783 issue so they could seamlessly operate 1854 01:14:59,783 --> 01:15:01,839 in that strategic environment . Very 1855 01:15:01,839 --> 01:15:04,061 good . Thank you , General Richardson . 1856 01:15:04,061 --> 01:15:06,228 Uh as you know , the uh National Guard 1857 01:15:06,228 --> 01:15:08,394 State Partnership program uh links our 1858 01:15:08,394 --> 01:15:10,339 uh state National Guard Units with 1859 01:15:10,339 --> 01:15:12,561 global uh partners . And uh the program 1860 01:15:12,561 --> 01:15:14,450 certainly has been invaluable . I 1861 01:15:14,450 --> 01:15:16,061 believe in strengthening our 1862 01:15:16,061 --> 01:15:17,950 relationship with partner nations 1863 01:15:17,950 --> 01:15:20,006 including South coms uh 29 active uh 1864 01:15:20,006 --> 01:15:22,061 SPP uh participants . But as part of 1865 01:15:22,061 --> 01:15:24,172 the uh state partnership program , us 1866 01:15:24,172 --> 01:15:26,228 embassies , ideally have a Bilateral 1867 01:15:26,228 --> 01:15:28,759 Affairs Officer is working as a conduit 1868 01:15:28,839 --> 01:15:31,061 between the state as well as the uh the 1869 01:15:31,061 --> 01:15:33,129 partner country . Uh But despite the 1870 01:15:33,140 --> 01:15:35,140 what I believe is a critical role , 1871 01:15:35,140 --> 01:15:37,084 these uh these billets , these bao 1872 01:15:37,084 --> 01:15:39,359 billets unfortunately often say sit 1873 01:15:39,370 --> 01:15:42,220 vacant uh forcing the cocom commanders 1874 01:15:42,229 --> 01:15:44,451 to use their assigned billets to pay uh 1875 01:15:44,451 --> 01:15:46,673 for these B OS . So my question for you 1876 01:15:46,673 --> 01:15:49,390 general is um uh first of all , what 1877 01:15:49,399 --> 01:15:51,919 role do bilateral affairs officers play 1878 01:15:51,930 --> 01:15:53,930 in successfully implementing uh the 1879 01:15:53,930 --> 01:15:55,986 state partnership programs ? And how 1880 01:15:55,986 --> 01:15:58,097 can we address the gaps that exist in 1881 01:15:58,097 --> 01:16:00,041 the billets to ensure that they're 1882 01:16:00,041 --> 01:16:02,263 filled and we can get the , the maximum 1883 01:16:02,263 --> 01:16:04,430 uh utility out of these partnerships . 1884 01:16:04,729 --> 01:16:06,673 Thank you , Senator . And the uh I 1885 01:16:06,673 --> 01:16:08,729 would say that the SS PP program , I 1886 01:16:08,729 --> 01:16:10,673 have the largest SPP program uh uh 1887 01:16:10,673 --> 01:16:12,870 amongst all the geo uh geographic 1888 01:16:12,879 --> 01:16:14,879 combatant commands . And we're very 1889 01:16:14,879 --> 01:16:17,101 grateful for that program . It's a huge 1890 01:16:17,101 --> 01:16:19,212 enabler . We've got to keep those B A 1891 01:16:19,212 --> 01:16:21,435 slots filled with those officers . They 1892 01:16:21,435 --> 01:16:23,709 organize and uh and synchronize the 1893 01:16:23,720 --> 01:16:25,776 activities of the National Guard SPP 1894 01:16:25,776 --> 01:16:28,410 program with the operation activities 1895 01:16:28,419 --> 01:16:30,641 and investments that I have in US South 1896 01:16:30,641 --> 01:16:32,863 com . So it's a critical role and we've 1897 01:16:32,863 --> 01:16:34,919 got to keep those filled and uh with 1898 01:16:34,919 --> 01:16:36,919 the Theater Maintenance Partnership 1899 01:16:36,919 --> 01:16:39,086 initiative , which uh is a , a program 1900 01:16:39,086 --> 01:16:41,141 that we're uh rolling out with uh to 1901 01:16:41,141 --> 01:16:43,252 put nine centers of excellence in the 1902 01:16:43,252 --> 01:16:45,629 region . And this is partnering with 1903 01:16:45,640 --> 01:16:47,850 the partner nation , uh Militaries and 1904 01:16:47,859 --> 01:16:50,220 their military academies uh with 1905 01:16:50,229 --> 01:16:53,140 program instruction to teach and train 1906 01:16:53,149 --> 01:16:54,871 maintenance and the culture of 1907 01:16:54,871 --> 01:16:57,093 maintenance . But it's a tactical level 1908 01:16:57,093 --> 01:16:58,705 program all the way up to an 1909 01:16:58,705 --> 01:17:00,816 operational level into the ministries 1910 01:17:00,816 --> 01:17:02,982 of defense where you can uh anticipate 1911 01:17:02,982 --> 01:17:05,439 uh logistics and teach log logistics 1912 01:17:05,450 --> 01:17:08,080 and that culture of maintenance to keep 1913 01:17:08,089 --> 01:17:10,470 uh to keep equipment ready and increase 1914 01:17:10,479 --> 01:17:12,590 the readiness of capability for these 1915 01:17:12,590 --> 01:17:16,160 partner nations . I appreciate that . 1916 01:17:16,169 --> 01:17:18,336 And uh you know , uh a question I have 1917 01:17:18,336 --> 01:17:20,669 for you as well . Uh General Richardson , 1918 01:17:20,669 --> 01:17:22,669 is that my understanding is that uh 1919 01:17:22,669 --> 01:17:25,450 right now that uh the Chinese military 1920 01:17:25,459 --> 01:17:28,209 is uh training about five times more 1921 01:17:28,220 --> 01:17:30,331 Latin American and Caribbean military 1922 01:17:30,331 --> 01:17:32,387 officers uh than the United States . 1923 01:17:32,387 --> 01:17:34,879 And uh I have some concerns that the 1924 01:17:34,890 --> 01:17:36,890 these Chinese professional military 1925 01:17:36,890 --> 01:17:38,834 education exchanges may have uh an 1926 01:17:38,834 --> 01:17:40,799 outsized impact on our allies , 1927 01:17:40,810 --> 01:17:43,032 particularly uh in , in South com So my 1928 01:17:43,032 --> 01:17:45,199 question for you is what are the risks 1929 01:17:45,199 --> 01:17:47,199 associated with continuing to allow 1930 01:17:47,199 --> 01:17:49,709 Chinese education exchanges to outpace 1931 01:17:49,740 --> 01:17:52,060 what we are providing and how can 1932 01:17:52,069 --> 01:17:54,120 Congress support your command in 1933 01:17:54,129 --> 01:17:56,830 countering uh this uh this uh challenge . 1934 01:17:57,310 --> 01:17:59,799 So the uh the , the PR C is using our 1935 01:17:59,810 --> 01:18:02,310 playbook against us uh in terms of 1936 01:18:02,319 --> 01:18:04,689 these exchanges and these all expense 1937 01:18:04,700 --> 01:18:06,930 paid training exchanges for a year to 1938 01:18:06,939 --> 01:18:09,649 two years to China . And uh and the 1939 01:18:09,660 --> 01:18:11,660 each is that we are able to provide 1940 01:18:11,660 --> 01:18:13,850 through the uh through the IME program 1941 01:18:13,859 --> 01:18:15,970 for professional military education . 1942 01:18:16,279 --> 01:18:18,390 But the difference that it makes when 1943 01:18:18,390 --> 01:18:20,501 they come to our schools uh uh in the 1944 01:18:20,501 --> 01:18:23,180 United States , for example , um when 1945 01:18:23,189 --> 01:18:25,300 you don't speak the language or speak 1946 01:18:25,300 --> 01:18:27,522 in the language , and I would say there 1947 01:18:27,522 --> 01:18:29,411 are several uh three Ministers of 1948 01:18:29,411 --> 01:18:31,578 Defense and about 15 Chiefs of Defense 1949 01:18:31,578 --> 01:18:33,578 that have been to our United States 1950 01:18:33,578 --> 01:18:35,522 schools . And so , uh , you , I've 1951 01:18:35,522 --> 01:18:37,689 already built the trust . I don't have 1952 01:18:37,689 --> 01:18:40,415 to build the trust over a year with , 1953 01:18:40,424 --> 01:18:42,424 uh , with these leaders . And so if 1954 01:18:42,424 --> 01:18:44,368 they've been to our US schools , I 1955 01:18:44,368 --> 01:18:46,480 would say that we need to continue to 1956 01:18:46,480 --> 01:18:48,813 sustain that and even increase our , uh , 1957 01:18:48,813 --> 01:18:51,146 our ime program . Thank you . Thank you , 1958 01:18:51,146 --> 01:18:53,480 Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator Peter . 1959 01:18:53,480 --> 01:18:55,535 Senator Scott . Please . Thank you , 1960 01:18:55,535 --> 01:18:57,424 Chairman . Um , before I begin my 1961 01:18:57,424 --> 01:18:59,646 remarks and questions for each of you , 1962 01:18:59,646 --> 01:18:59,359 I want to say something about what 1963 01:18:59,370 --> 01:19:01,592 majority leader Chuck Schumer is saying 1964 01:19:01,592 --> 01:19:03,592 on the senate floor right now , the 1965 01:19:03,592 --> 01:19:05,592 majority leader on the US N four is 1966 01:19:05,592 --> 01:19:07,759 calling for a new Israeli government . 1967 01:19:07,930 --> 01:19:09,930 This is coercion . It's dangerous , 1968 01:19:09,930 --> 01:19:12,629 it's undemocratic . If Chuck Schumer 1969 01:19:12,640 --> 01:19:14,640 doesn't like Netanyahu , it doesn't 1970 01:19:14,640 --> 01:19:17,379 matter . We should respect the Israeli 1971 01:19:17,390 --> 01:19:19,501 government should be respected by the 1972 01:19:19,501 --> 01:19:21,668 American government . Americans should 1973 01:19:21,668 --> 01:19:23,723 stand strongly with Israel's elected 1974 01:19:23,723 --> 01:19:25,946 leadership not threatening as it fights 1975 01:19:25,946 --> 01:19:28,112 terrorism . I personally hope , I hope 1976 01:19:28,112 --> 01:19:30,057 that Israel destroys , kills every 1977 01:19:30,057 --> 01:19:32,168 Hamas terrorist . There is , first of 1978 01:19:32,168 --> 01:19:34,057 all , thanks both of you for your 1979 01:19:34,057 --> 01:19:36,057 service . Uh So I want to say a few 1980 01:19:36,057 --> 01:19:35,419 things before I ask you a couple of 1981 01:19:35,430 --> 01:19:37,689 questions , protecting our national 1982 01:19:37,700 --> 01:19:39,533 security interest means that the 1983 01:19:39,533 --> 01:19:41,644 military must be laser focused on the 1984 01:19:41,644 --> 01:19:43,867 cold , hard facts and not only what our 1985 01:19:43,867 --> 01:19:46,089 adversaries are doing but what they are 1986 01:19:46,089 --> 01:19:48,089 capable of doing . The violence and 1987 01:19:48,089 --> 01:19:50,200 unrest in Haiti is heartbreaking . It 1988 01:19:50,200 --> 01:19:52,311 is a symptom of political unrest that 1989 01:19:52,311 --> 01:19:54,422 has only continued to grow under this 1990 01:19:54,422 --> 01:19:56,644 administration . Not only has the Biden 1991 01:19:56,644 --> 01:19:58,811 administration taken an active role in 1992 01:19:58,811 --> 01:20:00,922 destabilizing the region by appeasing 1993 01:20:00,922 --> 01:20:03,033 Cuba Venezuela and Nicaragua . But it 1994 01:20:03,033 --> 01:20:02,500 appears that the White House is totally 1995 01:20:02,509 --> 01:20:04,065 unprepared to deal with the 1996 01:20:04,065 --> 01:20:06,231 consequences of the political unrest . 1997 01:20:06,231 --> 01:20:08,287 These regimes create and support the 1998 01:20:08,287 --> 01:20:10,398 policy of the United States could not 1999 01:20:10,398 --> 01:20:12,620 be that we just let everyone in totally 2000 01:20:12,620 --> 01:20:14,620 in the our country totally unvetted 2001 01:20:14,620 --> 01:20:14,410 anytime there's trouble around the 2002 01:20:14,419 --> 01:20:16,475 world . That is what President Biden 2003 01:20:16,475 --> 01:20:18,586 has done at the border with 8 million 2004 01:20:18,586 --> 01:20:20,697 people pouring across . And after the 2005 01:20:20,697 --> 01:20:22,697 botched withdrawal from Afghanistan 2006 01:20:22,697 --> 01:20:24,919 with 90,000 unvetted people coming in . 2007 01:20:24,919 --> 01:20:27,086 Not only does this administration open 2008 01:20:27,086 --> 01:20:29,086 the floodgates for people who don't 2009 01:20:29,086 --> 01:20:31,252 know anything about to come , anything 2010 01:20:31,252 --> 01:20:33,475 about what we believe in to come to our 2011 01:20:33,475 --> 01:20:35,697 country . President Biden and Democrats 2012 01:20:35,697 --> 01:20:35,310 at every level of government then give 2013 01:20:35,319 --> 01:20:37,660 these individuals cash phones , lawyers 2014 01:20:37,669 --> 01:20:39,947 and everything else paid for by the US . 2015 01:20:39,947 --> 01:20:41,502 Taxpayer . The entire Biden 2016 01:20:41,502 --> 01:20:43,836 administration can be summed up as this . 2017 01:20:43,836 --> 01:20:45,780 Biden creates a magnet for illegal 2018 01:20:45,780 --> 01:20:47,725 immigration here . A piece of evil 2019 01:20:47,725 --> 01:20:49,947 regimes then forces the American people 2020 01:20:49,947 --> 01:20:52,002 to pay for the unrest , humanitarian 2021 01:20:52,002 --> 01:20:54,113 crisis and mass border crossings that 2022 01:20:54,113 --> 01:20:56,280 result it doesn't work and it can't be 2023 01:20:56,280 --> 01:20:58,502 our answer to the chaos in Haiti . It's 2024 01:20:58,502 --> 01:20:58,200 also worth knowing that all of this 2025 01:20:58,209 --> 01:21:00,431 works to the benefit of our adversaries 2026 01:21:00,431 --> 01:21:02,376 like China , Russia and Iran , our 2027 01:21:02,376 --> 01:21:04,819 enemies thrive on our chaos . These 2028 01:21:04,830 --> 01:21:07,052 evil regimes are working every day . To 2029 01:21:07,052 --> 01:21:09,108 expand their foothold in the western 2030 01:21:09,108 --> 01:21:11,330 hemisphere and increase the ability for 2031 01:21:11,330 --> 01:21:13,386 their proxies to threaten the US and 2032 01:21:13,386 --> 01:21:15,552 destabilize the region for South Com . 2033 01:21:15,552 --> 01:21:17,719 We see Iran in infiltrating the region 2034 01:21:17,719 --> 01:21:17,600 and Communist trying to use initiatives 2035 01:21:17,609 --> 01:21:19,553 like Belt and Road to spread their 2036 01:21:19,553 --> 01:21:21,720 influence and saddle poor countries in 2037 01:21:21,720 --> 01:21:24,120 Latin America with massive debt for 2038 01:21:24,129 --> 01:21:26,351 North com . We see Russia and Communist 2039 01:21:26,351 --> 01:21:28,407 China using unconventional warfare , 2040 01:21:28,407 --> 01:21:30,351 especially with cyberattacks going 2041 01:21:30,351 --> 01:21:32,240 after our supply chains or taking 2042 01:21:32,240 --> 01:21:34,351 advantage of the open border . We are 2043 01:21:34,351 --> 01:21:36,462 even seeing our adversaries undermine 2044 01:21:36,462 --> 01:21:36,330 us security while expanding their reach 2045 01:21:36,339 --> 01:21:38,395 in places like the Arctic , bringing 2046 01:21:38,395 --> 01:21:40,561 their militaries closer to the US . So 2047 01:21:40,561 --> 01:21:42,728 I have a couple of questions , General 2048 01:21:42,728 --> 01:21:44,839 Richardson , let's start with Haiti . 2049 01:21:44,839 --> 01:21:46,783 The people of Haiti have reached a 2050 01:21:46,783 --> 01:21:46,459 breaking point . Florida families , we 2051 01:21:46,470 --> 01:21:48,581 have a lot of Haitian families in our 2052 01:21:48,581 --> 01:21:50,414 state are compassion but they're 2053 01:21:50,414 --> 01:21:52,526 worried about how this instability in 2054 01:21:52,526 --> 01:21:54,581 the region to not only include Haiti 2055 01:21:54,581 --> 01:21:56,526 but all of South Com theater could 2056 01:21:56,526 --> 01:21:58,470 possibly stroke a mass immigration 2057 01:21:58,470 --> 01:22:00,526 event in my state . I spoke with the 2058 01:22:00,526 --> 01:22:00,350 Coast Guard last night . I'd like to 2059 01:22:00,359 --> 01:22:02,415 hear from you . What is your plan to 2060 01:22:02,415 --> 01:22:04,303 address the possibility of a mass 2061 01:22:04,303 --> 01:22:06,248 migration event which may not only 2062 01:22:06,248 --> 01:22:08,470 impact uh uh Florida but other also our 2063 01:22:08,470 --> 01:22:10,526 base within the Caribbean . What are 2064 01:22:10,526 --> 01:22:12,581 the options available to us with dod 2065 01:22:12,581 --> 01:22:15,000 assets and capabilities ? So in terms 2066 01:22:15,009 --> 01:22:17,459 of the mass migration , we did a uh uh 2067 01:22:17,470 --> 01:22:20,040 we have our contingency plan at us 2068 01:22:20,049 --> 01:22:22,629 South Com and we did a train walk last 2069 01:22:22,640 --> 01:22:24,830 uh last summer on Naval Station 2070 01:22:24,839 --> 01:22:27,149 Guantanamo Bay . And that was with all 2071 01:22:27,160 --> 01:22:29,327 of the interagency to walk through all 2072 01:22:29,327 --> 01:22:31,779 the processes and uh ensure that all 2073 01:22:31,790 --> 01:22:34,319 the steps that are necessary uh to take 2074 01:22:34,330 --> 01:22:36,879 place are actually uh in place . 2075 01:22:36,890 --> 01:22:39,223 Everything is refreshed , the equipment , 2076 01:22:39,223 --> 01:22:42,319 uh everything is ready to go . And , uh 2077 01:22:42,330 --> 01:22:44,386 and so as we work through all of our 2078 01:22:44,386 --> 01:22:46,497 contingency plans , I assure you that 2079 01:22:46,497 --> 01:22:48,663 us South com the Department of Defense 2080 01:22:48,663 --> 01:22:51,629 are ready to go . Second question . Um 2081 01:22:51,640 --> 01:22:53,807 For General Richardson , I have a , we 2082 01:22:53,807 --> 01:22:55,918 I worked on and a lot of us worked on 2083 01:22:55,918 --> 01:22:57,751 getting a dual use amendment for 2084 01:22:57,751 --> 01:22:59,918 Homestead Air Force Base in the fiscal 2085 01:22:59,918 --> 01:23:02,140 year 23 . ND A . This base allows us to 2086 01:23:02,140 --> 01:23:04,251 project power in the hemisphere where 2087 01:23:04,251 --> 01:23:06,196 enemies China , Russia and Iran as 2088 01:23:06,196 --> 01:23:08,473 proxies are present and they're active . 2089 01:23:08,473 --> 01:23:10,640 I asked Air Force leadership about the 2090 01:23:10,640 --> 01:23:10,180 future of Homestead and having a 2091 01:23:10,189 --> 01:23:12,356 permanent flying mission at the base . 2092 01:23:12,356 --> 01:23:14,578 Um General Brown assured me that he was 2093 01:23:14,578 --> 01:23:16,745 committed to having a platform operate 2094 01:23:16,745 --> 01:23:18,856 out of homestead . Can you talk about 2095 01:23:18,856 --> 01:23:18,709 the strategic value of the base and why 2096 01:23:18,720 --> 01:23:21,250 we need it ? So Homestead Air Reserve 2097 01:23:21,259 --> 01:23:23,609 Base actually is a , is a great staging 2098 01:23:23,620 --> 01:23:25,799 platform . Uh When I was in North Com 2099 01:23:25,810 --> 01:23:27,643 in my previous job as army North 2100 01:23:27,643 --> 01:23:29,421 commander , we staged out of uh 2101 01:23:29,421 --> 01:23:31,669 Homestead for the response into the 2102 01:23:31,680 --> 01:23:34,319 Bahamas for uh the damage that was done 2103 01:23:34,330 --> 01:23:36,810 by hurricane Dorian . Uh we re uh 2104 01:23:36,819 --> 01:23:38,810 launched our missions . My special 2105 01:23:38,819 --> 01:23:40,597 operations , my theater special 2106 01:23:40,597 --> 01:23:42,763 operations command is at Homestead Air 2107 01:23:42,763 --> 01:23:45,500 Reserve Base . Uh So South and so being 2108 01:23:45,509 --> 01:23:47,509 able to , we stage our two missions 2109 01:23:47,509 --> 01:23:49,930 that uh that we conducted into Haiti uh 2110 01:23:49,939 --> 01:23:52,709 this past week from Homestead . And so 2111 01:23:52,750 --> 01:23:54,890 the ability for uh the Department of 2112 01:23:54,899 --> 01:23:57,220 Defense to have Homestead as a staging 2113 01:23:57,229 --> 01:24:00,160 base in South Florida uh to be able to 2114 01:24:00,169 --> 01:24:02,899 jump uh to respond to humanitarian 2115 01:24:02,910 --> 01:24:05,021 assistance and disaster response type 2116 01:24:05,021 --> 01:24:08,259 activities is very , uh hugely helpful . 2117 01:24:09,049 --> 01:24:12,290 Thank both of you . Uh Thank you , 2118 01:24:12,299 --> 01:24:14,490 Senator Scott , Senator Kin , please . 2119 01:24:14,879 --> 01:24:17,046 Thank you , Mr Chair and thanks to our 2120 01:24:17,046 --> 01:24:18,990 witnesses for your great service , 2121 01:24:18,990 --> 01:24:21,268 General Glo . I want to begin with you . 2122 01:24:21,268 --> 01:24:23,379 My colleagues and I on this committee 2123 01:24:23,379 --> 01:24:25,435 have recently discussed installation 2124 01:24:25,435 --> 01:24:27,910 security from , with respect to drone 2125 01:24:27,919 --> 01:24:30,529 threats at bases in the United States . 2126 01:24:30,540 --> 01:24:32,151 Recognizing that we're in an 2127 01:24:32,151 --> 01:24:34,151 unclassified setting . What can you 2128 01:24:34,151 --> 01:24:36,100 tell me about how North Com is 2129 01:24:36,109 --> 01:24:38,770 addressing this issue and with , with 2130 01:24:38,779 --> 01:24:40,723 what partners are you working this 2131 01:24:40,723 --> 01:24:44,459 challenge ? Senator North Com uh , 2132 01:24:44,470 --> 01:24:47,290 as part of my 90 day uh assessment is 2133 01:24:47,299 --> 01:24:49,600 uh to tell the truth . The uh counter 2134 01:24:49,609 --> 01:24:52,799 UAs uh mission has dominated that so 2135 01:24:52,810 --> 01:24:54,850 far in the first month . Uh uh Of 2136 01:24:54,859 --> 01:24:57,026 course , I knew it was an issue coming 2137 01:24:57,026 --> 01:24:59,248 from uh another combatant command where 2138 01:24:59,248 --> 01:25:01,415 uh we , we faced that threat in a very 2139 01:25:01,415 --> 01:25:03,026 different way because of the 2140 01:25:03,026 --> 01:25:05,192 environment . Uh But I wasn't prepared 2141 01:25:05,192 --> 01:25:07,526 for the number of incursions that I see . 2142 01:25:07,526 --> 01:25:11,410 Uh I've gone into the uh um events 2143 01:25:11,419 --> 01:25:14,299 at joint base , Langley Eustace and I'm 2144 01:25:14,310 --> 01:25:16,459 using that as a uh the , the 2145 01:25:16,470 --> 01:25:18,870 centerpiece of my 90 day assessment to 2146 01:25:18,879 --> 01:25:21,629 see where NORAD and North Com can and 2147 01:25:21,640 --> 01:25:24,500 should do more as this uh merging uh 2148 01:25:24,509 --> 01:25:27,899 capability outstrips the operational 2149 01:25:27,910 --> 01:25:30,077 framework that we have to address it . 2150 01:25:30,279 --> 01:25:32,470 And can you talk about other partners 2151 01:25:32,479 --> 01:25:34,312 that you're working with because 2152 01:25:34,312 --> 01:25:36,090 obviously there's sort of a law 2153 01:25:36,090 --> 01:25:38,201 enforcement component of this . Um So 2154 01:25:38,201 --> 01:25:40,312 who who else is , is working with you 2155 01:25:40,312 --> 01:25:42,257 on this problem ? So , yes , sir . 2156 01:25:42,257 --> 01:25:44,479 Absolutely . So primarily Department of 2157 01:25:44,479 --> 01:25:46,479 Homeland Security and Department of 2158 01:25:46,479 --> 01:25:48,479 Justice uh along the border had the 2159 01:25:48,479 --> 01:25:50,701 primary responsibility . That's who I'm 2160 01:25:50,701 --> 01:25:53,035 working with there . Uh in the interior , 2161 01:25:53,035 --> 01:25:54,812 it's the services that have the 2162 01:25:54,812 --> 01:25:56,757 responsibility for defending their 2163 01:25:56,757 --> 01:25:58,535 bases . Uh So working with each 2164 01:25:58,535 --> 01:26:00,812 individual service and then also again , 2165 01:26:00,812 --> 01:26:02,812 Department of Homeland Security and 2166 01:26:02,812 --> 01:26:05,035 Department of Energy uh for specific uh 2167 01:26:05,035 --> 01:26:07,035 critical infrastructure locations . 2168 01:26:07,035 --> 01:26:06,379 Those are the primary ones that I'm 2169 01:26:06,390 --> 01:26:08,557 working with . Th Thank you for that . 2170 01:26:08,557 --> 01:26:10,723 Now , a question for both of you about 2171 01:26:10,723 --> 01:26:13,060 F MS . The importance of uh F MS was 2172 01:26:13,069 --> 01:26:15,379 mentioned by General Corella last week , 2173 01:26:15,600 --> 01:26:17,656 General Guillo , you mentioned it in 2174 01:26:17,656 --> 01:26:19,489 your written statement , General 2175 01:26:19,489 --> 01:26:21,656 Richardson , you and I talked about it 2176 01:26:21,656 --> 01:26:21,649 a little bit last week when we were 2177 01:26:21,660 --> 01:26:24,649 together the F MS programs not only 2178 01:26:24,660 --> 01:26:26,327 increase interoperability and 2179 01:26:26,327 --> 01:26:28,430 strengthen partnerships but can help 2180 01:26:28,439 --> 01:26:30,830 reduce our partners reliance upon 2181 01:26:30,839 --> 01:26:33,600 strategic competitors as Well , what 2182 01:26:33,609 --> 01:26:35,810 are you hearing from your counterparts 2183 01:26:36,040 --> 01:26:38,262 about F MS ? And I want to particularly 2184 01:26:38,262 --> 01:26:40,207 direct at the General Richardson , 2185 01:26:40,207 --> 01:26:42,429 recognizing General Guillo short tenure 2186 01:26:42,429 --> 01:26:44,651 that's been dominated by other issues . 2187 01:26:44,651 --> 01:26:46,873 But General Richardson , could you talk 2188 01:26:46,873 --> 01:26:48,984 about ? So F MS is a critical enabler 2189 01:26:48,984 --> 01:26:51,096 and obviously , with uh with uh being 2190 01:26:51,096 --> 01:26:53,318 able to um have our equipment , have up 2191 01:26:53,318 --> 01:26:55,640 to date equipment and uh and then 2192 01:26:55,649 --> 01:26:57,910 having us equipment and being 2193 01:26:57,919 --> 01:27:00,030 interoperable and that , that sort of 2194 01:27:00,030 --> 01:27:02,252 thing is , um , is , is an imperative . 2195 01:27:02,252 --> 01:27:04,720 And so what Secretary Austin and uh the 2196 01:27:04,729 --> 01:27:07,000 chairman have instituted to speed up 2197 01:27:07,009 --> 01:27:09,669 the processes within F MS over the past 2198 01:27:09,680 --> 01:27:12,390 two years , um , have taken place . But 2199 01:27:12,399 --> 01:27:14,066 I would say that we've got to 2200 01:27:14,066 --> 01:27:15,955 streamline that through the inter 2201 01:27:15,955 --> 01:27:17,788 agency because it's not just the 2202 01:27:17,788 --> 01:27:19,843 Department of Defense that , that uh 2203 01:27:19,843 --> 01:27:21,621 has a stake in that and that uh 2204 01:27:21,621 --> 01:27:23,732 approves things . And so we've got to 2205 01:27:23,732 --> 01:27:25,788 streamline that process a little bit 2206 01:27:25,788 --> 01:27:27,955 better and , and speed it up . We , we 2207 01:27:27,955 --> 01:27:30,177 talked last week in my office about the 2208 01:27:30,177 --> 01:27:32,177 potential synergy between the state 2209 01:27:32,177 --> 01:27:34,399 partnership program that Senator Peters 2210 01:27:34,399 --> 01:27:36,066 was discussing in the theater 2211 01:27:36,066 --> 01:27:38,121 maintenance partnership initiative . 2212 01:27:38,121 --> 01:27:40,288 Could you talk a little bit about that 2213 01:27:40,288 --> 01:27:42,066 and whether it could support or 2214 01:27:42,066 --> 01:27:44,232 complement the F MS um , uh priorities 2215 01:27:44,232 --> 01:27:46,455 that we have ? Well , it absolutely , I 2216 01:27:46,455 --> 01:27:48,566 mean , that's the whole reason for it 2217 01:27:48,566 --> 01:27:48,250 where we have , uh , we have us 2218 01:27:48,259 --> 01:27:50,439 equipment in these countries and so 2219 01:27:50,540 --> 01:27:52,373 maintenance is hard for our , us 2220 01:27:52,373 --> 01:27:54,799 military and it's hard for our partner 2221 01:27:54,810 --> 01:27:56,850 nations as well . And so , uh with 2222 01:27:56,859 --> 01:27:59,000 turnover , we always have , we always 2223 01:27:59,009 --> 01:28:01,009 in our US military , we have people 2224 01:28:01,009 --> 01:28:02,898 coming in and , and going out and 2225 01:28:02,898 --> 01:28:05,120 leaving the military . And so there's a 2226 01:28:05,120 --> 01:28:05,120 constant turnover . So you have to have 2227 01:28:05,129 --> 01:28:07,240 a really good training , teaching and 2228 01:28:07,240 --> 01:28:09,073 training program at the , at the 2229 01:28:09,073 --> 01:28:11,129 tactical level . And so the T MP I 2230 01:28:11,140 --> 01:28:13,029 program , the Theater Maintenance 2231 01:28:13,029 --> 01:28:14,807 Partnership Initiative that you 2232 01:28:14,807 --> 01:28:16,807 mentioned the uh the Nexus with the 2233 01:28:16,807 --> 01:28:18,640 National Guard State Partnership 2234 01:28:18,640 --> 01:28:20,751 program , there's tons of maintainers 2235 01:28:20,751 --> 01:28:22,751 in the National Guard . And so this 2236 01:28:22,751 --> 01:28:24,973 makes a very simple , easy way to teach 2237 01:28:24,973 --> 01:28:27,084 and train fits right in line with the 2238 01:28:27,084 --> 01:28:29,418 institutional capacity building as well . 2239 01:28:29,418 --> 01:28:31,584 Um Last question , I'd like to ask you 2240 01:28:31,584 --> 01:28:33,640 General Richardson , one of the best 2241 01:28:33,640 --> 01:28:35,950 advantages we have in in your region is 2242 01:28:35,959 --> 01:28:38,390 the women peace and security agenda . 2243 01:28:38,700 --> 01:28:41,229 Um You have made this a real priority 2244 01:28:41,240 --> 01:28:43,351 in your travel . Can you speak on the 2245 01:28:43,351 --> 01:28:45,890 impacts that the WPS initiatives are 2246 01:28:45,899 --> 01:28:48,010 having within our partner countries ? 2247 01:28:48,010 --> 01:28:49,955 Huge impact ? So thank you for the 2248 01:28:49,955 --> 01:28:52,121 question , Senator Un Security Council 2249 01:28:52,121 --> 01:28:54,350 resolution 1325 for women , peace and 2250 01:28:54,359 --> 01:28:56,970 security . And so in every , every 2251 01:28:56,979 --> 01:28:59,201 visit I do in the countries , we have a 2252 01:28:59,201 --> 01:29:01,257 women peace and security event . The 2253 01:29:01,257 --> 01:29:03,423 great thing is that we have a , we get 2254 01:29:03,423 --> 01:29:05,674 a uh what I call a twofer uh with our 2255 01:29:05,685 --> 01:29:07,407 enlisted leader , professional 2256 01:29:07,407 --> 01:29:09,518 development program as well . We have 2257 01:29:09,518 --> 01:29:12,645 many women enlisted leaders that are uh 2258 01:29:12,875 --> 01:29:15,645 in our uh military formations in the , 2259 01:29:15,654 --> 01:29:18,404 in , in the region . And so that uh 2260 01:29:18,415 --> 01:29:21,035 dovetailing nicely with uh with our 2261 01:29:21,044 --> 01:29:23,134 different programs . Uh They're both 2262 01:29:23,145 --> 01:29:26,069 rock star programs , if I must say and 2263 01:29:26,080 --> 01:29:28,379 uh the our partner nations doing that 2264 01:29:28,390 --> 01:29:30,223 and seeing the diversity and the 2265 01:29:30,223 --> 01:29:32,279 ability to increase readiness within 2266 01:29:32,279 --> 01:29:34,660 their forces . Um They have realized 2267 01:29:34,669 --> 01:29:36,891 that and they continue on a really good 2268 01:29:36,891 --> 01:29:38,947 path . Thank you very much . I yield 2269 01:29:38,947 --> 01:29:41,390 back . Thank you , Senator KT Bill , 2270 01:29:41,399 --> 01:29:43,343 please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 2271 01:29:43,343 --> 01:29:45,566 Thanks for both of you being here today 2272 01:29:45,566 --> 01:29:47,343 and your service uh to the most 2273 01:29:47,343 --> 01:29:49,177 important combatant commanders . 2274 01:29:49,177 --> 01:29:51,343 Everybody's important , but one of you 2275 01:29:51,430 --> 01:29:53,799 uh guards our front door and one guards 2276 01:29:53,810 --> 01:29:56,180 our back door . And uh well , how 2277 01:29:56,189 --> 01:29:58,356 important that is in this day and time 2278 01:29:58,470 --> 01:30:01,459 general , uh we've seen the change in 2279 01:30:01,470 --> 01:30:05,220 the government in Canada , maybe the 2280 01:30:05,229 --> 01:30:07,540 direction that they're going , which is 2281 01:30:07,549 --> 01:30:09,771 very important should be very important 2282 01:30:09,771 --> 01:30:11,993 to all of us . Have you seen any change 2283 01:30:11,993 --> 01:30:13,882 with the military in terms of how 2284 01:30:13,882 --> 01:30:15,993 they're helping us , uh you know , in 2285 01:30:15,993 --> 01:30:19,240 North Com Senator , uh on the first day 2286 01:30:19,250 --> 01:30:21,472 of my command , I met with the Minister 2287 01:30:21,472 --> 01:30:23,799 of National Defense uh Minister Blair 2288 01:30:24,089 --> 01:30:26,033 and the Chief of the Defense Staff 2289 01:30:26,033 --> 01:30:28,145 General Eyre uh in Colorado Springs . 2290 01:30:28,145 --> 01:30:29,922 And we talked about uh Canada's 2291 01:30:29,922 --> 01:30:32,390 commitment to uh NORAD and no R AD 2292 01:30:32,399 --> 01:30:34,520 modernization . And they told me at 2293 01:30:34,529 --> 01:30:36,640 that time that they were committed uh 2294 01:30:36,640 --> 01:30:38,609 with funding aligned for over the 2295 01:30:38,620 --> 01:30:42,270 horizon radar F-35 P eight and MQ nine , 2296 01:30:42,339 --> 01:30:44,870 all those systems will immediately have 2297 01:30:44,879 --> 01:30:47,410 benefit to us in the homeland defense 2298 01:30:47,419 --> 01:30:49,875 mission that we share in . No ad . And 2299 01:30:49,884 --> 01:30:52,305 so , uh since the first day , I've seen 2300 01:30:52,314 --> 01:30:54,481 nothing but strong commitment from our 2301 01:30:54,481 --> 01:30:56,703 Canadian partners for modernizing uh no 2302 01:30:56,703 --> 01:30:58,765 ad and uh working together to defend 2303 01:30:58,774 --> 01:31:00,996 our homelands . Great . That's , that's 2304 01:31:00,996 --> 01:31:03,163 good news . What about the border ? Um 2305 01:31:03,163 --> 01:31:05,052 You get any uh push back from the 2306 01:31:05,052 --> 01:31:07,163 border , northern border , you know , 2307 01:31:07,163 --> 01:31:09,385 we hear a lot about the southern border 2308 01:31:09,385 --> 01:31:08,924 but the northern border is very 2309 01:31:08,935 --> 01:31:11,157 important . We hear a lot of people are 2310 01:31:11,157 --> 01:31:13,268 coming , especially terrorists of the 2311 01:31:13,268 --> 01:31:13,205 northern northern border if you had any 2312 01:31:13,560 --> 01:31:15,282 conversations with any of your 2313 01:31:15,282 --> 01:31:17,939 counterparts there . Uh Senator I have , 2314 01:31:17,950 --> 01:31:21,290 um although the uh uh customs and 2315 01:31:21,299 --> 01:31:23,521 border protection and homeland security 2316 01:31:23,521 --> 01:31:25,580 have not requested dod or north com 2317 01:31:25,589 --> 01:31:27,589 support on the north border , it is 2318 01:31:27,589 --> 01:31:29,645 something I watch very closely for a 2319 01:31:29,645 --> 01:31:31,367 number of reasons . One is the 2320 01:31:31,367 --> 01:31:33,256 potential threats uh entering our 2321 01:31:33,256 --> 01:31:35,478 country through the north and I have uh 2322 01:31:35,478 --> 01:31:37,645 frequent discussions with CBP and with 2323 01:31:37,645 --> 01:31:39,867 the intel community to see if there are 2324 01:31:39,867 --> 01:31:42,145 any uh threats that are coming through . 2325 01:31:42,145 --> 01:31:44,089 And then of course , it's a shared 2326 01:31:44,089 --> 01:31:45,978 border with a strong partner like 2327 01:31:45,978 --> 01:31:48,200 Canada . So on the uh from Mill to Mill 2328 01:31:48,200 --> 01:31:50,367 with Canada , uh we talk about it . Uh 2329 01:31:50,367 --> 01:31:52,533 So it's something I absolutely getting 2330 01:31:52,533 --> 01:31:54,645 cooper and keeping a , a strong sense 2331 01:31:54,645 --> 01:31:56,422 of situational awareness on the 2332 01:31:56,422 --> 01:31:58,422 activities of the northern border . 2333 01:31:58,422 --> 01:32:00,311 Thank you General Richardson . Uh 2334 01:32:00,311 --> 01:32:02,089 Panama Canal is one of the most 2335 01:32:02,089 --> 01:32:03,922 important resources for us . And 2336 01:32:04,049 --> 01:32:06,540 Central America , give us an update 2337 01:32:06,549 --> 01:32:08,771 right now on that . If , if we had some 2338 01:32:08,771 --> 01:32:10,882 kind of conflict all over the world , 2339 01:32:10,882 --> 01:32:13,105 would we , we be able to use the Panama 2340 01:32:13,105 --> 01:32:14,771 Canal ? We have a very strong 2341 01:32:14,771 --> 01:32:17,040 partnership with uh with Panama and 2342 01:32:17,049 --> 01:32:19,160 that that only continues to improve . 2343 01:32:19,160 --> 01:32:22,310 But my concern are the uh pr pr C state 2344 01:32:22,319 --> 01:32:24,541 owned enterprises that are along either 2345 01:32:24,541 --> 01:32:26,819 side of the Panama Canal . The five and 2346 01:32:26,830 --> 01:32:29,370 so uh just that strategic sea line of 2347 01:32:29,379 --> 01:32:32,779 communication , uh the Panama Canal , 2348 01:32:32,790 --> 01:32:35,012 uh I would be extremely concerned about 2349 01:32:35,012 --> 01:32:37,569 that . And M and I uh as a result , we 2350 01:32:37,580 --> 01:32:39,747 watch that very closely . Senator . Do 2351 01:32:39,747 --> 01:32:41,524 you think the security there is 2352 01:32:41,524 --> 01:32:44,950 adequate uh above and beyond uh where 2353 01:32:44,959 --> 01:32:47,470 we would be able to use it again ? I my 2354 01:32:47,479 --> 01:32:49,423 concern is being able to use those 2355 01:32:49,423 --> 01:32:51,479 state owned enterprises for military 2356 01:32:51,479 --> 01:32:53,870 application uh if required . And so the , 2357 01:32:53,879 --> 01:32:55,935 the proximity that , that has to the 2358 01:32:55,935 --> 01:32:58,669 Panama Canal uh is a concern to me . I 2359 01:32:58,680 --> 01:33:01,100 have no doubt on uh Panama's ability to 2360 01:33:01,109 --> 01:33:03,810 secure that and our ability to uh help 2361 01:33:03,819 --> 01:33:05,950 defend that if required is the 2362 01:33:05,959 --> 01:33:09,149 expansion uh on target . I know the 2363 01:33:09,160 --> 01:33:11,216 last time I was down there they were 2364 01:33:11,216 --> 01:33:13,271 doing a lot of work . Uh It's Panama 2365 01:33:13,271 --> 01:33:15,382 Canal . I don't know whether you keep 2366 01:33:15,382 --> 01:33:17,438 up with that or not . And that is uh 2367 01:33:17,438 --> 01:33:19,890 the Pr C Senator . Yes . And they're uh 2368 01:33:19,899 --> 01:33:22,640 building 1/4 bridge across the canal . 2369 01:33:22,660 --> 01:33:25,350 And so , uh we , we absolutely track 2370 01:33:25,359 --> 01:33:27,415 everything that uh that is done with 2371 01:33:27,415 --> 01:33:29,526 the Panama Canal and work with uh our 2372 01:33:29,526 --> 01:33:31,890 Panama uh painting Panamanian uh 2373 01:33:31,899 --> 01:33:35,390 authorities and our partners . Um uh as 2374 01:33:35,399 --> 01:33:38,430 we uh watch all of this activity that 2375 01:33:38,439 --> 01:33:40,772 takes place and continues to take place . 2376 01:33:41,060 --> 01:33:43,171 Have you or any of your staff visited 2377 01:33:43,171 --> 01:33:46,049 the DA and Gap where uh we have all the 2378 01:33:46,529 --> 01:33:49,009 uh immigrants coming uh from South 2379 01:33:49,020 --> 01:33:51,200 America to North America . Senator I 2380 01:33:51,209 --> 01:33:53,589 visited the Dion several times , both 2381 01:33:53,600 --> 01:33:55,822 on the Colombian side and on the Panama 2382 01:33:55,822 --> 01:33:57,989 side . And I've been to the binational 2383 01:33:57,989 --> 01:34:00,500 base that Colombia and Panama share 2384 01:34:00,509 --> 01:34:02,339 together and conduct joint uh 2385 01:34:02,350 --> 01:34:04,572 operations funding coming from for that 2386 01:34:05,189 --> 01:34:08,819 for the dairy answer . So , uh in terms 2387 01:34:08,830 --> 01:34:12,549 of the um the uh the operations that 2388 01:34:12,560 --> 01:34:15,979 Colombia uh that conducts is Colom uh 2389 01:34:15,990 --> 01:34:18,729 comes from Colombian resourcing that 2390 01:34:18,740 --> 01:34:20,962 they have for their military . The ones 2391 01:34:20,962 --> 01:34:23,299 for Panama come for the Panama security 2392 01:34:23,310 --> 01:34:26,959 forces . Our uh activities oais that we 2393 01:34:26,970 --> 01:34:29,192 operations , activities and investments 2394 01:34:29,192 --> 01:34:31,137 that we do with Panama are from my 2395 01:34:31,137 --> 01:34:33,081 security cooperations in , in , in 2396 01:34:33,081 --> 01:34:35,137 South com . Yeah , I saw your budget 2397 01:34:35,137 --> 01:34:37,303 and , and there's no doubt both of you 2398 01:34:37,303 --> 01:34:40,680 are so important to the protection of 2399 01:34:40,689 --> 01:34:42,800 the American citizens and our and our 2400 01:34:42,800 --> 01:34:45,078 country . You know , we , we just , we , 2401 01:34:45,078 --> 01:34:47,133 we just voted to give $60 billion to 2402 01:34:47,133 --> 01:34:49,300 Ukraine . I wish it would have gone to 2403 01:34:49,300 --> 01:34:51,467 y'all . I'm sure y'all could have used 2404 01:34:51,467 --> 01:34:51,370 it and I've seen your budgets and your 2405 01:34:51,379 --> 01:34:54,830 things that you use for uh to 2406 01:34:54,839 --> 01:34:57,660 work in , in both of your uh 2407 01:34:58,379 --> 01:35:00,660 north and south come and , and what you 2408 01:35:00,669 --> 01:35:02,836 do is amazing . Uh But we need to help 2409 01:35:02,836 --> 01:35:04,836 you . We really do . Thank you very 2410 01:35:04,836 --> 01:35:06,780 much , Flag Center Tober Center of 2411 01:35:06,780 --> 01:35:09,410 Rosen Place . Uh Thank you , Chairman 2412 01:35:09,419 --> 01:35:11,475 Reed . Uh of course , ranking member 2413 01:35:11,475 --> 01:35:13,586 wicker for holding this hearing . I'd 2414 01:35:13,586 --> 01:35:15,419 like to thank General Guillo and 2415 01:35:15,419 --> 01:35:17,475 General Richardson uh for testifying 2416 01:35:17,475 --> 01:35:19,641 today and of course , for your service 2417 01:35:19,641 --> 01:35:21,808 to our nation , really appreciate it . 2418 01:35:22,029 --> 01:35:23,862 Um I'm gonna hit a little bit on 2419 01:35:23,862 --> 01:35:25,973 countering Chinese and Russian forces 2420 01:35:25,973 --> 01:35:28,140 because as Russia continues its war in 2421 01:35:28,140 --> 01:35:30,990 Ukraine and China acts with increasing 2422 01:35:31,000 --> 01:35:33,450 aggression in the Indo Pacific . Both 2423 01:35:33,459 --> 01:35:35,515 countries are also taking steps that 2424 01:35:35,515 --> 01:35:37,570 pose a direct threat to our national 2425 01:35:37,570 --> 01:35:39,626 security right here at home . And so 2426 01:35:39,626 --> 01:35:42,370 General Gio , how can North com adapt 2427 01:35:42,379 --> 01:35:45,560 its force posture to proactively 2428 01:35:45,569 --> 01:35:47,669 proactively deter and respond to the 2429 01:35:47,680 --> 01:35:50,399 increasing presence and capabilities of 2430 01:35:50,410 --> 01:35:52,779 Russian and Chinese assets off our 2431 01:35:52,790 --> 01:35:54,850 coast . And actually within North 2432 01:35:54,859 --> 01:35:58,750 America , Senator , the uh the , the 2433 01:35:58,759 --> 01:36:00,870 best way for us to counter them is to 2434 01:36:00,870 --> 01:36:03,600 have presence of our own . So the uh 2435 01:36:03,609 --> 01:36:07,439 execution of exercises , patrols uh in 2436 01:36:07,450 --> 01:36:10,750 all domains , uh extremely important uh 2437 01:36:10,759 --> 01:36:12,759 off all of our coast . Uh primarily 2438 01:36:12,759 --> 01:36:15,140 focusing right now uh in the region of 2439 01:36:15,149 --> 01:36:17,629 a of Alaska because of the number of uh 2440 01:36:17,899 --> 01:36:20,700 uh incursions by Russian aircraft . And 2441 01:36:20,709 --> 01:36:23,879 then the um number of maritime uh the , 2442 01:36:23,890 --> 01:36:26,640 the , the strong presence that uh both 2443 01:36:26,649 --> 01:36:28,982 the Chinese and the Russians have there . 2444 01:36:28,982 --> 01:36:31,260 And the same thing applies on the what , 2445 01:36:31,260 --> 01:36:33,371 what we call the two o'clock approach 2446 01:36:33,371 --> 01:36:35,593 off on the , the North East . Uh making 2447 01:36:35,593 --> 01:36:37,705 sure that we have presence uh there . 2448 01:36:37,705 --> 01:36:39,871 That's what I think is the best way to 2449 01:36:39,871 --> 01:36:41,649 counter . And then part of that 2450 01:36:41,649 --> 01:36:43,538 presence being exercised a strong 2451 01:36:43,538 --> 01:36:45,760 exercise program , multinational , uh a 2452 01:36:45,760 --> 01:36:47,816 lot of partners showing that we have 2453 01:36:47,816 --> 01:36:49,593 the resolve to defend that most 2454 01:36:49,593 --> 01:36:51,760 strategic area . Um Thank you . Uh I'm 2455 01:36:51,760 --> 01:36:53,982 gonna move on again , General Guillo on 2456 01:36:53,982 --> 01:36:56,149 um talking about cybersecurity because 2457 01:36:56,149 --> 01:36:58,093 this is a big part of our homeland 2458 01:36:58,093 --> 01:37:00,205 security system as well . So , um can 2459 01:37:00,205 --> 01:37:02,316 you talk to us about how north com is 2460 01:37:02,316 --> 01:37:04,490 currently addressing a cybersecurity 2461 01:37:04,500 --> 01:37:06,333 threats to the homeland ? You're 2462 01:37:06,333 --> 01:37:08,500 talking about other kinds of posturing 2463 01:37:08,500 --> 01:37:10,278 and in your opinion , could the 2464 01:37:10,278 --> 01:37:12,389 creation of a new subordinate Unified 2465 01:37:12,389 --> 01:37:14,444 Command specifically responsible for 2466 01:37:14,444 --> 01:37:17,509 defensive cyber operations could ensure 2467 01:37:17,520 --> 01:37:19,631 a better comprehensive and actually a 2468 01:37:19,631 --> 01:37:21,687 cohesive defense posture against our 2469 01:37:21,687 --> 01:37:23,899 cyber . Adversaries senator . In my 2470 01:37:23,910 --> 01:37:25,799 previous response , I should have 2471 01:37:25,799 --> 01:37:27,966 mentioned cyber because it is the most 2472 01:37:27,966 --> 01:37:30,188 prevalent and consistent threat that we 2473 01:37:30,188 --> 01:37:32,243 see on a daily basis . You know , su 2474 01:37:32,243 --> 01:37:34,410 sure we see the maritime in the air uh 2475 01:37:34,410 --> 01:37:36,466 occasionally and they're important . 2476 01:37:36,466 --> 01:37:38,688 But every day , uh we have state actors 2477 01:37:38,688 --> 01:37:40,819 including Russia and China that are 2478 01:37:40,830 --> 01:37:42,997 attempting to get on our Department of 2479 01:37:42,997 --> 01:37:45,219 Defense Networks . Uh the strength that 2480 01:37:45,219 --> 01:37:47,052 we have through Cyber command in 2481 01:37:47,052 --> 01:37:49,274 detecting and defeating those threats . 2482 01:37:49,274 --> 01:37:51,140 Uh is , is what's keeping us uh 2483 01:37:51,149 --> 01:37:54,689 operational . Northern Command's role 2484 01:37:54,700 --> 01:37:57,049 is first and foremost , to protect the , 2485 01:37:57,060 --> 01:37:59,640 the systems that we use in inside our 2486 01:37:59,649 --> 01:38:02,770 NORAD and North com to uh operate . And 2487 01:38:02,779 --> 01:38:05,001 we have four different networks that we 2488 01:38:05,001 --> 01:38:07,240 protect . Beyond that is anything with 2489 01:38:07,250 --> 01:38:09,306 the Department of Defense Nexus . We 2490 01:38:09,306 --> 01:38:11,361 work with Cyber Command to make sure 2491 01:38:11,361 --> 01:38:13,472 that all of those are addressed . And 2492 01:38:13,472 --> 01:38:15,528 then the third thing that we do , we 2493 01:38:15,528 --> 01:38:17,361 work with the FBI and CIA strong 2494 01:38:17,361 --> 01:38:19,528 partnership with both of them . And in 2495 01:38:19,528 --> 01:38:21,528 my short command , I've already met 2496 01:38:21,528 --> 01:38:23,750 with both of their leadership about how 2497 01:38:23,750 --> 01:38:25,694 do we uh help other members of the 2498 01:38:25,694 --> 01:38:27,861 critical infrastructure community . Uh 2499 01:38:27,861 --> 01:38:30,600 And if they need dod support , it is uh 2500 01:38:30,709 --> 01:38:32,959 uh synchronized presented through north 2501 01:38:32,979 --> 01:38:35,720 com to , to protect them to , for your 2502 01:38:35,729 --> 01:38:38,160 question about a , a separate command . 2503 01:38:38,419 --> 01:38:40,641 Uh I I would need to look into it , but 2504 01:38:40,641 --> 01:38:42,752 my initial responses would be that in 2505 01:38:42,752 --> 01:38:44,752 the two combatant commands in which 2506 01:38:44,752 --> 01:38:46,919 I've served . The relationship and 2507 01:38:46,930 --> 01:38:49,490 support from Cyber command has been 2508 01:38:49,500 --> 01:38:51,879 phenomenal and I would uh really 2509 01:38:51,890 --> 01:38:54,720 hesitate to do anything that bifurcated 2510 01:38:54,729 --> 01:38:57,240 or separated them from their seamless 2511 01:38:57,250 --> 01:39:00,259 ability to do operational offensive , 2512 01:39:00,270 --> 01:39:04,250 Cyber and defensive Cyber um uh 2513 01:39:04,330 --> 01:39:06,609 under the same leadership because it's 2514 01:39:06,620 --> 01:39:08,453 work really well for us uh in my 2515 01:39:08,453 --> 01:39:10,453 previous job in Central command and 2516 01:39:10,453 --> 01:39:12,287 certainly working well for us in 2517 01:39:12,287 --> 01:39:14,509 Northern Command . So always looking to 2518 01:39:14,509 --> 01:39:14,470 improve , but it's something I'd look 2519 01:39:14,479 --> 01:39:16,701 very closely because Cyber Command , uh 2520 01:39:16,701 --> 01:39:18,423 in my opinion , has been a , a 2521 01:39:18,423 --> 01:39:20,479 tremendous partner in this , in this 2522 01:39:20,479 --> 01:39:22,368 realm . Well , thank you . That's 2523 01:39:22,368 --> 01:39:22,290 really valuable input . I , I 2524 01:39:22,299 --> 01:39:24,640 appreciate it . Uh I'm gonna move on to 2525 01:39:24,649 --> 01:39:26,538 you General Richardson and talk a 2526 01:39:26,538 --> 01:39:28,750 little bit about uh linguists and uh 2527 01:39:28,759 --> 01:39:30,481 with the Department of Defense 2528 01:39:30,481 --> 01:39:32,703 increasingly making investments focused 2529 01:39:32,703 --> 01:39:34,870 on countering the People's Republic of 2530 01:39:34,870 --> 01:39:37,259 China . Um Do you have concerns 2531 01:39:37,270 --> 01:39:39,437 regarding a lack of language expertise 2532 01:39:39,437 --> 01:39:41,659 for countries in the South come area of 2533 01:39:41,659 --> 01:39:44,339 responsibility or is this gap 2534 01:39:44,350 --> 01:39:46,572 sufficiently addressed by the diversity 2535 01:39:46,572 --> 01:39:49,370 of the force that we recruit ? Um I 2536 01:39:49,379 --> 01:39:52,410 think with uh Spanish predominantly and 2537 01:39:52,419 --> 01:39:55,870 uh Portuguese , with Brazil . Uh the we 2538 01:39:55,879 --> 01:39:58,890 have enough uh linguists uh Senator . 2539 01:39:58,899 --> 01:40:02,080 But the , because a lot of uh uh a lot 2540 01:40:02,089 --> 01:40:04,256 of our linguists will speak Spanish uh 2541 01:40:04,256 --> 01:40:07,279 as well as other languages as well . So 2542 01:40:07,390 --> 01:40:09,557 it's just a matter of making sure that 2543 01:40:09,557 --> 01:40:11,612 we register our personnel demand and 2544 01:40:11,612 --> 01:40:13,834 our requirements all the time that this 2545 01:40:13,834 --> 01:40:16,057 region is important and that we gotta , 2546 01:40:16,057 --> 01:40:18,390 we've gotta keep these positions filled . 2547 01:40:18,390 --> 01:40:20,723 Well , you speak about the Panama Canal , 2548 01:40:20,723 --> 01:40:22,946 uh canal and uh the PR C investments uh 2549 01:40:22,946 --> 01:40:25,112 around there . So it , it is important 2550 01:40:25,112 --> 01:40:27,450 to have possibly more than Spanish and 2551 01:40:27,459 --> 01:40:29,890 Portuguese even uh in , in that area 2552 01:40:29,899 --> 01:40:32,370 because we know um our adversaries are 2553 01:40:32,379 --> 01:40:34,601 also there as well . So , thank you . I 2554 01:40:34,601 --> 01:40:38,029 appreciate my time is up . Thank you 2555 01:40:38,040 --> 01:40:40,620 very much . Uh Senator Rosen . Uh We 2556 01:40:40,629 --> 01:40:42,950 anticipate that Senator Schmidt will 2557 01:40:42,959 --> 01:40:45,560 arrive shortly . Uh And I will take 2558 01:40:45,569 --> 01:40:48,759 this opportunity to ask questions . Uh 2559 01:40:49,000 --> 01:40:52,490 but General Glo uh , as you know , 2560 01:40:52,500 --> 01:40:55,879 Congress has been considering uh taking 2561 01:40:55,899 --> 01:40:58,390 s bans which is now exclusively a 2562 01:40:58,399 --> 01:41:01,970 military uh uh for 2563 01:41:01,979 --> 01:41:05,859 military use and uh begin to share 2564 01:41:05,870 --> 01:41:07,819 or sell it to private entities . 2565 01:41:07,830 --> 01:41:09,830 Couldn't you tell the committee the 2566 01:41:09,830 --> 01:41:11,552 impact that would have on your 2567 01:41:11,552 --> 01:41:15,060 operations ? Senator 2568 01:41:15,069 --> 01:41:18,500 sharing or yielding the uh 2569 01:41:18,509 --> 01:41:21,859 spectrum between 3.1 and 3.45 gigahertz 2570 01:41:21,870 --> 01:41:24,037 would have a significant impact on our 2571 01:41:24,037 --> 01:41:27,350 uh homeland defense systems . Uh 2572 01:41:27,979 --> 01:41:31,640 And is there , there are a possibility 2573 01:41:31,649 --> 01:41:33,649 of sharing ? I know some folks have 2574 01:41:33,649 --> 01:41:35,760 come back and said they , that we can 2575 01:41:35,760 --> 01:41:37,760 use it mutually . Is that something 2576 01:41:37,760 --> 01:41:40,680 that you could do ? Senator or excuse 2577 01:41:40,689 --> 01:41:42,911 me , chairman ? I , I would say that in 2578 01:41:42,911 --> 01:41:44,856 our initial review , I , I haven't 2579 01:41:44,856 --> 01:41:46,745 found a way that we could share , 2580 01:41:46,745 --> 01:41:48,799 especially because uh with Northern 2581 01:41:48,810 --> 01:41:50,959 Command the 24 7 on alert uh 2582 01:41:50,970 --> 01:41:52,803 responsibility for defending the 2583 01:41:52,803 --> 01:41:55,439 homeland . Uh I would need full access 2584 01:41:55,450 --> 01:41:57,500 to that uh for all of the various 2585 01:41:57,509 --> 01:42:00,330 systems which are um seabased , 2586 01:42:00,339 --> 01:42:02,450 land-based and air based systems that 2587 01:42:02,450 --> 01:42:05,439 use that uh that frequency range . And 2588 01:42:05,450 --> 01:42:07,700 I would assume too that in a sharing 2589 01:42:07,709 --> 01:42:09,931 arrange that there would be a period of 2590 01:42:09,931 --> 01:42:12,042 time where some of your systems could 2591 01:42:12,042 --> 01:42:14,209 not effectively operate as they modify 2592 01:42:14,209 --> 01:42:17,419 themselves . Is that fair as we uh as 2593 01:42:17,430 --> 01:42:19,541 we negotiate the potential to share , 2594 01:42:19,541 --> 01:42:21,652 uh We've made it very clear that that 2595 01:42:21,652 --> 01:42:24,080 we would need 24 7 access to to those 2596 01:42:24,089 --> 01:42:27,339 frequency ranges and general Richardson . 2597 01:42:27,350 --> 01:42:31,060 Um the uh Chinese 2598 01:42:31,069 --> 01:42:33,479 influence and Russian influence degree 2599 01:42:33,490 --> 01:42:37,319 in your area of , of command is focused 2600 01:42:37,330 --> 01:42:39,497 on many things . But one of the things 2601 01:42:39,497 --> 01:42:41,274 they're focused on is strategic 2602 01:42:41,274 --> 01:42:44,140 minerals which could in fact be the oil 2603 01:42:44,149 --> 01:42:46,220 of the next generation as we move to 2604 01:42:46,229 --> 01:42:48,720 more electric power to vehicles , homes , 2605 01:42:48,729 --> 01:42:51,750 et cetera . Um Have you seen a 2606 01:42:51,759 --> 01:42:54,189 noticeable concentration of focus by 2607 01:42:54,200 --> 01:42:56,399 the Chinese on trying to identify and 2608 01:42:56,410 --> 01:43:00,319 control these strategic miracles and 2609 01:43:00,330 --> 01:43:04,229 especially in the , the work that uh 2610 01:43:04,240 --> 01:43:07,209 I've done to partner with our uh us 2611 01:43:07,220 --> 01:43:10,140 ambassadors in uh Ar Argentina and also 2612 01:43:10,149 --> 01:43:12,790 Chile . And the um as we know that uh 2613 01:43:12,799 --> 01:43:16,549 lithium triangle is in the lit uh is in 2614 01:43:16,560 --> 01:43:18,870 uh comprised of Argentina , Bolivia and 2615 01:43:18,879 --> 01:43:21,250 Chile . And so 60% of the world's 2616 01:43:21,259 --> 01:43:24,339 lithium is in uh in that region . And 2617 01:43:24,350 --> 01:43:26,669 so the uh aggressive nature of which 2618 01:43:26,680 --> 01:43:30,229 the PR C works to uh extract that uh 2619 01:43:30,240 --> 01:43:32,879 lithium as well as gold and copper from 2620 01:43:32,890 --> 01:43:36,859 the region too . And as we spoke before , 2621 01:43:36,870 --> 01:43:38,870 uh resources in the Inter American 2622 01:43:38,879 --> 01:43:41,819 Development Bank could help non Chinese 2623 01:43:41,830 --> 01:43:44,069 companies acquire these mines and begin 2624 01:43:44,080 --> 01:43:46,209 processing . Is that accurate ? This 2625 01:43:46,220 --> 01:43:48,053 would all be part of that , that 2626 01:43:48,060 --> 01:43:50,520 initiative similar to what I mentioned 2627 01:43:50,529 --> 01:43:52,418 before , chairman on the Economic 2628 01:43:52,418 --> 01:43:54,580 Recovery Act of 1948 which was the 2629 01:43:54,589 --> 01:43:57,740 Marshall Plan . And uh and that a pe 2630 01:43:57,870 --> 01:43:59,981 initiative , American partnership for 2631 01:43:59,981 --> 01:44:02,979 economic prosperity through the I DB 2632 01:44:02,990 --> 01:44:05,250 invest program at the Inter American 2633 01:44:05,259 --> 01:44:07,481 Development Bank and also Developmental 2634 01:44:07,481 --> 01:44:10,109 Finance Corporation and the infusion of 2635 01:44:10,120 --> 01:44:12,209 billions of dollars into critical 2636 01:44:12,220 --> 01:44:15,600 infrastructure , uh clean technology or 2637 01:44:15,609 --> 01:44:18,140 clean energy and digital technology . 2638 01:44:18,500 --> 01:44:20,667 Well , thank you very much , ma'am . I 2639 01:44:20,667 --> 01:44:22,778 will recognize Senator Schmidt and if 2640 01:44:22,778 --> 01:44:25,000 Senator King has additional questions , 2641 01:44:25,000 --> 01:44:26,833 I'll recognize him after Senator 2642 01:44:26,833 --> 01:44:29,000 Schmidt . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um 2643 01:44:29,000 --> 01:44:32,970 Thank you um General . Um 2644 01:44:34,080 --> 01:44:36,830 uh I wanted to ask 2645 01:44:38,410 --> 01:44:41,370 uh about um 2646 01:44:42,180 --> 01:44:45,350 the , the increase and by some accounts , 2647 01:44:45,359 --> 01:44:47,779 a tenfold increase in the number of 2648 01:44:47,790 --> 01:44:50,149 Chinese nationals that have come across 2649 01:44:50,160 --> 01:44:52,600 our southern border . Um 2650 01:44:54,640 --> 01:44:57,529 It's a 50 times , I mean , whatever 2651 01:44:57,540 --> 01:44:59,484 account , there's a lot of Chinese 2652 01:44:59,484 --> 01:45:01,484 nationals coming across in the last 2653 01:45:01,484 --> 01:45:03,707 year and , you know , flying in and out 2654 01:45:03,707 --> 01:45:05,873 of China is not like getting out of um 2655 01:45:05,873 --> 01:45:08,151 DC a back home to Saint Louis . It's a , 2656 01:45:08,151 --> 01:45:10,709 it's a much different ordeal and I 2657 01:45:10,720 --> 01:45:13,029 guess I just wanna ask and , and , you 2658 01:45:13,040 --> 01:45:15,700 know , in 60 minutes had a report um 2659 01:45:16,520 --> 01:45:20,370 about um what's ha some content 2660 01:45:20,379 --> 01:45:22,323 that's being pushed through social 2661 01:45:22,323 --> 01:45:24,490 media channels of vulnerabilities with 2662 01:45:24,490 --> 01:45:26,546 the border . I'm certainly concerned 2663 01:45:26,546 --> 01:45:28,435 about espionage operations . What 2664 01:45:28,435 --> 01:45:31,120 information do we have about who these 2665 01:45:31,129 --> 01:45:34,020 people are ? Um what 2666 01:45:34,029 --> 01:45:36,509 activities um are taking place when 2667 01:45:36,520 --> 01:45:38,631 they cross our southern border . It's 2668 01:45:38,631 --> 01:45:41,529 just , it seems like this is um this is 2669 01:45:41,540 --> 01:45:43,540 happening now at a , at a rate that 2670 01:45:43,540 --> 01:45:45,540 just doesn't , it , it doesn't feel 2671 01:45:45,540 --> 01:45:47,596 natural um to the extent that any of 2672 01:45:47,596 --> 01:45:47,490 this is what's happening in our 2673 01:45:47,500 --> 01:45:49,611 southern border makes any sense . But 2674 01:45:49,611 --> 01:45:51,667 certainly the number of , of Chinese 2675 01:45:51,667 --> 01:45:53,667 nationals coming across is of great 2676 01:45:53,667 --> 01:45:55,833 concern to me . And I wonder um if you 2677 01:45:55,833 --> 01:45:57,779 could speak to that senator , the 2678 01:45:57,790 --> 01:45:59,846 number of uh Chinese that are coming 2679 01:45:59,846 --> 01:46:01,957 across the border uh is a big concern 2680 01:46:01,957 --> 01:46:04,020 of mine . In fact , uh in the short 2681 01:46:04,029 --> 01:46:06,029 period of time that I've uh been in 2682 01:46:06,029 --> 01:46:07,807 command , I've gone down to the 2683 01:46:07,807 --> 01:46:09,959 southern border to talk to the agents 2684 01:46:09,970 --> 01:46:11,970 and the leadership about that . And 2685 01:46:11,970 --> 01:46:13,879 then I've also spoken with the uh 2686 01:46:13,890 --> 01:46:16,379 acting commissioner of the CBP on the 2687 01:46:16,390 --> 01:46:19,379 subject . Um What concerns me most 2688 01:46:19,390 --> 01:46:22,509 about uh specifically the Chinese 2689 01:46:22,520 --> 01:46:24,819 migrants is one is that they're so 2690 01:46:24,830 --> 01:46:27,979 centralized in , in one location across 2691 01:46:27,990 --> 01:46:30,319 on the border . And two is uh while 2692 01:46:30,330 --> 01:46:33,430 many may be uh political um uh 2693 01:46:33,439 --> 01:46:36,419 refugees and , and other explanations , 2694 01:46:36,600 --> 01:46:39,490 the ability for uh counterintelligence 2695 01:46:39,500 --> 01:46:41,500 to hide in , in , in plain sight in 2696 01:46:41,500 --> 01:46:43,556 those numbers . Uh So therefore , we 2697 01:46:43,556 --> 01:46:45,222 have a very strong and robust 2698 01:46:45,222 --> 01:46:47,389 relationship with the interagency , uh 2699 01:46:47,389 --> 01:46:49,830 intelligence community and I receive 2700 01:46:49,839 --> 01:46:51,830 frequent uh briefings in the 2701 01:46:51,839 --> 01:46:53,950 headquarters on uh the , the 2702 01:46:53,959 --> 01:46:55,681 disposition of who has been uh 2703 01:46:55,689 --> 01:46:58,109 apprehended and the potential of , of , 2704 01:46:58,120 --> 01:47:00,120 of that threat that you described . 2705 01:47:00,120 --> 01:47:02,287 Have you uh do we have any ? Um And if 2706 01:47:02,287 --> 01:47:04,398 some of this is in a closed setting , 2707 01:47:04,398 --> 01:47:07,470 I'm I'm happy to . But um what uh what 2708 01:47:07,479 --> 01:47:09,590 kind of coordinations is taking place 2709 01:47:09,590 --> 01:47:11,701 here ? Um because you're right , it's 2710 01:47:11,701 --> 01:47:13,812 um , you know , I think there were um 2711 01:47:13,812 --> 01:47:16,379 um 21,000 just in the last four months 2712 01:47:16,390 --> 01:47:19,259 in California alone there , the numbers 2713 01:47:19,270 --> 01:47:21,214 that I've seen recently , so there 2714 01:47:21,214 --> 01:47:23,381 seems to be a concentration , it seems 2715 01:47:23,381 --> 01:47:25,603 to be coordinate again , getting in and 2716 01:47:25,603 --> 01:47:27,714 out of the People's Republic of China 2717 01:47:27,714 --> 01:47:29,881 is a , is a different deal . What have 2718 01:47:29,881 --> 01:47:32,048 you heard about , sort of coordinating 2719 01:47:32,048 --> 01:47:34,270 activities and , and , and are we aware 2720 01:47:34,270 --> 01:47:37,029 of um specific uh efforts on their part 2721 01:47:37,040 --> 01:47:39,779 to um you know , be in parts of the 2722 01:47:39,790 --> 01:47:41,901 interior United States with sensitive 2723 01:47:41,901 --> 01:47:44,379 military locations ? Uh Senator I , I 2724 01:47:44,390 --> 01:47:46,612 had some of the same questions that you 2725 01:47:46,612 --> 01:47:48,723 brought up . Uh What , what I've been 2726 01:47:48,723 --> 01:47:50,946 told by our partners in CBP is that the 2727 01:47:50,946 --> 01:47:52,946 reason that California is the focal 2728 01:47:52,946 --> 01:47:55,790 point is just simply ease of flying uh 2729 01:47:55,799 --> 01:47:59,180 from China into , into Tijuana and then , 2730 01:47:59,189 --> 01:48:02,520 and then across um I am concerned , I 2731 01:48:02,529 --> 01:48:04,879 think you were alluding to is the , and , 2732 01:48:04,890 --> 01:48:07,001 and have talked to our partners about 2733 01:48:07,001 --> 01:48:10,169 this is how the um the , the whole the 2734 01:48:10,180 --> 01:48:13,020 surges seem to be uh coordinate and 2735 01:48:13,029 --> 01:48:15,029 command and controlled using social 2736 01:48:15,029 --> 01:48:17,689 media uh primarily by the cartels to 2737 01:48:17,700 --> 01:48:20,600 drive the , the migrants to areas where , 2738 01:48:20,609 --> 01:48:23,240 where we might not be similar analogy 2739 01:48:23,250 --> 01:48:25,640 uh to , to squeezing the , the balloon 2740 01:48:25,910 --> 01:48:29,029 uh where we squeeze down they with uh 2741 01:48:29,040 --> 01:48:30,762 command and control usually uh 2742 01:48:30,762 --> 01:48:32,818 primarily through social media . I'm 2743 01:48:32,818 --> 01:48:34,930 told uh no , to go to the other uh 2744 01:48:34,939 --> 01:48:38,430 areas . So um our role in North Com is 2745 01:48:38,439 --> 01:48:40,439 we're in support of the customs and 2746 01:48:40,439 --> 01:48:42,606 border protection uh for detection and 2747 01:48:42,606 --> 01:48:45,580 monitoring uh along the site with about 2748 01:48:45,589 --> 01:48:49,220 2500 uh military members 2749 01:48:49,229 --> 01:48:51,396 primarily from the Army and the Marine 2750 01:48:51,396 --> 01:48:53,620 Corps . And uh they work very closely 2751 01:48:53,629 --> 01:48:56,410 to , to pick up where those uh surges 2752 01:48:56,419 --> 01:48:58,586 are as well as where the gaps are with 2753 01:48:58,586 --> 01:49:00,697 the monitoring equipment to alert the 2754 01:49:00,697 --> 01:49:02,419 law enforcement side of border 2755 01:49:02,419 --> 01:49:04,586 protection to make the apprehensions . 2756 01:49:04,586 --> 01:49:06,697 I look forward to working with you on 2757 01:49:06,697 --> 01:49:08,475 that and um and continuing that 2758 01:49:08,475 --> 01:49:10,697 dialogue about what's happening because 2759 01:49:10,697 --> 01:49:12,586 I think it's um uh a dangerous uh 2760 01:49:12,586 --> 01:49:14,752 potentially very dangerous situation . 2761 01:49:14,752 --> 01:49:16,752 And then with my limited time , one 2762 01:49:16,752 --> 01:49:18,641 last question as far as the drone 2763 01:49:18,641 --> 01:49:20,863 activity that we see um at the southern 2764 01:49:20,863 --> 01:49:22,839 border , um presumably um being co 2765 01:49:22,850 --> 01:49:25,049 ordinated by the cartels , maybe other 2766 01:49:25,299 --> 01:49:28,589 actors . Um What information can you 2767 01:49:28,600 --> 01:49:30,822 share about ? What , what is it they're 2768 01:49:30,822 --> 01:49:33,044 doing ? Are they , are they tracking um 2769 01:49:33,044 --> 01:49:35,378 border patrol agents ? What's , what is , 2770 01:49:35,378 --> 01:49:37,156 what is sort of the , the drone 2771 01:49:37,156 --> 01:49:39,156 activity ? What are they , what are 2772 01:49:39,156 --> 01:49:41,100 they seeking to , to discover with 2773 01:49:41,100 --> 01:49:40,930 these drones that are coming across ? 2774 01:49:41,689 --> 01:49:44,049 Senator ? Uh Again , I had that uh 2775 01:49:44,060 --> 01:49:46,410 asked those very same questions to the , 2776 01:49:46,419 --> 01:49:48,641 uh to the commissioner . Uh He said the 2777 01:49:48,641 --> 01:49:52,580 overall majority of the uh uh activity 2778 01:49:52,589 --> 01:49:55,839 that they see the incursions uh are 2779 01:49:56,020 --> 01:49:59,310 spotters trying to find gaps , finding 2780 01:49:59,319 --> 01:50:01,430 out where we are so they can be where 2781 01:50:01,430 --> 01:50:03,899 we , you know , where we aren't uh , 2782 01:50:03,910 --> 01:50:06,243 that's the , over , that's the majority , 2783 01:50:06,243 --> 01:50:08,521 there's a smaller number that are , uh , 2784 01:50:08,521 --> 01:50:10,632 probably moving narcotics ac , across 2785 01:50:10,632 --> 01:50:13,600 the , the border and then , uh , the 2786 01:50:13,609 --> 01:50:15,553 drones themselves . That's right . 2787 01:50:15,553 --> 01:50:17,831 That's right . Uh , Senator , and then , 2788 01:50:17,831 --> 01:50:19,942 uh , the last thing I would say there 2789 01:50:19,942 --> 01:50:19,919 is a lot of activity that's our own 2790 01:50:19,930 --> 01:50:22,279 that's doing the same , uh , thing to , 2791 01:50:22,290 --> 01:50:24,560 to try to find , uh , where that 2792 01:50:24,569 --> 01:50:26,625 activity is and , and make sure that 2793 01:50:26,625 --> 01:50:28,847 we're prepared to stop it . Thank you . 2794 01:50:28,847 --> 01:50:30,958 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 2795 01:50:30,958 --> 01:50:33,180 Senator Schmidt . Uh Senator King , you 2796 01:50:33,180 --> 01:50:33,169 have another question , just one brief 2797 01:50:33,180 --> 01:50:34,847 question to follow up General 2798 01:50:34,847 --> 01:50:36,902 Richardson on our conversation about 2799 01:50:36,902 --> 01:50:39,124 coordinations . I understand there's an 2800 01:50:39,124 --> 01:50:41,180 interdiction committee that's led by 2801 01:50:41,180 --> 01:50:43,490 the , by the Coast Guard . Um Could we 2802 01:50:43,500 --> 01:50:46,569 uh follow up together on upgrading that 2803 01:50:46,580 --> 01:50:48,859 to a task force to include all the 2804 01:50:48,870 --> 01:50:50,926 other agencies and really talk about 2805 01:50:50,926 --> 01:50:53,037 how to better coordinate our response 2806 01:50:53,037 --> 01:50:54,926 at the border . Is that something 2807 01:50:54,926 --> 01:50:57,092 you're willing to work with us on ? Uh 2808 01:50:57,092 --> 01:50:59,314 Absolutely , Senator , the interdiction 2809 01:50:59,314 --> 01:51:01,620 committee is uh uh uh meets regularly 2810 01:51:01,629 --> 01:51:03,518 and uh actually the meeting is uh 2811 01:51:03,518 --> 01:51:05,685 coming up and that includes all of the 2812 01:51:05,685 --> 01:51:08,830 interagency . Well , II , I hope we can , 2813 01:51:08,839 --> 01:51:11,061 I'd like to meet with you to talk about 2814 01:51:11,061 --> 01:51:12,810 the activity and to further 2815 01:51:12,819 --> 01:51:14,910 operationalize the , the activity of 2816 01:51:14,919 --> 01:51:17,252 the committee . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 2817 01:51:17,252 --> 01:51:19,589 Thank you , Senator King . Uh Thank you 2818 01:51:19,600 --> 01:51:21,322 to the witnesses for excellent 2819 01:51:21,322 --> 01:51:24,310 testimony . I will adjourn the open 2820 01:51:24,319 --> 01:51:27,709 session and we will reconvene in SCC 2821 01:51:27,720 --> 01:51:30,629 217 , let us say 2822 01:51:30,649 --> 01:51:34,319 1140 we give people a 2823 01:51:34,330 --> 01:51:37,370 time to rest and recuperate . Uh But 2824 01:51:37,379 --> 01:51:39,601 again , thank you for your service . Uh 2825 01:51:39,601 --> 01:51:41,712 General Richardson is particularly uh 2826 01:51:41,712 --> 01:51:44,589 your remarkable service over a career 2827 01:51:44,600 --> 01:51:48,500 uh has really uh sustained this 2828 01:51:48,509 --> 01:51:52,209 nation and uh set an example that uh 2829 01:51:52,450 --> 01:51:54,689 we admire . Thank you . Thank you , 2830 01:51:54,700 --> 01:51:58,439 ma'am . With that . I will adjourn the 2831 01:51:58,450 --> 01:51:59,140 open session .